Evidence Based Medicine - A Critical Analysis by Vere, Joseph
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence Based Medicine – A Critical Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
Joseph W Vere 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
The University of Sheffield 
Academic Unit of Dental Public Health 
School of Clinical Dentistry 
 
 
 
 
 
Submission Date: June 2018 
 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
 
Evidence based medicine uses hierarchies of evidence to justify knowledge 
claims that are made. These knowledge claims are important because they 
dictate which treatment interventions are provided and funded, medicolegal 
standards and the medical research agenda. It is therefore interesting that 
different hierarchies can be used as this suggests that knowledge claims can 
be justified in different ways. This thesis presents a critical analysis of 
evidence based medicine, using the method of analytical philosophy, to 
improve understanding of the concept. The thesis is divided into two 
sections. In the first section a systematic review and thematic analysis of 
hierarchies of evidence is presented; the arguments used to rank systematic 
reviews, randomised controlled trials and expert opinion within hierarchies 
are analysed, and the properties used to rank different study designs are 
analysed. Five factors, independent of study design, that have influenced the 
development of hierarchies are then presented and it is argued that a lack of 
theoretical support for hierarchies has led to their proliferation. In the second 
section the claims that evidence based medicine is rational, science and a 
new Kuhnian paradigm are analysed. It is argued that evidence based 
medicine can be substantively rational but this means that knowledge claims 
can be both rational and inconsistent dependent upon any value 
commitments that are held. It is then argued that evidence based medicine 
cannot be science because it does not use scientific method and it cannot be 
a new Kuhnian paradigm because it is not science, it was not preceded by a 
revolutionary crisis and it is not incommensurable with previous versions of 
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medicine. The analysis presented strips evidence based medicine of power 
and has important implications for the status of knowledge claims that are 
made.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
Evidence based medicine emerged from the discipline of clinical 
epidemiology, and the work of British epidemiologists such as Archie 
Cochrane, in the early 1990’s (Daly 2005). The term first appeared in the 
medical literature in 1991 (Guyatt 1991). However, it was not until the 
succeeding year that the concept of evidence based medicine was first fully 
articulated by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1992). The 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group was a collection of medical 
professionals and clinical epidemiologists centred on McMaster University in 
Canada (Daly 2005). The Working Group claimed that evidence based 
medicine was a new paradigm that would revolutionise the practice of 
medicine.  
 
Evidence based medicine has become increasingly important since the 
concept was first articulated. Every year vast numbers of evidence-based 
guidelines are produced by institutions such as the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE), in the United Kingdom, and the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), in the United States. These 
evidence-based guidelines dictate which treatment interventions clinicians 
can prescribe for patients, which treatment interventions are funded and the 
10 
 
legal standard of care (Batchelor 2000, Timmermans and Berg 2003, 
Tanenbaum 2014). Evidence based medicine also influences the medical 
research agenda and the pharmaceutical industry (Hyde 2004, Mebius 2014, 
Bingeman 2016). Research that does not conform to the principles of 
evidence based medicine is unlikely to obtain funding, difficult to publish and 
can be detrimental to career progression (Hammersley 2013). New drugs 
that are not supported by the right type of ‘evidence’ are unlikely to obtain 
marketing approval. Evidence based medicine is clearly an important 
concept. 
 
The concept of evidence based medicine was originally developed for use 
within the specialty of internal medicine (Evidence Based Medicine Working 
Group 1992). However, as time has progressed the underlying principles 
have been adopted by all of medicine and other medical professions such as 
nursing, midwifery and dentistry (Swinkels et al 2002, Needleman et al 2005, 
McNeill 2006, Satterfield et al 2009). Although it is possible to make a 
distinction between evidence based medicine, evidence based nursing, 
evidence based midwifery and evidence based dentistry the term ‘evidence 
based medicine’ is usually used as an overarching umbrella term to 
encompass all medical professions. The term ‘evidence based medicine’ is 
used in this overarching sense in this thesis. Recognition of the importance of 
evidence based medicine has also spread beyond the medical world and the 
concept made a list of great ideas published in the New York Times in 2001 
(Hilt 2001). This provides further evidence of the importance of evidence 
based medicine.  
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Evidence based medicine is presented as a tool to improve patient care and 
prevent unnecessary patient harm (Dickersin et al 2007, La Caze 2011)1. 
Many medical interventions are associated with significant adverse effects 
and patients may be harmed if they receive the wrong intervention or do not 
receive the right intervention. Proponents of evidence based medicine argue 
that a number of emotive medical tragedies could have been avoided if the 
principles of evidence based medicine had been followed. Examples of these 
tragedies include the increased incidence of birth defects in pregnant women 
prescribed Thalidomide to alleviate morning sickness and the increased risk 
of breast cancer associated with the use of hormone replacement therapy 
(Evans et al 2010). Evidence based medicine is attractive to the medical 
profession and patients because it purports to improve patient care and 
prevent unnecessary patient harm. 
 
Evidence based medicine is also presented as a tool that can be used to 
identify variation in medical practice (Dickersin et al 2007, La Caze 2011). 
Variations in medical practice are considered undesirable because they imply 
that some patients receive inferior care. Variations in medical practice may 
be indicative of health inequalities, misuse of healthcare resources or patient 
harm (Cochrane 1972, Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973, Rosenberg and 
Donald 1995). In recent years it has been increasingly recognised that the 
                                                          
1
 These are not the only benefits have been attributed to evidence based medicine in the literature. 
Other benefits include improvements in study conduct and reporting, computer literacy, critical 
appraisal skills and improved accessibility to research evidence. However, improved patient care and 
identification of variation in medical practice are seen as the primary benefits of evidence based 
medicine (Rosenberg and Donald 1995, Bluhm 2005, La Caze 2011). 
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medical profession may harm patients. In the UK this recognition has been 
driven by a number of high profile scandals such as the failings at Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust, the murderous activities of Harold Shipman and the 
Bristol Heart Hospital Inquiry. These scandals have led to greater oversight 
of medicine to assure the quality of care and reduce the risk of patient harm 
(Storey et al 2011). Evidence based medicine is important in the governance 
of medicine because it provides standards that medical care can be judged 
against. This facilitates the identification of variation in medical practice. 
Evidence based medicine is attractive to the medical profession, patients, 
regulators and purchasers of healthcare because it may provide a tool that 
can be used to identify such undesirable variations in practice.  
 
Although widely accepted by the medical profession as a way to improve 
patient care and identify variation in medical practice, evidence based 
medicine has not been universally accepted. Critics have claimed that there 
is no empirical evidence to support the use of evidence based medicine. This 
claim has not been disputed (Haynes 2002, Djulbegovic et al 2009) although 
proponents of evidence based medicine frequently claim that it would be 
impossible or unethical to undertake a study demonstrating the superiority of 
evidence based medicine. Every-Palmer and Howick (2014) recently argued 
that there was no empirical evidence to support evidence based medicine 
because it had been poorly implemented following manipulation by the 
pharmaceutical industry.   
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Evidence based medicine has also been criticised because it has weakened 
the professional jurisdiction of the medical profession. Timmermans and 
Kolver (2004) argued that evidence based medicine made medical 
knowledge more transparent so that the knowledge was no longer esoteric 
and exclusive to the medical profession. It has been suggested that this 
deprofessionalisation of medicine has facilitated increased oversight, control 
and regulation of the medical profession by employers, regulators and 
purchasers of healthcare (Kelleher et al 2006)2. It has also been claimed that 
deprofessionalisation has allowed greater control of healthcare costs as 
evidence of ineffectiveness, or the absence of evidence of effectiveness, can 
be used to deny treatments and disinvest in health care services 
(Greenhalgh and Russell 2009, Tanenbaum 2014, Storey et al 2011). If 
evidence based medicine has weakened the professional jurisdiction of the 
medical profession it is likely to be less attractive to the medical profession, 
but more attractive to patients, regulators and purchasers of healthcare. 
 
Interestingly, evidence based medicine has also been presented as a tool 
that reinforces and expands the professional jurisdiction of the medical 
profession. Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) argued that evidence based 
medicine buttressed the medical profession against patients, regulators and 
purchasers of healthcare because it emphasised the scientific character of 
medical practice3. They argued that the development of evidence based 
                                                          
2
 Increased managerial control over medical professionals has been referred to as the 
proletarianisation of medicine (Kelleher et al 2006).  
3
 Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) also suggested that evidence based medicine had divided the 
medical profession with an academic elite controlling rank and file medical professionals. 
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medicine had allowed the medical profession to control medicine and 
maintain professional dominance. Evidence based medicine has also been 
implicated in the medicalisation of normal life processes (Ballard and Elston 
2005, Maturo 2012). Once a life process has been medicalised it becomes 
amenable to medical treatment (Moynihan and Smith 2002). This 
medicalisation has expanded the professional jurisdiction of the medical 
profession and led to further increases in the cost of healthcare. On this 
interpretation evidence based medicine is likely to less attractive to regulators 
and purchasers of healthcare because it reinforces the professional 
dominance of the medical profession. 
 
Evidence based medicine has also been criticised because it requires 
medical professionals to learn new skills, there is an unmanageable volume 
of evidence, studies report aggregate values that cannot be applied to 
individual patients and the results of studies have poor external validity 
(Tonelli 1998, Straus and McAlister 2000, Tanenbaum 2014). These are 
important practical considerations that relate to the interpretation and 
application of evidence. 
 
Evidence based medicine is an important concept that dictates which 
treatment interventions are provided and funded, legal standards of care and 
the medical research agenda. Evidence based medicine has been widely 
accepted by the medical profession, patients and healthcare regulators as a 
tool to improve patient care and identify undesirable variation in medical 
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practice. However, it has also been criticised because it lacks empirical 
support. There is also controversy as to whether evidence based medicine 
strengthens or weakens the professional jurisdiction of the medical 
profession. This has important implications for the control of medical 
knowledge and medical resources.  There is therefore some justification for 
examining the concept and practice of evidence based medicine in greater 
depth. 
 
1.2. Defining Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
In order to investigate evidence based medicine we must first develop a 
working definition. This is surprisingly difficult as evidence based medicine 
has been defined in a number of different ways in the literature (Sackett et al 
1996, Bruce 1999, Straus and McAlister 2000, Straus et al 2007, Straus et al 
2011) and there does not appear to be a single accepted definition 
(Satterfield et al 2009). Opponents of evidence based medicine are often 
criticised for attacking a straw man because they fail to capture the true 
essence of the concept (Tonelli 2009, Turner 2011). It is therefore important 
to consider several definitions of evidence based medicine, both early and 
more contemporary, to draw out the essential features of this concept, before 
it is analysed in greater detail. 
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An early, often quoted, definition of evidence based medicine was provided 
by Sackett et al (1996):   
‘Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of 
individual patients. The practice of evidence based medicine means 
integrating individual clinical experience with the best available 
external clinical evidence from systematic research’. (Sackett et al, 
1996, page 71) 
This definition emphasises the importance of both clinical experience and 
evidence from systematic research although it does not clarify which types of 
research evidence should guide decision-making. This definition appears to 
restrict evidence based medicine to the care of individual patients and 
suggests a paternalistic approach where clinical experience and research 
evidence are the sole determinants of the care received by patients.  
 
Straus and McAlister (2000) provided a later definition. They defined 
evidence based medicine as: 
‘The process of systematically finding, appraising and using 
contemporaneous research findings as the basis for clinical decisions’ 
(Straus and McAlister, 2000)  
This definition also emphasises the importance of research evidence without 
clarifying the type of research evidence that is preferred. This definition does 
not restrict evidence based medicine to medical decision-making and 
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presents a much wider concept that also involves accessing and critically 
appraising the medical literature. This is more consistent with the original 
articulation of the concept of evidence based medicine (Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group 1992) and articulations in modern evidence based 
medicine textbooks (Guyatt et al 2008, Straus et al 2011). This definition 
does not limit evidence based medicine to the care of individual patients and 
allows the concept to be used at a population level in the development of 
clinical guidelines and healthcare policy. 
 
A more contemporary definition of evidence based medicine is provided in 
‘Evidence-Based Medicine How to Practice and Teach it’: 
‘Evidence based medicine requires the integration of the best research 
evidence with our clinical expertise and our patient’s unique values 
and circumstances’ (Straus et al, 2011, page 1) 
This definition again emphasises the importance of research evidence but 
does not clarify which types of research evidence are preferred. It also 
emphasises the importance of clinical expertise and patient values rebutting 
the criticisms of paternalism that can be made against the definition provided 
by Sackett et al (1996).  
 
It is clear from the definitions of evidence based medicine presented above 
that the use of research evidence is central to the concept. However, none of 
the definitions specify which types of research evidence should be used to 
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guide medical decision-making. This creates a problem if we want to critically 
analyse the concept of evidence based medicine. Fortunately this problem 
can be resolved if we consider the literature relating to evidence based 
medicine and the development of evidence-based guidelines. This reveals 
that evidence based medicine uses hierarchies of evidence to determine the 
type of research evidence that should be used to guide medical decision-
making. These hierarchies of evidence generally value the results of 
randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews and do not value expert 
opinion and pathophysiological rationale (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, 
Trout 1981, Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992, Guyatt et al 
2008, Straus et al 2011).  
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine are clear that research evidence 
alone, as dictated in the hierarchy of evidence, is never sufficient to make a 
clinical decision (Sackett et al 1996, Guyatt et al 2008, Satterfield et al 2009, 
Straus et al 2011). Any interpretation of evidence based medicine, where the 
hierarchy of evidence is used as the sole determinant of clinical decision 
making, is a misrepresentation of the concept. Attacks based on this 
assumption might be considered as attacks on a straw man version of 
evidence based medicine (Tonelli 2009). This is clear from the definitions of 
evidence based medicine provided by both Sackett et al (1996) and Straus et 
al (2011). However, this does not mean that the hierarchy of evidence is not 
a fundamental component of evidence based medicine. 
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The importance of hierarchies of evidence can be illustrated by the large 
numbers of evidence-based clinical guidelines that are produced every year 
by institutions such as NICE in the UK and the AHRQ in the USA. These 
guidelines are subsequently used to determine the treatment interventions 
that are funded, and which clinicians can prescribe for patients. They also 
often determine legal standards of care. Consistent with the definitions of 
evidence based medicine presented above, evidence derived using 
hierarchies of evidence is not the sole determinant of the conclusion of the 
guideline development process, but it is a fundamental component of the 
process. The importance of hierarchies of evidence to evidence based 
medicine is further supported by the absence of evidence-based guidelines 
that do not use hierarchies. 
 
Another important feature of evidence based medicine was that it was 
presented as a revolutionary change in the way that medicine was practised 
when the concept was first articulated (Evidence Based Medicine Working 
Group 1992). However, medical decision-making was surely influenced by 
research evidence, clinical experience and patient values prior to the 
development of evidence based medicine. The publication of large numbers 
of patient opinion surveys between 1950 and 1980 (French 1981) suggests 
that patient values clearly influenced medical decision-making prior to the 
advent of evidence based medicine. It could be argued that the only thing 
significantly different about evidence based medicine was the use of 
hierarchies to determine the research evidence that should be used. On this 
interpretation the hierarchies of evidence are not just a fundamental feature 
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of evidence based medicine they are the defining feature4. In essence, the 
hierarchies of evidence put the ‘evidence’ in evidence based medicine.  
 
In this section different definitions of evidence based medicine have been 
considered. These definitions all highlight the importance of research 
evidence but do not clarify the preferred types or research evidence. Deeper 
investigation has revealed that evidence based medicine uses hierarchies of 
evidence to determine the types of research evidence that should inform 
medical decision-making. Hierarchies of evidence are not the sole 
determinant of decision-making within evidence based medicine but they are 
an important component and may be the defining component. The 
hierarchies of evidence should therefore by investigated in greater detail if we 
are to critically analyse evidence based medicine. 
 
1.3. Hierarchies of Evidence 
 
A hierarchy of evidence can be defined as any system within medicine that 
ranks the importance of evidence primarily based upon the study design that 
is used to produce that evidence (Upshur 2009). It is generally acknowledged 
that the first hierarchy was published by the Canadian Task Force in 1979 
(Spitzer et al 1979). However, the idea that different study designs could be 
ranked hierarchically appears to originate in the work of Cochrane (1972). 
                                                          
4
 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 9 when I consider whether evidence based medicine is a new 
Kuhnian paradigm, 
21 
 
Early hierarchies usually rank randomised controlled trials as the highest 
level of evidence, observational studies as an intermediate level of evidence 
and expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence. Later hierarchies usually 
rank systematic reviews and meta-analyses above randomised controlled 
trials, observational studies and expert opinion. 
 
Within evidence based medicine the term ‘hierarchy of evidence’ is usually 
used in a singular sense. This disguises the fact that there are actually many 
different hierarchies. A systematic review published by West et al (2002) 
identified 40 different systems for grading the strength of a body of evidence 
with many of these systems using different hierarchies. Since this time a 
significant number of new hierarchies have been published. The existence of 
many different hierarchies has been acknowledged by a number of different 
authors and this is not a new finding (West et al 2002, Upshur 2003, Atkins et 
al 2004, Rawlins 2008, Tonelli 2009, Gugiu and Gugiu 2010, Worrall 2010, 
Howick 2011, Turner 2011, Blunt 2015).  
 
Most early hierarchies of evidence rank randomised controlled trials as the 
highest level of evidence (West et al 2002) However, there has been a 
significant discussion in the medical literature as to whether this status is 
deserved (Hyde 2004, Cartwright 2007, Thompson 2010, Worrall 2010, La 
Caze 2011). Randomised controlled trials are generally considered to provide 
the highest level of evidence because they control for known and unknown 
confounding factors, facilitate Fisherian significance testing, minimise 
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selection bias, permit blinding and provide an accurate estimate of treatment 
effect (Worrall 2007, Rawlins 2008, Worrall 2010). Many of these arguments 
originate in the work of Cochrane (1972). 
 
Although randomised controlled trials often provide the highest level of 
evidence a number of theoretical and practical problems are recognised with 
this study design. From a theoretical perspective, randomised controlled trial 
have been criticised because they do not explain why a treatment 
intervention is effective (Thompson 2010, Chin-Yee 2014). They can produce 
inconsistent results, even when well conducted, and are considered 
unnecessary when the effects of a treatment intervention are obvious (Hyde 
2004, Worrall 2007, Worrall 2010). From a practical perspective, randomised 
controlled trials have been criticised because they are expensive, 
inappropriate for rare conditions, inappropriate for the assessment of harm, 
fail to differentiate between clinical and statistical significance and have poor 
external validity (Hyde 2004, Rawlins 2008, Worrall 2010)5. These practical 
and theoretical problems have led some authors to question whether 
randomised controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence in 
hierarchies (Hyde 2004, Cartwright 2007). 
 
Later hierarchies of evidence often rank systematic reviews or meta-analyses 
as the highest level of evidence. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses are 
                                                          
5
 It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive list of all the practical and theoretical problems 
associated with randomised controlled trials at this stage. I simply aim to demonstrate that the 
ranking of randomised controlled trials as the highest level of evidence in any hierarchy of evidence 
is potentially problematic.  
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considered to provide the highest level of evidence because they produce 
results that are closer to the truth and allow assessment of the consistency of 
results (Cook et al 1992, Guyatt et al 1995). Systematic reviews and meta-
analyses are usually ranked above randomised controlled trials but it is 
unclear how the arguments that are used to assert the superiority of these 
different study designs can be related. The ranking of systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence has received less attention in 
the medical literature although it is notable that a number of hierarchies do 
not include these study designs.  
 
Most hierarchies of evidence rank expert opinion as the lowest level of 
evidence. Expert opinion is considered to provide the lowest level of 
evidence because it does not involve measurement, does not consider large 
numbers of patients, is susceptible to bias and may be false.  Many of the 
arguments that are used to assert the inferiority of expert opinion can be 
identified in the work of Cochrane (1972). The ranking of expert opinion as 
the lowest level of evidence has also been questioned in the medical 
literature (Thompson 2010, Hofmeijer 2014).   
 
Some critics of evidence based medicine have questioned the utility of the 
hierarchies of evidence themselves (Glasziou et al 2004, Hofmeijer 2014). 
These criticisms move beyond arguments asserting the superiority or 
inferiority of different study designs and argue that hierarchies should be 
abolished. Sehon and Stanley (2003) argued that different forms of evidence 
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were complementary and could not be ranked hierarchically. Hyde (2004) 
and Cartwright (2007) argued that the most appropriate method should be 
determined by the question and the context not the study design. 
 
Although the presence of different hierarchies of evidence has been 
recognised the reasons behind this have not been investigated in any great 
depth. West et al (2002) identified 40 different systems for grading the 
strength of a body of evidence but provided no explanation for this finding. 
Atkins et al (2004) proposed a new hierarchy of evidence but did not seek to 
explain variation amongst existing hierarchies. Gugiu and Gugiu (2010) 
criticised five different hierarchies because they lacked theoretical and 
empirical support, neglected methodological quality and defined terms 
imprecisely. However, although these criticisms could potentially explain 
some of the variation that was seen amongst hierarchies, this was not 
explored. 
 
The existence of multiple hierarchies of evidence is confusing. Evidence 
based medicine claims to improve patient care and allow identification of 
variation in medical practice (Dickersin 2007). Yet the existence of different 
hierarchies suggests that decision-making may be justified in a variety of 
different ways. There is a risk that inconsistent conclusions may be 
considered evidence-based depending upon the hierarchy that is used to 
support decision-making. If this is the case, the hierarchy that is used may 
determine which treatment interventions can be offered to patients, 
25 
 
healthcare funding and the legal standard of care. This would have significant 
implications for the knowledge claims made by evidence based medicine. It 
is therefore important that the hierarchies of evidence are systematically 
investigated to understand why there are so many and to understand the 
impact this has had on evidence based medicine. 
 
The existence of multiple hierarchies of evidence is not just a theoretical 
problem. It has important implications for medical professionals and patients. 
This is illustrated by the recent confusion surrounding the necessity for 
antibiotic prophylaxis prior to dental treatment in cardiac patients where 
different groups reviewed the same evidence base and reached contradictory 
conclusions6. The European Society of Cardiology concluded that antibiotic 
prophylaxis should be given to high risk cardiac patients (Habib et al 2015) 
whereas NICE concluded that antibiotic prophylaxis was unnecessary (NICE 
2015).  
   
In order to systematically investigate the hierarchies of evidence it is 
necessary to identify and critically analyse the arguments that have been 
used to support the different hierarchies. The arguments that have been used 
to rank randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews, meta-analyses and 
expert opinion within hierarchies of evidence are controversial and this may 
explain why there are so many different hierarchies. A critical analysis would 
make a significant contribution to our knowledge of evidence based medicine 
                                                          
6
 The reader is referred to the paper by Thornhill et al (2016) for a review of the necessity for 
antibiotic prophylaxis prior to dental procedures in cardiac patients. 
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as it would build upon previously published research to clarify areas of 
disagreement and improve understanding of this important concept. An 
analysis may also explain the variation that exists amongst different 
hierarchies.      
 
1.4. The Implications of Different Hierarchies of Evidence: 
 
The existence of multiple hierarchies of evidence has important implications 
for evidence based medicine because it suggests that the decision-making 
process may not be rational. One way to consider a decision-making process 
to be rational is if the conclusions that are derived from this process are done 
so in a consistent way (Newton-Smith 1981). However, if different hierarchies 
of evidence process the same information in different ways, inconsistent 
conclusions may be reached. This could mean that patients receive 
inconsistent clinical care, medicolegal standards are inconsistent, healthcare 
resources are allocated inconsistently and research priorities are judged 
inconsistently. It is therefore important to investigate whether the decision-
making method that is used by evidence based medicine is rational. The 
rationality of the decision-making process used by evidence based medicine 
has not previously been explicitly considered in any real depth in the 
literature. 
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The existence of multiple hierarchies of evidence also has significant 
implications for the status of evidence based medicine as science. Evidence 
based medicine was originally going to be called ‘scientific medicine’ (Howick 
2011) and it has been claimed to be science on a number of different 
occasions (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer 1979, Evidence Based Medicine Working 
Group 1992, Guyatt et al 2000, Djulbegovic et al 2009). It has also been 
claimed that the characterisation of evidence based medicine as science has 
allowed the medical profession to protect its professional jurisdiction 
(Mykhalovskiy and Weir 2004).  
 
If evidence based medicine is science, knowledge claims should be derived 
using scientific method. Within the philosophy of science there are four main 
theories about the nature of science: inductivism (Ayer 1946), falsification 
(Popper 1963), Kuhnian paradigms (Kuhn 1996) and scientific research 
programmes (Lakatos 1970). None of these theories advocate a hierarchy of 
evidence or appear to value evidence derived from randomised controlled 
trials, systematic reviews or meta-analyses. Each of these theories does 
value explanatory theory and, although this may underpin the hypotheses 
that are tested in empirical studies, this form of evidence is not generally 
valued by the hierarchies of evidence (Thompson 2010). This suggests that 
there may be unanswered questions concerning the status of evidence 
based medicine as science.  
 
28 
 
The status of evidence based medicine as science and the rationality of the 
decision-making used by evidence based medicine are actually interlinked. 
This is because although different theories about the nature of science are 
recognised, they all derive conclusion using a rational process (the scientific 
method), (Ladyman 2002). Therefore, if evidence based medicine does not 
derive conclusions using a rational process it cannot be science and does not 
deserve the status of science (Sorell 1991). If evidence based medicine does 
derive conclusions using a rational process it does not necessarily follow that 
evidence based medicine is science. Rationality is not a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a discipline to be science and many disciplines are 
both rational and non-scientific. 
 
If evidence based medicine is not science it may be more appropriately 
categorised as pseudoscience. Pseudoscience can be defined as a collection 
of beliefs or practices mistakenly regarded as being based on the scientific 
method (Oxford English Dictionary 2006, Pigliucci 2015). Categorisation of 
any discipline as pseudoscience is considered derogatory and has negative 
implications for the knowledge claims made by that discipline. Categorisation 
of evidence based medicine as pseudoscience would have significant 
implications because it would mean that the treatment interventions that were 
funded and provided to patients, medicolegal standards and the research 
agenda were determined by pseudoscience. 
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There has been a limited discussion in the medical literature about whether 
the method employed by evidence based medicine to derive conclusions can 
be best explained using inductivism or falsificationism (Senn 1991, Shahar 
1997, Djulbegovic et al 2009, Silva and Wyer 2009, Goldenberg 2010, Sestini 
2010, Thompson 2010, Kerry et al 2012)7. However, this discussion is 
predicated on the assumption that evidence based medicine is science. 
Therefore, although it is acknowledged that there are problems explaining the 
method used by evidence based medicine using both inductivism and 
falsificationism, this does not lead to consideration of whether evidence 
based medicine is science or pseudoscience8. There has been no discussion 
in the medical literature about whether the method used by evidence based 
medicine can be related to the theory of scientific research programmes.  
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm has 
been discussed in greater depth in the literature (Couto 1998, Shahar 1998, 
Tonelli 1998, Greaves 2002, Sehon and Stanley 2003, Daly 2005, Lambert 
2006, Djulbegovic et al 2009, Goldenberg 2010, Gaeta and Gentile 2016). 
However, this claim has proved contentious and considerable disagreement 
exists with a number of different arguments being used to both support and 
refute the claim. Some of these arguments relate to the concept of evidence 
                                                          
7
 A systematic review was undertaken to identify articles that related the method used by evidence 
based medicine to the theories of inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and scientific 
research programmes. The search strategies that were used are included as Appendix 1.  
8
 Charlton (2009) did categorise evidence based medicine as both pseudoscience and zombie science 
although no arguments were presented to support either of these claims. Schafranski (2016) also 
claimed that evidence based medicine was pseudoscience although no detailed analysis was 
presented. No other articles have been identified that explicitly categorise evidence based medicine 
as pseudoscience. 
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based medicine whereas others relate to the theory about the nature of 
science proposed by Kuhn (1996). It has been argued that evidence based 
medicine is not a new paradigm because it is not significantly different from 
the way that medicine was previously practised (Couto 1998, Sehon and 
Stanley 2003, Daly 2005, Goldenberg 2010), randomised controlled trials are 
poorly understood by the medical profession (Shahar 1998), the concept of 
evidence based medicine is poorly defined (Shahar 1998, Tonelli 1998, 
Sehon and Stanley 2003) and there are problems with the theory of Kuhnian 
paradigms (Greaves 2002, Sehon and Stanley 2003, Gaeta and Gentile 
2016). Nobody has previously argued that evidence based medicine cannot 
be a new Kuhnian paradigm because evidence based medicine is not 
science9. Conversely, it has been claimed that evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm because it is significantly different from the way that medicine 
was previously practised (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992, 
Lambert 2006, Djulbegovic et al 2009).  
 
There appear to be three main sources of confusion when the claim that 
evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm has previously been 
considered. Firstly, there appears to be a poor understanding of the theory of 
Kuhnian paradigms. For example, it has been falsely claimed that evidence 
based medicine is not a new paradigm because the notion of 
incommensurability is incoherent (Sehon and Stanley 2003) and paradigms 
are not influenced by moral and cultural factors (Greaves 2002). Secondly, 
                                                          
9
 Gaeta and Gentile (2016) argued that evidence based medicine could not be a Kuhnian paradigm 
because it described a methodology not an underlying theory. However, they did not explicitly claim 
that evidence based medicine was not science. 
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some authors have struggled to define the concept of evidence based 
medicine. This is important because if evidence based medicine cannot be 
clearly defined it may be difficult to determine whether it is a new paradigm. 
Finally, there is disagreement as to whether evidence based medicine is 
incommensurable with a previous paradigm of medicine. 
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm is also 
significant because it gives the concept power. This claim is used because it 
enhances the status of evidence based medicine, suggesting that it is 
somehow superior to the way that medicine was previously practised. Yet, if 
evidence based medicine is not a new Kuhnian paradigm this undermines its 
claim to a special status within medicine. It is therefore important to critically 
analyse such claims in order to improve our understanding of its status and 
resolve disputes about the underlying claims.  
 
Howick (2011) and Blunt (2015) have previously analysed the hierarchies of 
evidence in depth. They both identified a number of problems with the 
epistemology of evidence based medicine and recognised that the existence 
of different hierarchies was confusing. Howick (2011) resolved these 
problems by favouring a particular hierarchical interpretation whereas Blunt 
(2015) advocated abolition of the hierarchies of evidence unless empirical 
support was provided. Neither Howick (2011) or Blunt (2015) sought to 
explain why there were so many different hierarchies or considered whether 
the decision-making process used within evidence based medicine was 
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rational or scientific. This thesis builds upon previously published work but 
considers the implications of different hierarchies of evidence from an 
alternative perspective.  
 
The existence of different hierarchies of evidence has significant implications 
for evidence based medicine because they potentially allow knowledge 
claims to be justified in different ways. This leads us to question whether the 
decision-making process that is used by evidence based medicine is rational 
and whether the concept is science. These are important considerations 
because evidence based medicine dictates the treatment interventions that 
patients receive, healthcare funding, medico-legal standards and the 
research agenda. If the decision-making process that is used by evidence 
based medicine is not rational or scientific, we may question whether 
evidence based medicine should exert such a significant influence on 
modern medicine. The rationality of the decision making process used by 
evidence based medicine has not previously been explicitly considered in 
any great depth and the status of evidence based medicine as science is 
unclear. These claims require critical analysis to improve our understanding 
of the concept of evidence based medicine. 
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1.5 Aim and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis presents a critical analysis of evidence based medicine, using the 
method of analytical philosophy, to improve understanding of this important 
concept. The thesis is divided into two parts. The hierarchies of evidence are 
fundamental to the justification of the knowledge claims that are made by 
evidence based medicine and these will be analysed in detail in the first part. 
A systematic review is initially presented identifying the different hierarchies 
that can be used to support decision-making within evidence based 
medicine. These hierarchies are then compared and contrasted to identify 
underlying themes. These underlying themes allow the construction of a 
typology of hierarchies of evidence in Chapter 3. The arguments that are 
used to support the different hierarchies are critically analysed in Chapter 4. 
This analysis expands upon previously published work to increase clarity 
concerning the underlying arguments. Chapter 5 analyses the properties that 
are used to order different study designs within hierarchies and Chapter 6 
considers factors, unrelated to study design, that have influenced the 
development of hierarchies. This completes the first part of the thesis. 
 
The second part of this thesis considers the implications that different 
hierarchies of evidence have for evidence based medicine. In Chapter 7 the 
rationality of the decision-making process used by evidence based medicine 
is analysed. In Chapter 8 the claim that evidence based medicine is science 
is analysed and in Chapter 9 the claim that evidence based medicine is a 
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new paradigm, from the perspective of Thomas Kuhn, is analysed. These 
chapters draw on previously published work where this is available. The final 
chapter, Chapter 10, considers the implications of these analyses for the 
future of evidence based medicine and makes recommendations for future 
research. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to critically analyse the arguments that are used to 
support the claim that evidence based medicine is rational and scientific. 
These arguments and claims have not previously been explicitly considered 
in great detail, and those that have been considered remain disputed. It 
should be pointed out that this thesis should not be interpreted as an attempt 
to undermine evidence based medicine. Rather this thesis draws on the 
techniques of analytical philosophy to explore argument and 
counterargument whilst evaluating the epistemological problems associated 
with evidence based medicine. This may ultimately lead to a re-evaluation 
and strengthening of the concept.   
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Chapter 2: Methodological Deliberations 
 
2.1. Introduction: 
 
Evidence based medicine is an important concept that dictates which 
treatment interventions are provided and funded, medicolegal standards and 
the medical research agenda. There is also controversy as to whether 
evidence based medicine strengthens or weakens the professional 
jurisdiction of the medical profession. Hierarchies of evidence are an 
important component of the decision making process used within evidence 
based medicine but the existence of different hierarchies means that 
knowledge claims may be justified in different ways. This has potentially 
important implications for the status of evidence based medicine as science, 
the rationality of the decision making process and the control of medical 
knowledge and resources.  
 
In this chapter we will consider different methods that could have been used 
to investigate evidence based medicine: conceptual history, discourse 
analysis, qualitative methods and analytical philosophy. It should already be 
clear to the reader that analytical philosophy is used to analyse the 
hierarchies but the thesis could have taken a different direction. In the first 
part of this chapter, possible methods are outlined and challenges associated 
36 
 
with applying them to evidence based medicine are considered. In the 
second part, analytical philosophy is described in greater detail.   
 
2.2. Possible Methods: 
 
2.2.1 Conceptual History: 
 
Conceptual history is a sociohistorical method that can be used to investigate 
how concepts change their meaning over time. It is argued that language has 
diachronic and synchronic aspects so, although the meaning of concepts 
changes with time, each concept has a definite meaning at any particular 
point in time. Conceptual history identifies these meanings and reveals how 
they are transformed over time. The method of conceptual history involves 
careful historical study so that concepts are interpreted within the correct 
context avoiding anachronism. Concepts cannot be reduced to language 
because language must always be interpreted. It is also important to 
investigate both related and opposite concepts and understand that concepts 
may exist prior to their articulation in language (Koselleck 1989, Hampsher-
Monk et al 1998). 
 
A conceptual history of evidence based medicine would chart the different 
meanings of the concept over time. Evidence based medicine first appeared 
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in the medical literature in 1991 (Guyatt 1991) but different meanings of the 
concept could be traced back, through clinical epidemiology, to 
epidemiologists such as Archie Cochrane and beyond. Moving forwards, 
different meanings could be identified as evidence based medicine was taken 
up by disciplines within medicine, dentistry, nursing and midwifery. Different 
meanings could also be identified as new hierarchies of evidence were used 
within evidence based medicine. 
 
A conceptual history of evidence based medicine has not previously been 
undertaken and would be interesting. It is possible that changing meanings of 
the concept could be related to the attempts of different groups within 
medicine to establish power and professional dominance over time. 
However, a conceptual history would require a vast amount of reading to 
both contextualise evidence based medicine and identify related and 
opposing concepts at different points in time. This problem could be resolved 
by focusing on a particular time period but the thesis may be considered 
incomplete if it did not consider the entire history of the concept. It was 
therefore decided not to undertake a conceptual history of evidence based 
medicine.   
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2.2.2. Discourse Analysis: 
 
Discourse can be understood as a continuous stretch of language. Discourse 
analysis refers to a range of methods that can be used to analyse language 
to understand the meaning that is conveyed. In order to undertake discourse 
analysis it is important to appreciate the sociohistorical context and 
reconstruct the beliefs and motives of writers to identify the full range of 
meanings that are conveyed. The researcher must differentiate between 
illocutionary acts, which are a resource of language, and perlocutionary acts 
which are designed to produce an effect. Discourse analysis can be 
challenging as meanings may not be explicitly stated and intended meanings 
can be contemporaneously misinterpreted (Skinner 2002). 
 
A discourse analysis of evidence based medicine would be interesting as a 
number of terms with perlocutionary force, such as ‘systematic review’ and 
new ‘paradigm’, have been used to reinforce the power of the concept. Even 
the name of the concept, evidence based medicine, paints a powerful picture 
of any opposing concepts of medicine. A discourse analysis of evidence 
based medicine could focus on the way that the concept has been used by 
different groups to establish power and professional dominance within 
medicine. Power relationships could be interpreted using the theory of 
countervailing powers. This theory hypothesises that the power of any 
dominant professional group will be countered by other groups over time 
(Light 1991).      
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A discourse analysis could reveal how various groups, including the medical 
profession, patients, purchasers and regulators of healthcare, had struggled 
to control power and resources within medicine. An analysis could also clarify 
whether evidence based medicine has strengthened or weakened the 
professional dominance of the medical profession. The biggest challenge to 
undertaking a discourse analysis would be the identification and analysis of 
large bodies of discourse to determine the perspectives of all relevant groups 
at different times. I anticipated that it would be difficult to determine whether 
evidence based medicine had strengthened or weakened the professional 
position of the medical profession because of the existence of different 
groups within medicine and likely fluctuating power relationships. It was 
therefore decided not to undertake a discourse analysis of evidence based 
medicine. 
 
2.2.3. Qualitative Methods in General: 
 
Interviews, which may be structured or unstructured, can be used to improve 
understanding of concepts and explore the construction and negotiation of 
meanings. Structured interviews follow a rigid structure with predetermined 
questions whereas unstructured interviews follow a more flexible structure. 
Structured interviews are considered to have good reliability but the method 
does not allow exploration of unanticipated perspectives. Unstructured 
interviews can allow a plurality of perspectives to emerge but the method is 
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considered less reliable and replication of results is difficult. Unstructured 
interviews also provide the researcher with an opportunity to test out 
preliminary understanding (Kelleher et al 2006, Alshenqeeti 2014). 
 
Unstructured interviews could be used to improve our understanding of 
evidence based medicine by exploring the meaning of the concept from the 
perspective of different groups. The importance of hierarchies of evidence 
and perceptions about the way evidence based medicine has been used to 
control power and resources within medicine could be investigated. The 
results that would be obtained using this method are difficult to anticipate 
because they would depend upon the groups that were sampled and the 
stories that emerged.  
 
Unstructured interviews could provide an interesting insight into evidence 
based medicine although the researcher must recognise that they can 
influence interviewee responses. Furthermore, the method can be time 
consuming (Alshenqeeti 2014). In order to comprehensively investigate 
evidence based medicine the views of patients, medical professionals, 
purchasers and regulators of healthcare would need to be sampled but some 
of these groups, particularly purchasers and regulators of healthcare, would 
be difficult to access. It would be more feasible to interview individuals 
representative of different professional groups within medicine to explore 
their perceptions of how evidence based medicine had influenced power 
relationships. However, as several studies have suggested poor 
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understanding of evidence based medicine amongst rank-and-file medical 
professionals (Iqbal and Glenny 2002, Young et al 2002) it is unclear whether 
any results would be meaningful. This would need to be tested in a pilot 
study. Unstructured interviews then, whilst interesting, were determined to 
perhaps not be the best method to get at the heart of evidence based 
medicine. 
 
2.2.4. Analytical Philosophy: 
 
Analytical philosophy is a range of methods that can be used to identify and 
analyse concepts and arguments in order to understand philosophical 
problems (Smith 2003). This method is used to identify arguments and 
present them in a structured way to reveal the argument form, premises and 
conclusion. An argument is considered sound if the argument form is valid 
and the premises are true. Any argument that is sound has a conclusion that 
is necessarily true. This method allows detailed analysis of concepts, 
arguments and philosophical problems (Smith 2003, Walton 2008).   
 
Evidence based medicine uses hierarchies of evidence to justify knowledge 
claims but the existence of different hierarchies allows knowledge claims to 
be justified in different ways. Analytical philosophy could be used to critically 
analyse the arguments that are used to support the different hierarchies. This 
may explain why there are different hierarchies of evidence and improve 
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understanding of evidence based medicine. This method differs from the 
other methods that have been outlined because it focuses on evidence 
based medicine itself rather than the way that evidence based medicine has 
been used to control power and resources within medicine. It is therefore a 
more direct evaluation of evidence based medicine. 
 
Analytical philosophy could be used to provide an important insight into 
evidence based medicine. This method appealed to me because, as a 
practising clinician, I was interested in the way that the hierarchies influenced 
my clinical practice. A critical analysis could be restricted to a discrete written 
discourse so it solved some of the practical problems associated with 
undertaking a conceptual history or discourse analysis of evidence based 
medicine. It is primarily for these reasons that analytical philosophy was 
chosen as the method for this thesis. 
 
2.3. The Method - Analytical Philosophy: 
 
 The method of analytical philosophy dates back to the time of Aristotle and 
can broadly be categorised into formal and informal approaches10. Formal 
approaches to analytical philosophy reformulate arguments and concepts in 
                                                          
10
 Modern analytical philosophy originated in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell in the 
early twentieth century although it has evolved through a number of different phases with time. 
Formal approaches to analytical philosophy originated with Russell and informal approaches to 
analytical philosophy originated with Moore (Preston 2006). Formal approaches to analytical 
philosophy utilise truth tables, truth trees and indirect proofs but these are not relevant to informal 
approaches (Smith 2003).   
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ordinary language into an object language to remove ambiguities and clarify 
argument structure. Informal approaches to analytical philosophy analyse 
arguments and concepts within ordinary language (Smith 2003, Preston 
2006). The approach used within this thesis is expressly informal in 
approach. 
 
An argument consists of one or more premises and a conclusion where the 
premises are offered in support of the conclusion. Premises and conclusions 
are relative terms and the conclusion of one argument may be offered as a 
premise in a later argument. Theses that use the method of analytical 
philosophy should be envisaged as branching structures where the 
conclusions of arguments developed in the earlier chapters are used as 
premises in later chapters.  
 
In order to undertake this critical analysis of evidence based medicine the 
arguments that are used to support the different hierarchies of evidence must 
first be identified. These arguments represent the commitment store11 of the 
hierarchies of evidence. The different hierarchies of evidence can be 
identified by undertaking a systematic review. Recognition of the arguments 
is more complicated and involves iterative reading of the source material to 
identify premises and conclusions12. Arguments that are identified are 
                                                          
11
 The commitment store refers to all the arguments taken in their totality. 
12
 Arguments are rarely clearly presented and it is often necessary to use indicator words such as 
‘therefore’, ‘because’ and ‘hence’ to identify the premises and conclusions of different arguments 
(Walton 2008).  
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interpreted using the principle of charity. If arguments are not presented in 
the most favourable light the analyser may be guilty of attacking a straw man 
(Walton 2008). 
 
Sometimes arguments that are identified may appear invalid because all of 
the premises are not explicitly stated. It is therefore important to interpret the 
arguments with charity rather than simply dismissing arguments because 
they are not clearly stated. Too hasty dismissal of an argument can result in 
the construction of a ‘straw man’ version of evidence based medicine. The 
result would undermine the credibility of this thesis. It is therefore important to 
give particular attention to supressed premises. These can be identified 
through wider reading of the literature pertaining to evidence based 
medicine13. Any suppressed premises that are added must be clearly 
identified and added in a way that is not misleading or detrimental to the 
argument (Walton 2008). Premises are often suppressed because they are 
widely accepted and their absence does not necessarily indicate that an 
argument is unsound. Nevertheless, suppressed premises should always be 
considered because, even when they are widely accepted, they may be 
false.   
 
                                                          
13
 The history of evidence based medicine, and its origins in the discipline of clinical epidemiology, is 
described in detail by Daly (2005). Further contextual information about the development of 
evidence based medicine is provided by books such as the ‘Users' Guide to the Medical Literature: A 
Manual for Evidence-Based Clinical Practice’ (Guyatt et al 2008) ‘Evidence-Based Medicine How to 
Practice and Teach it’ (Straus et al 2011) and ‘The Philosophy of Evidence Based Medicine’ (Howick 
2011). 
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Once the arguments that are used to support the different hierarchies have 
been identified they are analysed to assess the validity of the argument form 
and the truth of the premises. An argument form is valid if there is no 
possible situation in which the premises can be true and the conclusion false. 
Examples of valid argument forms include modus ponens and modus 
tollens14. If an argument form is valid, and the premises are true, the 
argument is considered sound because the conclusion is necessarily true. 
The counterexample technique, where true premises lead to a false 
conclusion, can be employed to demonstrate invalid argument forms (Smith 
2003). Within this thesis arguments are presented in a structured way to 
facilitate critical analysis.  
 
An argument may be sound, but not persuasive to the reader, if the premises 
are unacceptable to them, they cannot comprehend the validity of the 
argument or the argument consists of a single premise restated as the 
conclusion15. Premises may be unacceptable if they do not reflect the value 
commitments of the reader. Value commitments cannot be shown to be true 
or false but this does not mean that they cannot be highlighted and explored. 
When arguments are analysed it is therefore sometimes necessary to 
comment on their persuasiveness (Shand 2000). 
 
This thesis uses informal analytical philosophy to analyse the arguments that 
are used to support the different hierarchies of evidence. The arguments are 
                                                          
14
 Modus ponens: If A then C, A, hence C; modus tollens: If A then C, not C hence not A (Smith 2003). 
15
 A single premise restated as a conclusion is an assertion not an argument (Smith 2003). 
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presented in a structured way to provide clarity and improve understanding. 
The structured approach that is used highlights the premises, conclusion and 
argument form and this is then used to facilitate critical analysis of the 
arguments.  
 
2.4. Limitations of Analytical Philosophy: 
 
In order to undertake this critical analysis of evidence based medicine the 
commitment store of the hierarchies of evidence must first be identified. This 
involves iterative reading of the source material to identify the arguments that 
are used to justify the different hierarchies. It is accepted that this is a 
subjective approach that involves interpretation of the literature. The 
arguments that are presented in this thesis have been developed with 
reference to multiple sources and this should reassure the reader of the 
robustness of the method that is used.  
 
Some of the texts that have been used to develop the arguments and 
concepts presented in this thesis are over fifty years old. It is important to 
appreciate that our understanding of any historical text is limited by our 
preunderstanding16. We should not assume that the meaning that a 
contemporary reader would attribute to a text is the same meaning that the 
                                                          
16
 Preunderstanding reflects our values, expectations, resources and conception of the world 
(Hampsher-Monk et al 1998). 
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writer was attempting to convey at the time the text was written. This would 
imply a shared understanding (Hampsher-Monk et al 1998). Wider reading of 
the evidence based medicine literature has therefore been undertaken to 
place the arguments and concepts that are presented in the correct context. 
All of the arguments and concepts that are presented are supported by 
references and where different interpretations are plausible this has been 
explored. It is acknowledged that historical texts cannot be interpreted in 
isolation of later texts and it can be problematic to identify the meaning 
intended by the writer at the time of publication. This is a limitation of any 
research method that interprets historical texts and is not unique to analytical 
philosophy (Habermas 1988). 
 
Analytical philosophy involves analysis of both the argument form and the 
truth of the premises. The concept of truth is therefore fundamental to the 
method of analytical philosophy. However, although truth is a concept that we 
routinely use, the concept is surprisingly difficult to define and a number of 
different theories of truth have been proposed. These include the 
correspondence theory, semantic theory, coherence theory and pragmatic 
theory of truth (Simmons 2005).  
 
The correspondence theory of truth states that p is true if and only if p 
corresponds to a fact. This theory of truth presumes an external shared 
reality and this is not universally accepted. The semantic theory of truth 
describes a theory of truth which can be applied to an object language in 
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formal analytical philosophy but this theory cannot be extrapolated to informal 
analytical philosophy. This is because an ordinary language needs to refer to 
external ‘facts’ whereas an object language does not. The coherence theory 
of truth relates truth to our background knowledge. This theory allows truth to 
be relativistic so what is true for one individual may legitimately be false for 
another. This theory of truth creates problems for the method of analytical 
philosophy as the same argument could be both sound and unsound 
depending upon perspective. Pragmatic theories of truth claim that 
usefulness is the essential mark of truth. However, useful beliefs may be 
false and useless beliefs may be true. Similar to the coherence theory of 
truth, the pragmatic theory of truth can also be interpreted from a relativistic 
perspective (Simmons 2005). 
 
Within this thesis the correspondence theory of truth is used. This theory of 
truth is compatible with the method of informal analytical philosophy as it 
cannot be interpreted from a relativistic perspective. This theory of truth 
reflects the way that the concept of truth is routinely used and it should be 
familiar to many proponents of evidence based medicine (Goldenberg 2006). 
It is acknowledged that the correspondence theory of truth is associated with 
some problems but these problems are considered to be beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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2.5. Summary: 
 
Within this thesis the method of informal analytical philosophy is used to 
identify and analyse the concepts and arguments that underpin the different 
hierarchies of evidence and the claims that evidence based medicine is 
rational, science and a new paradigm. The arguments are presented in a 
structured way to highlight the argument form, premises and conclusion and 
facilitate critical analysis. It is accepted that the method that is presented 
uses a correspondence theory of truth and that the arguments have been 
developed following interpretation of the source material. In order to progress 
with this critical analysis the different hierarchies of evidence must first be 
identified. This is the focus of Chapter 3 where a typology of hierarchies of 
evidence is presented. 
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Chapter 3: Typology of Hierarchies of Evidence 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
 
Hierarchies of evidence are fundamental to the justification of the knowledge 
claims that are made by evidence based medicine. These knowledge claims 
are subsequently used to determine the treatment interventions that patient 
receive, funding for medical care, medicolegal standards and the medical 
research agenda. It is interesting that there are different hierarchies (West et 
al 2002, Gugiu and Gugiu 2010, Turner 2011) as this suggests that 
knowledge claims can be justified in different ways. It is therefore important 
to investigate why there are different hierarchies as this may have significant 
implications for the knowledge claims that are made by evidence based 
medicine. One way to investigate the hierarchies of evidence would be to first 
identify, and then analyse, the arguments that are used to support them.  
  
This chapter presents a systematic review and thematic analysis of the 
different hierarchies used by evidence based medicine. These are first 
identified through a systematic review of the medical literature. A hierarchy of 
evidence is identified as any system within medicine that ranks the 
importance of evidence primarily based upon the study design that is used to 
produce that evidence (Upshur 2009). Once identified, the different 
hierarchies are compared and contrasted to identify emerging themes. 
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Attributes that are considered include the different study designs that provide 
the highest and lowest levels of evidence, the number of levels and the 
properties that are used to rank different study designs. Selected hierarchies 
are then presented in detail to illustrate how the hierarchies are used and 
have evolved with time. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the 
limitations of systematic reviews and thematic analyses. This chapter 
provides an initial insight into the complexity that exists amongst the 
hierarchies of evidence and provides a foundation for the critical analysis 
presented in later chapters.  
 
3.2 Systematic Review: 
 
Hierarchies of evidence were identified following a detailed search of 
MEDLINE via the OVID interface, CINAHL via the EBSCO interface and the 
Cochrane Methodology Register (Appendix 2). A search strategy was 
constructed with the assistance of a medical librarian and revised 
appropriately for each database. The literature searches were initially 
undertaken between November 2011 and January 2012. A further search of 
the MEDLINE database via the OVID interface was undertaken in April 2016 
to identify any further hierarchies published in the intervening period. Once 
the hierarchies of evidence had been identified the literature was further 
searched for any studies relating to the development, implementation and 
modification of each hierarchy. 
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The abstracts of all studies identified by the search strategy were screened 
by a single reviewer using pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria. The 
full text of any study that potentially proposed a new hierarchy, or reviewed 
existing hierarchies, was obtained and examined. Additional hierarchies were 
identified from the reference lists of studies meeting the inclusion criteria, the 
reviews undertaken by West et al (2002) and Blunt (2015) and evidence 
based medicine textbooks (Daly 2005, Guyatt et al 2008, Howick 2011, 
Straus et al 2011). 
 
3.3 Inclusion Criteria: 
  
1. Studies presenting hierarchies of evidence that have been used within 
medicine to determine the effectiveness of treatment interventions. 
2. Studies presenting hierarchies of evidence that have been used within 
medicine to determine the answers to questions that are not about the 
effectiveness of treatment interventions. 
3. Studies that review or evaluate the use of hierarchies of evidence 
within medicine. 
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3.4 Exclusion Criteria: 
 
1. Studies presenting hierarchies of evidence that were not available in 
the English language. 
2. Studies presenting hierarchies of evidence where the full text was 
unavailable. 
3. Studies presenting hierarchies of evidence that were not significantly 
different from previously published hierarchies of evidence. 
 
A hierarchy of evidence was considered significantly different from other 
hierarchies if it could potentially interpret the same body of evidence in a 
different way. Any hierarchy that had a different number of levels, included 
different study designs, or ranked previously included study designs in a 
different way was designated as a new hierarchy of evidence. The reference 
lists of any potential new hierarchies were closely examined as they often 
revealed closely related hierarchies. As an example, the hierarchy described 
by the American College of Chest Physicians (Sackett 1989) was considered 
a new hierarchy, despite its similarity to the hierarchy used by the Canadian 
Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979), because it differentiated between 
randomised controlled trials depending upon the statistical significance of the 
results. These two hierarchies would therefore interpret randomised 
controlled trials with non-statistically significant results in different ways. The 
Canadian Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979) would rank this study design as the 
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highest level of evidence whereas the American College of Chest Physicians 
(Sackett 1989) would not.  
 
3.5. Thematic Analysis 
 
Once the different hierarchies of evidence had been identified the following 
information was collected: author, year of publication, whether there were 
different hierarchies for different questions, study designs providing the 
highest and lowest levels of evidence, number of levels, factors independent 
of study design that affected hierarchical position, the property that was used 
to rank different study designs and the existence of a separate grading 
process. 
 
The hierarchies were then iteratively analysed to identify all of the different 
arguments that were presented to support them. The frequency with which 
different arguments were used was also recorded. These arguments were 
then grouped together within different themes to facilitate analysis. These 
themes emerged from the data but they were driven by my research aim 
which was to improve understanding of evidence based medicine. The 
themes that emerged therefore allowed me to understand, from the 
perspective of evidence based medicine, why hierarchies were required, why 
randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews were prioritised at the 
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expense of expert opinion and why there were so many different hierarchies 
of evidence. 
   
3.6 Results: 
 
The search strategy detailed above identified 45 different hierarchies of 
evidence. 42 of these hierarchies were found to rank the importance of 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of treatment interventions 
(Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, Trout 1981, Sackett 1989, Cook et al 
1992, Carruthers et al 1993, Gross et al 1994, Braunewald et al 1994, Guyatt 
et al 1995, Hadorn et al 1996, Goldbloom 1997, Granados et al 1997, Guyatt 
et al 1998, Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998, Meltzer et al 1998, Stetler et al 
1998, Wilkinson 1999, Chestnut et al 1999, Guyatt et al 2000, American 
Heart Association 2000, Briss et al 2000, Greer et al 2000, Harbour and 
Miller 2001, Ball and Phillips 2001, Guyatt et al 2001, Bandelow et al 2002, 
Evans 2003, Ebell et al 2004, Mitchell and Friese 2007, Newhouse et al 
2007, Armola et al 2009, Brozek et al 2009, Grunze et al 2009, Merlin et al 
2009, Hooper et al 2009, Gugiu and Gugiu 2010, Sayre et al 2010, Joanna 
Briggs Institute 2011, Howick et al 2011, Tomlin and Borgetto 2011 and 
Gugiu 2015). A further three hierarchies were identified which did not 
consider treatment interventions. These hierarchies were found to rank the 
importance of evidence for questions of aetiology (Ariens et al 2000) and 
diagnosis (Zhang et al 2006, Schunemann et al 2008). All of the hierarchies 
that were identified are listed chronologically in Table 1 overleaf. The 42 
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hierarchies that have been used to determine the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions are detailed in Appendix 3 in chronological order.  
 
Year Hierarchy of Evidence 
1972 Cochrane 
1973   
1974   
1974   
1976   
1977   
1978   
1979 Canadian Task Force 
1980   
1981 How to Read Clinical Journals' 
1982   
1983   
1984   
1985   
1986 American College of Chest Physicians 
1987   
1988   
1989 Canadian Task Force modification 1 
1990   
1991   
1992 American College of Chest Physicians modification 1 
1993 
American Association of Critical Care Nurses, Canadian 
Hypertension Society 
1994 Infectious Diseases Society of America, Brunewald et al 
1995 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group, Australian National Health 
and Medical Research Council  
1996 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality  
1997 EUR-ASSESS 
1998 
American College of Chest Physicians modification 2, Djulbegovic & 
Hadley, Canadian Diabetes Association, Stetler et al, Scottish 
Intercollegiate Guidelines Network  
1999 
Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine, American Academy of 
Ophthalmology, Chestnut et al 
 
Table 1a: Hierarchies of Evidence listed chronologically according to date of 
first use. 
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Year Hierarchy of Evidence 
2000 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group modification 1, 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Guidelines, Institute for Clinical 
Systems Improvement, United States Task Force on Community 
Preventive Services, Ariens et al. 
2001 
American College of Chest Physicians modification 3, Stetler 
modification 1 
2002 World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry 
2003 Evans 
2004 
Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy, Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment Development and Evaluation 
2005 Joanna Briggs Institute for Nursing 
2006 European League against Rheumatism  
2007 
Oncology Nursing Society Putting Evidence into Practice Weight of 
Evidence Classification Schema, John Hopkins Evidence Rating 
Scale 
2008 
American Association of Critical Care Nurses modification 1, Grading 
of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(Diagnosis) 
2009 
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council 
modification 1, World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry 
modification 1 
2010 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Guidelines modification 1 
2011 
Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine modification 1, Research 
Pyramid 
2012   
2013   
2014   
2015 Hierarchy of Evidence and Appraisal of Limitations 
 
Table 1(continued): Hierarchies of Evidence listed chronologically according 
to date of first use. 
 
Seven of the systems that were identified contained a number of different 
hierarchies (Ball and Phillips 2001, Evans 2002, Merlin et al 2009, Sayre et al 
2010, Joanna Briggs Institute 2011, Howick et al 2011, Tomlin and Borgetto 
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2011)17. In these systems, the question that is asked dictates the hierarchy 
that should be used to determine the most appropriate evidence. For 
example, Evans (2002) presented different hierarchies for questions of 
effectiveness, appropriateness and feasibility; Sayre et al (2010) presented 
different hierarchies for prognosis, diagnosis and treatment interventions and 
the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine (Howick et al 2011) 
presented different hierarchies for diagnosis, prognosis, treatment 
interventions, common harms, rare harms, screening and frequency of the 
problem. The different questions that were collectively considered by the 
hierarchies of evidence are shown in Table 2 overleaf. There appears to be 
little consistency amongst these hierarchies as they consider a variety of 
different questions. 
 
When the 42 different hierarchies of evidence were considered collectively, a 
number of different study designs are found to provide the highest level of 
evidence. These are shown in Table 3 overleaf. Some hierarchies allow more 
than one study design to provide the highest level. Randomised controlled 
trials were found to provide the highest level in 24 hierarchies of evidence 
although in 15 of these hierarchies only randomised controlled trials meeting 
certain criteria provided the highest level. For example, in the hierarchy 
proposed by Evans (2003) only multi-centre randomised controlled trials 
provide the highest level of evidence; in the hierarchy used by the American 
                                                          
17
 The Canadian Hypertension Society (Carruthers et al 1993) and the Canadian Diabetes Association 
(Meltzer et al 1998) purported to present hierarchies for diagnosis and prognosis. However, these 
groups presented desirable methodological criteria not hierarchies of evidence. They have therefore 
been excluded. 
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Heart Association (2000) only prospective, statistically significant randomised 
controlled trials provide the highest level of evidence and in the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality hierarchy (Hadorn et al 1996) only well-
conducted, multi-centre randomised controlled trials with over 100 patients 
provide the highest level of evidence. In other hierarchies methodological 
criteria dictate which randomised controlled trials provide the highest level, 
although these methodological criteria do vary (Mitchell and Friese 2007, 
Brozek et al 2009, Gugiu 2015).  
 
Question Number of Hierarchies of Evidence 
Aetiology 3 
Appropriateness 2 
Diagnosis 6 
Economic analysis 2 
Feasibility 2 
Frequency of problem 1 
Harm18 2 
Meaningfulness 2 
Outcomes research 1 
Prognosis 4 
Qualitative research 1 
Screening 2 
 
Table 2: Hierarchies of evidence that do not consider the effectiveness of 
treatment interventions. 
 
Systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses provided the highest level of 
evidence in 20 hierarchies of evidence although in 9 of these hierarchies only 
                                                          
18
 Howick et al (2011) differentiate between common harms and rare harms. 
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systematic reviews/meta-analyses meeting certain criteria provided the 
highest level. For example, in the Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy 
(Ebell et al 2004) hierarchy only systematic reviews or meta-analyses with 
consistent findings provide the highest level of evidence. Other study designs 
or forms of evidence, including n-of-1 studies (Guyatt et al 2000, Howick et al 
2011), observational studies (Brozek et al 2009), meta-syntheses of 
qualitative studies (Armola et al 2009) and expert opinion (Mitchell and Friese 
2007), provided the highest level of evidence in 9 hierarchies. 
 
Study design 
Hierarchies of 
evidence 
Randomised controlled trial  9 
Randomised controlled trial meeting certain criteria 15 
Systematic review/meta-analyses 11 
Systematic review/meta-analyses meeting certain 
criteria 
9 
Other study designs 9 
 
Table 3: Study designs that provide the highest level of evidence in 
hierarchies that are used to determine the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions. 
 
When the 42 different hierarchies of evidence were considered collectively a 
number of different study designs were also found to provide the lowest level 
of evidence. These study designs are shown in Table 4 overleaf. Some 
hierarchies allow more than one study design to provide the lowest level of 
evidence. Expert opinion provides the lowest level of evidence in 19 
hierarchies although only one of these hierarchies differentiates between the 
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opinion of an individual expert and a group of experts (Newhouse et al 2007). 
Observational studies provide the lowest level of evidence in 12 hierarchies 
(observational studies include cohort studies, cross-sectional studies, case-
control studies, descriptive studies), case series provide the lowest level of 
evidence in 12 hierarchies and case reports provide the lowest level of 
evidence in 5 hierarchies. Studies that have been poorly conducted provide 
the lowest level of evidence in 7 hierarchies, with 3 of these ranking poorly 
conducted randomised controlled trials as the lowest level of evidence 
(Mitchell and Friese 2007, Brozek at al 2009, Gugiu 2015). The remaining 
hierarchies rank mechanistic reasoning (Sayre et al 2010, Howick et al 
2011), manufacturer’s recommendations (Armola et al 2009), rational 
conjecture, common sense (American Heart Association 2000) and the 
absence of evidence (Bandelow et al 2002, Grunze et al 2009) as the lowest 
level of evidence.  
 
Form of Evidence Hierarchies of Evidence 
Expert opinion 19 
Observational studies 12 
Case series  12 
Studies with flawed methodology 7 
Case reports 5 
Clinical experience 4 
Common sense/rational conjecture 3 
Physiology, bench research or first principles 3 
Mechanistic reasoning 2 
Absence of evidence 2 
 
Table 4: Study designs that provide the lowest level of evidence in 
hierarchies that are used to determine the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions. 
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When considered collectively, the 42 different hierarchies contain a number 
of different levels between the highest and lowest level of evidence. This is 
shown overleaf in Table 5. The simplest hierarchies have only 3 levels of 
evidence (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998, 
Ebell et al 2004) whereas the most complicated hierarchies have 10 or more 
levels and sub-levels (Hadorn et al 1996, Ball and Phillips 2001). 
 
Number of levels Number of hierarchies of evidence 
2 0 
3 9 
4 10 
5 6 
6 7 
7 1 
8 6 
9 1 
10 1 
11 0 
12 1 
 
Table 5: Levels of evidence in the different hierarchies that are used to 
determine the effectiveness of treatment interventions. 
 
The property that is used to rank different study designs within the 42 
different hierarchies is often unclear. Many of the hierarchies either failed to 
explain the property that was used or referred to nebulous qualities such as 
‘evidence strength’ or ‘quality of evidence’ without explicitly defining these 
terms. Some hierarchies were clear about the property that was used 
although a number of different properties were mentioned. These properties 
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included truth (Cook et al 1992, Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998), bias (Guyatt 
et al 1995), validity (Hadorn et al 1996, Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines 
Network 2011), confidence (Trout 1981) and trustworthiness (Joanna Briggs 
Institute 2011). 
 
Twenty two of the hierarchies of evidence were presented in conjunction with 
a separate process for formulating treatment recommendations. The process 
of formulating treatment recommendations is often termed the grading 
process. These systems19 use a hierarchy to determine the level of evidence 
supporting a treatment intervention but only make a final treatment 
recommendation following consideration of other factors. These factors may 
include financial costs, feasibility, external validity and adverse effects. It is 
therefore possible to have a treatment intervention that is ranked highly by a 
hierarchy but that is not recommended because it is too expensive or 
associated with adverse effects. The different factors that were considered 
during the formulation of treatment recommendations varied between 
different systems. 
. 
Hierarchies that are presented in conjunction with a separate process for 
formulating treatment recommendations include the systems proposed by the 
Canadian Task Force system (Spitzer et al 1979), Scottish Intercollegiate 
Guidelines Network (Harbour and Miller 2001) and the Joanna Briggs 
Institute for Nursing (2011). The hierarchies proposed by Sackett (1989), 
                                                          
19
 In this thesis the term ‘system’ is used as an overarching term to include both the hierarchy of 
evidence and any separate process that is used to formulate treatment recommendations. 
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Cook et al (1992), Carruthers et al (1993), Hadorn et al (1996) and Ball and 
Phillips (2001) purport to present a separate process for formulating 
treatment recommendations. However, in these systems the grade of 
treatment recommendation is directly determined by the hierarchy so the 
grading process is superfluous. These 5 hierarchies were therefore 
categorised as not having a separate process for grading recommendations. 
 
3.6.1. Summary of Results:   
 
The systematic review identified 45 different hierarchies of evidence that 
have been used within evidence based medicine. Most of these hierarchies 
are used to determine the effectiveness of treatment interventions although 
they have also been developed to support decision making in other areas of 
medicine. When considered collectively the hierarchies contain a variable 
number of levels and appear to use a variety of different properties to rank 
different study designs. Some hierarchies are accompanied by a separate 
process for formulating treatment recommendations. In the hierarchies that 
are used to determine the effectiveness of treatment interventions 
randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and meta-analyses often 
provide the highest level of evidence. However, this is not a universal trend 
and randomised controlled trials can provide the lowest level of evidence 
when they are poorly conducted. Expert opinion and observational studies 
often provide the lowest level of evidence but this is also not a universal trend 
and they can provide the highest level of evidence in some hierarchies.  
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3.7. Selected Hierarchies of Evidence: 
 
In this section, the hierarchies developed by Cochrane (1972), the Canadian 
Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979), American College of Chest Physicians 
(Sackett 1989, Cook et al 1992, Guyatt et al 1998, Guyatt et al 2001), Oxford 
Centre for Evidence Based Medicine (Ball and Phillips 2001, Howick et al 
2011), GRADE Working Group (2004) and Oncology Nursing Society 
(Mitchell and Friese 2007) are summarised to illustrate how they have been 
used and evolved with time. This section expands upon the results of the 
systematic review and provides important contextual information. It is not my 
intention to summarise all hierarchies or describe any single hierarchy in 
great detail. This would result in a morass of information and contribute little 
to the overall thesis. The reader is referred to the original articles if they 
would like further information on particular hierarchies. 
 
The hierarchies summarised in this section have been selected because they 
are early examples, commonly used, illustrate evolution or have been 
considered important, at different times, by proponents of evidence based 
medicine. It is accepted that the hierarchies that are presented have been 
subjectively selected and that different hierarchies may have been used to 
illustrate some of the points considered below. 
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3.7.1. Cochrane (1972): 
 
The first hierarchy of evidence was described by Cochrane (1972) in Chapter 
4 of ‘Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health Services’. 
Cochrane (1972) believed that treatment provided under the auspices of the 
National Health Service should be cost-effective, beneficial to patients and 
equitable. He further believed that randomised controlled trials could be used 
to achieve these aims. Cochrane (1972) did not use the term ‘hierarchy of 
evidence’, but he very clearly ranked the importance of different study 
designs for determining the effectiveness of treatment interventions. 
Randomised controlled trials were considered to provide the most valuable 
evidence and clinical opinion was considered to provide the least valuable 
evidence with observational studies occupying an intermediate level. This 
was the first attempt to rank different study designs in a hierarchical manner. 
 
Cochrane (1972) provided two arguments to justify his ranking of randomised 
controlled trials as the highest level of evidence: randomisation could be 
used to create comparable treatment and control groups and randomised 
controlled trials could be blinded to control measurement bias. These 
arguments are consistently used by many later hierarchies. Although 
Cochrane (1972) valued randomised controlled trials he also recognised that 
the study design were often impractical to implement, blinding was difficult 
when subjective outcome measures were used and randomisation could 
produce non-comparable treatment and control groups. Cochrane (1972) 
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was also clear that randomised controlled trials were unnecessary to support 
treatment interventions when the effects of a treatment intervention were 
obvious.  
 
This hierarchy of evidence is considered important because it was the first 
hierarchy; recognises potential problems associated with the hierarchical 
ranking of knowledge claims derived from different study designs and 
provides the earliest arguments for the ranking of randomised controlled trials 
as the highest level of evidence. 
 
3.7.2. Canadian Task Force (1979): 
 
The Canadian Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979) used their hierarchy to 
determine whether specific conditions should be included in the Canadian 
annual health examination. This is widely cited as the first hierarchy (Atkins 
et al 2004) although it is clearly predated by the work of Cochrane (1972). 
This hierarchy ranked randomised controlled trials as the highest level of 
evidence and expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence although no 
arguments were presented to support this ranking.  
 
The system presented by the Canadian Task Force is important because it is 
the first system to make a distinction between a hierarchy of evidence and a 
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grade of recommendation. In this system the grade of recommendation is 
determined following consideration of 3 factors: burden of suffering, the 
validity and acceptability of the manoeuvre used to detect or prevent the 
condition and the effectiveness of the treatment intervention. The 
effectiveness of the treatment intervention, as determined by the hierarchy, is 
the most important of these factors, as the Canadian task Force are clear 
that the highest treatment recommendation (Grade A) is unlikely to be made 
unless the intervention is supported by evidence from randomised controlled 
trials.  
 
This hierarchy was used to support the conclusion that the routine annual 
health examination should be abandoned in Canada. The Canadian Task 
Force instead advocated a selective annual health examination targeting at-
risk groups such as neonates and pregnant women. This illustrates the 
power that hierarchies possess as they can be used to support conclusions 
that may have huge implications for medicine. Abandoning routine health 
examinations may have meant that preventable conditions were not 
diagnosed (and therefore not treated) and would have had significant 
financial implications for patients, medical professionals and purchasers of 
health care. Spitzer et al (1979) appear to have been aware of the potential 
power inherent in their hierarchy as they warned against misuse or 
manipulation of their system. 
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3.7.3. American College of Chest Physicians (1986, 1992, 1998, 2001): 
 
The American College of Chest Physicians have used a number of different 
hierarchies over the last 30 years to produce treatment recommendations 
following thromboembolic events (Sackett 1989, Cook et al 1992, Guyatt et al 
1998, Guyatt et al 2001). Thromboembolic events, such as myocardial 
infarctions and strokes, are common events associated with significant 
mortality and morbidity. Antithrombotic medication can reduce mortality and 
morbidity following thromboembolic events but this medication can also 
impact on patient’s lives20 and the medication itself may cause bleeding 
complications. The hierarchies used by the American College of Chest 
Physicians have therefore been used to produce treatment recommendations 
which affect millions of people. The hierarchies used by the American 
College of Chest Physicians have been summarised because they 
demonstrate evolution over time. 
 
The American College of Chest Physicians first used a hierarchy in 1986 
(Sackett 1989). Expert opinion was excluded from this hierarchy because it 
was considered fallible and susceptible to statistical phenomenon such as 
regression towards the mean. At this time the grade of recommendation was 
directly determined by the hierarchy and evidence from any study design that 
was not a randomised controlled trial could only lead to the lowest grade of 
treatment recommendation. 
                                                          
20
 For example, patients who take warfarin have to have regular blood tests to monitor their 
bleeding potential. 
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The hierarchy used by the American College of Chest Physicians was 
modified in 1992 with the addition of meta-analyses (Cook et al 1992). This 
was the first hierarchy to include systematic reviews or meta-analyses. Meta-
analyses were ranked as level I or II with a positive or negative suffix 
depending upon whether the results were clinically significant and consistent 
across included studies. This was the first hierarchy to consider clinical 
significance and heterogeneity, although no guidance was provided on how 
these factors should be interpreted. At this time the grade of recommendation 
was still directly determined by the hierarchy.  
 
The hierarchy used by the American College of Chest Physicians was 
modified again in 1998 (Guyatt et al 1998). This hierarchy had only 3 levels 
and ranked randomised controlled trials with no heterogeneity as the highest 
level, randomised controlled trials with heterogeneity as the second level and 
observational studies as the lowest level of evidence. Meta-analyses were 
purposely excluded from this hierarchy because they could include poor 
quality studies21 (Guyatt et al 2001). In this system the level of evidence did 
not directly determine the treatment recommendation and other factors, 
including risks and benefits, were considered.  
 
                                                          
21
 The inclusion of heterogeneity in this hierarchy suggests that meta-analyses undertaken by users 
are acceptable. It is actually unclear whether this hierarchy can be applied to individual study designs 
and it may be more appropriately considered a hierarchy of evidence bases (Blunt 2015). 
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The hierarchy used by the American College of Chest Physicians was 
modified again in 2001 to include extrapolations from randomised controlled 
trials and overwhelming evidence from observational studies (Guyatt et al 
2001). This additional level was added because it was recognised that it may 
be difficult to undertake a randomised controlled trial when a particular 
treatment intervention was already widely accepted (Hirsch et al 2001)22. 
This hierarchy also included randomised controlled trials with methodological 
flaws. In the 2001 system, the importance of the hierarchy was reduced and 
consideration of risks and benefits assumed greater importance. The primacy 
of consideration of risks and benefits was illustrated by placing the 
recommended grade before the evidence level i.e. 1A and not A1. This 
system also differed from earlier systems because financial costs could now 
explicitly influence the final treatment recommendation. In 2006 the American 
College of Chest Physicians abandoned their own system and adopted the 
Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
system (Baumann and Gutterman 2006). 
 
The hierarchies used by the American College of Chest Physicians are 
interesting because they changed 4 times over a 20 year period before they 
were finally abandoned. These hierarchies were the first to consider meta-
analyses but they never included expert opinion. The evolution of these 
systems illustrates a decline in the relative importance of research evidence, 
as determined by the hierarchy, over time although this is not a consistent 
                                                          
22
 A randomised controlled trial is not considered possible in these circumstances because it would 
be unethical for the control group to not receive the treatment intervention. 
72 
 
finding amongst other hierarchies. It is important to appreciate that the 
hierarchies used by the American College of Chest Physicians are not the 
only hierarchies to have evolved with time. For example, the hierarchies 
proposed by the Canadian Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979, Goldbloom 1997) 
and the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine (Ball and Phillips 2001, 
Howick et al 2011) have also evolved. 
 
3.7.4. Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine Levels of Evidence (1999, 
2011):  
 
The system proposed by the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine 
(Ball and Phillips 2001) is important because it was the first to present 
different hierarchies of evidence for different questions. Each individual 
hierarchy ranked the systematic review as the highest level of evidence and 
the evidence level directly determined the grade of treatment 
recommendation. This system was modified in 2011 with the addition of new 
hierarchies for common and rare harms, screening and common problems 
and removal of the hierarchy for economic analyses. Howick et al (2011) 
reported that the hierarchy for economic analyses was removed because of 
uncertainty about what constituted good evidence. This would have had 
73 
 
important implications for any recommendations made using the previous 
hierarchy for economic analyses23.  
 
Following its development in 1999 the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based 
Medicine system was widely adopted by both medicine and dentistry in the 
United Kingdom. This was an interesting development as the system was 
originally designed for use in general acute medicine as part of the 
‘Evidence-Based On-Call’ project and its potential applicability to other areas 
of medicine was questioned by the developers (Ball and Phillips 2001). 
 
3.7.5. Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and 
Evaluation (GRADE) System (2004): 
 
The GRADE system was developed in 2004 by the GRADE Working Group 
following a review of existing hierarchies. Existing hierarchies were criticised 
because they missed important elements, had poor reproducibility and relied 
on implicit judgements. The GRADE system was proposed as a solution to 
these problems. The GRADE system can be used to determine the level of 
evidence supporting a particular treatment intervention or develop a 
treatment recommendation following a wider consideration of risks and 
benefits, patient values and resource implications in addition to an 
                                                          
23
 Howick et al (2011) are clear that they also expect the latest Oxford Centre for Evidence Based 
Medicine hierarchy to change with time. This has potentially important implications for any 
recommendations made using the existing system.  
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assessment of the supporting evidence (Atkins et al 2004, GRADE Working 
Group 2004, Atkins et al 2005). 
 
The GRADE system initially ranks randomised controlled trials as the highest 
level and observational studies as the lowest level of evidence. However, 
randomised controlled trials and observational studies can be downgraded or 
upgraded if certain criteria are fulfilled. For example, randomised controlled 
trials can be downgraded if they are considered at risk of bias and 
observational studies can be upgraded when they demonstrate a large 
magnitude of effect (Guyatt et al 2008)24.  
 
The GRADE system does not include expert opinion or systematic reviews. 
Expert opinion is excluded because judgement is considered necessary for 
the interpretation of all evidence (Brozek et al 2009). Systematic reviews are 
excluded because they are considered a means of collecting evidence, not a 
form of evidence, and they are reliant on the quality of the primary studies 
(Atkins et al 2004). Nevertheless, although systematic reviews are explicitly 
excluded from the GRADE hierarchy the evidence appraisal process does 
involve a systematic review to identify relevant randomised controlled trials 
and observational studies before they are appraised.  
 
                                                          
24
 Guyatt et al (2011a, 2011b) have accepted that there is little empirical evidence to support the 
criteria that are used to upgrade and downgrade studies and that the threshold for upgrading and 
downgrading is often arbitrary. 
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The GRADE system is important because the Working Group behind the 
system recognised that the existence of multiple hierarchies created 
problems for evidence based medicine25. They aspired to create a universal 
hierarchy that would replace existing hierarchies and resolve confusion 
(Guyatt et al 2008). This attempt was unsuccessful as the GRADE system is 
not universally used and, as Table 1 reveals, it has not prevented the 
continued development of new hierarchies.  
 
3.7.6. Oncology Nursing Society Putting Evidence into Practice Weight of 
Evidence Classification Schema (ONSPEP) (2007): 
 
The ONSPEP hierarchy (Mitchell and Friese 2007) was developed to 
determine the effectiveness of nursing interventions in oncology patients. 
This hierarchy is primarily important because the opinion of a group of 
experts can provide the highest level of evidence alongside systematic 
reviews and randomised controlled trials. In order to attain the highest level, 
expert recommendations must synthesise any available evidence found 
following a thorough search and synthesis of the literature. This allows expert 
opinion alone to provide the highest level of evidence when a search of the 
literature reveals no evidence, evidence that is flawed or the experts disagree 
with any evidence that is found. This is the only hierarchy that places expert 
opinion at the highest level. 
                                                          
25
 Other groups have also recognised that multiple hierarchies create problems for evidence based 
medicine but they have responded in different ways. For example, Glasziou et al (2004) advocated 
that hierarchies should be abandoned not standardised.  
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The ONSPEP hierarchy was originally developed to support nursing 
interventions in oncology patients. However, it has subsequently been 
recommended as the most appropriate hierarchy to support perioperative 
nursing interventions in all patients (Steelman et al 2011). This 
recommendation was made because the ONSPEP hierarchy did not prioritise 
study designs, such as randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews, 
which were often unavailable to support nursing interventions. This hierarchy 
is important because it recognises that expert opinion can be as important as 
evidence derived from other study designs. The ONSPEP hierarchy also 
provides an example of a hierarchy targeted at a particular professional 
group within medicine. 
 
3.7.7. Summary: 
 
In this section, six hierarchies of evidence have been summarised to illustrate 
how they are used within evidence based medicine and have evolved with 
time. Some of the arguments that have been used to support the ranking of 
randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and expert opinion, within 
different hierarchies, have been outlined although they have not been 
analysed. These arguments have led to the inclusion and exclusion of expert 
opinion and different study designs in different hierarchies. It is notable that 
the first hierarchy (Cochrane 1972) ranked the randomised controlled trial as 
the highest level of evidence despite acknowledging that evidence from this 
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study design was unnecessary in some situations. Problems associated with 
multiple hierarchies have been recognised within evidence based medicine, 
particularly by the GRADE Working Group, but attempts to create a universal 
hierarchy appear to have been unsuccessful. 
 
3.8. Discussion:  
 
All research methods have limitations and any results should be interpreted 
in light of these limitations. Within this thesis a systematic review has been 
undertaken to identify different hierarchies of evidence and thematic analysis 
has been used to identify emerging themes. It is therefore important to 
consider the limitations of these methods before analysing the arguments 
that have been used to support the different hierarchies. Systematic reviews 
identifying different hierarchies have previously been undertaken by West et 
al (2002) and Blunt (2015) and their findings should also be considered when 
the results of this systematic review and thematic analysis are interpreted.  
 
The results of any systematic review are determined by the search strategy 
that is used. In this systematic review a search strategy was developed with 
the assistance of a medical librarian, building on the search strategy used by 
a previous systematic review (West et al 2002). The search strategy was 
designed to have high sensitivity, at the expense of specificity, in an effort to 
be as comprehensive as possible (Haynes et al 2005). The search strategy 
that was used actually identified 1178 potentially relevant studies when it was 
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used to search the MEDLINE database April 2016 (Appendix 2) although 
many of these studies were excluded following assessment of the abstract. 
Further hierarchies were identified from the reference lists of studies meeting 
the inclusion criteria and relevant evidence based medicine textbooks. It is 
however accepted that there are likely to be further hierarchies that have not 
been identified by the search process used in this systematic review.  
 
Hierarchies of evidence can only be identified through systematic review if 
they are accurately coded in medical databases. West et al (2002) reported 
difficultly identifying different grading systems because of the insensitivity of 
thesaurus headings. Similar problems were encountered during this 
systematic review as the thesaurus headings for each study usually related 
to the treatment intervention that was considered not the hierarchy that was 
used. West et al (2002) advocated citation tracking and contact with guideline 
developers, in addition to a comprehensive literature search, as the most 
efficient means of identifying grading systems. This systematic review used 
citation tracking but did not contact guidelines developers as this was 
considered impractical. Accurate coding of any new hierarchies would 
facilitate any future systematic reviews in this area. 
 
This systematic review was restricted to hierarchies published in the English 
language for practical reasons. However, this is likely to have introduced 
language bias. The hierarchy of evidence developed by Tomlin and Borgetto 
(2011) appears to have been published in German in 2006 but did not 
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appear in English until 5 years later. This is a clear example of a hierarchy 
published in a different language and it is possible that there are other 
hierarchies, in different languages, that have not been identified.  
 
It was not possible to obtain the original articles for some of the earlier 
hierarchies because they were published in journal supplements and 
electronic copies were unavailable. In these situations, later studies that 
described these hierarchies were used. These hierarchies were only included 
if they were described in adequate detail. It is accepted that this may have 
introduced inaccuracies if the original hierarchies were modified following 
initial publication. It was felt important to include these hierarchies because 
they were of historical significance. Hierarchies that were not described in 
adequate detail were not included. Where the original studies were 
unavailable the year of first publication was always clear. 
 
This systematic review excluded hierarchies that were not significantly 
different from earlier hierarchies. In general terms a hierarchy was 
considered significantly different if it contained different study designs or 
ranked the same study designs in a different way. This was a subjective 
decision made by the reviewer which involved comparing and contrasting 
different hierarchies. As an example, the hierarchy described by Eccles and 
Mason (2001) was not included because it was not considered significantly 
different from the first hierarchy used by the Australian National Health and 
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Medical Research Council (Appendix 4). Where hierarchies were not 
considered significantly different any later hierarchies were excluded. 
 
This systematic review was designed to identify systems that ranked the 
importance of evidence based primarily upon the study design that was used 
to produce that evidence. However, several systems were identified that 
ranked pre-appraised sources of evidence within a hierarchical framework 
(Haynes 2001, Haynes 2006, DiCenso et al 2009). These systems include 
computerised decision support systems and interpretations of the results of 
systematic reviews and primary studies as different levels. These systems 
were not included as they did not rank evidence primarily according to study 
design. 
 
This systematic review builds on the previous systematic reviews undertaken 
by West et al (2002) and Blunt (2015). West et al (2002) identified 40 
different systems that could be used to grade the strength of a body of 
evidence within medicine. However, they did not identify 40 different 
hierarchies as many of the systems used the same hierarchies of evidence. 
Blunt (2015) identified 88 different hierarchies although his search strategy 
and inclusion criteria were not described. The systematic review undertaken 
by Blunt (2015) does not identify significantly more hierarchies than this 
systematic review as his total includes hierarchies that are very similar to one 
another and systems that rank pre-appraised evidence within a hierarchical 
framework. 
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Once the hierarchies of evidence had been identified they were compared 
and contrasted to identify recurrent themes and arguments. These recurrent 
themes and arguments were identified by iterative reading of the hierarchies 
and wider reading of the evidence based medicine literature. Common 
themes that were identified included the ranking of randomised controlled 
trials and systematic reviews/meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence 
and the ranking of expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence. The 
arguments that were used to support the respective ranking of randomised 
controlled trials, systematic reviews and expert opinion were also commonly 
repeated across different hierarchies. It is accepted that this systematic 
review may have failed to identify some hierarchies. However, as the themes 
and arguments that have been identified are consistent across many 
hierarchies it is unlikely that synthesis of further hierarchies would 
significantly affect the critical analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
 
Thematic analysis has been criticised because it lacks transparency and 
relies upon subjective interpretation of the source material (Pope et al 2007). 
These are valid criticisms but they can be levelled at any interpretivist 
approach. The recurrent themes identified amongst the hierarchies that are 
analysed in later chapters are supported by numerous references and quotes 
to assure the reader of the robustness of the approach that has been used. 
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With any qualitative research method the role of the researcher, and the 
influence they have on knowledge construction, should be considered. 
Reflexive evaluation acknowledges any assumptions and preconceptions 
that underpin the research process and strengthens the integrity of 
conclusions (Finlay 2002). It is therefore important to reflexively evaluate my 
influence, as the researcher, on the research process used in this thesis.  
 
The reader should understand that I am a practising dentist who works as an 
NHS Consultant in a District General Hospital. Evidence based medicine was 
already well established when I qualified in 1999 and I have not known any 
other way to practice dentistry. I am motivated by a desire to explain why 
there are so many different hierarchies because they have direct implications 
for my clinical practice. I do not intrinsically believe that evidence based 
medicine is irrational and this may influence the way that I have collected and 
analysed the data. I may also have unconsciously favoured the arguments 
used to support the hierarchies that are commonly used within dentistry: The 
Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine Levels of Evidence (Ball and 
Phillips 2001, Howick et al 2011) and the GRADE system (Brozek et al 
2009). Any unconscious bias towards these arguments is unlikely to impact 
significantly on my analysis as the arguments used by all of the hierarchies 
have been considered and the hierarchies that are commonly used within 
dentistry are not supported by arguments that are not repeated by other 
hierarchies. 
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Blunt (2015) has described 4 phases in the development of hierarchies of 
evidence. In the first trend (1979-1991) hierarchies are generally restricted to 
different study designs and neglect expert opinion. The second phase (1991-
1998) is characterised by experimentation with competition between different 
hierarchies. The third phase (1998-2004) is characterised by the prominence 
of pre-appraised evidence and the final phase (2004-present) is 
characterised by increasingly sophisticated hierarchies such as the GRADE 
system. However, this systematic review has identified a number of 
hierarchies that do not correspond to these different phases26. For example, 
the hierarchies described by Cochrane (1972) and Spitzer et al (1979) 
contain expert opinion and a number of recent hierarchies appear simple. 
The phases described by Blunt (2015)  are not used because it is uncertain 
that they accurately reflect the development of the hierarchies and this thesis 
does not consider systems that rank pre-appraised sources of evidence.   
 
This section has discussed the limitations of the systematic review and 
thematic analysis presented in this chapter. It is recognised that the 
systematic review may not have identified some relevant hierarchies because 
of language bias, problems with thesaurus headings and the need to balance 
sensitivity and specificity within any search strategy. The results of this 
systematic review appear similar to those presented by Blunt (2015) once 
systems considering pre-appraised evidence and similar hierarchies are 
discounted. This suggests that the approach that has been used is robust. 
                                                          
26
 Blunt (2015) does acknowledge that the 4 different phases represent trends and there may be 
some overlap between them. 
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Subsequent thematic analysis has revealed a number of consistent trends 
and common arguments across different hierarchies and it is considered 
unlikely that analysis of further hierarchies would affect these trends or 
arguments.  
 
3.9. Summary: 
 
The systematic review presented in this chapter has identified 42 different 
hierarchies of evidence that can be used to determine the effectiveness of 
treatment interventions. Hierarchies have also been identified that can be 
used to answer other questions that are of importance within medicine. The 
first hierarchy appeared in 1972 and they appear to have proliferated since 
this time. The GRADE Working Group has attempted to develop a universal 
hierarchy but this attempt appears to have been unsuccessful. The 
hierarchies provide justification for the knowledge claims made by evidence 
based medicine and these knowledge claims determine treatment decisions, 
medicolegal standards and healthcare funding. It is therefore important to 
understand why there are so many different hierarchies and why attempts to 
create a universal hierarchy of evidence have been unsuccessful.  
 
When the hierarchies of evidence are analysed collectively some common 
themes emerge. Randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and meta-
analyses generally provide the highest level and expert opinion generally 
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provides the lowest level of evidence. However, these are not universal 
themes as some hierarchies rank randomised controlled trials as the lowest 
level and one hierarchy ranks expert opinion as the highest level of evidence. 
This is confusing and should be investigated. Some of the arguments that 
have been used to support the ranking of randomised controlled trials, 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence, and 
expert opinion as the lowest level, have been outlined but these arguments 
require critical analysis.     
 
The thematic analysis identified a number of common themes amongst the 
different hierarchies but also identified significant dissimilarities. The number 
of levels varies from 3 to 12 and the property that is used to rank different 
study designs is unclear. Properties that the hierarchies claim to use to rank 
different study designs include truth, bias, validity, confidence and 
trustworthiness. This raises important questions: What property should be 
used to rank different study designs within a hierarchy, how many different 
levels are required and do the hierarchies have utility if the property is 
unclear? This is another area that requires critical analysis. 
 
The results of the systematic review and thematic analysis presented in this 
chapter provide a foundation for the analysis of the hierarchies of evidence 
that is presented in the next 3 chapters. In Chapter 4 the arguments that are 
used to support the claims that randomised controlled trials, systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses should provide the highest level, and expert 
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opinion should provide the lowest level, of evidence are analysed using the 
method of analytical philosophy. In Chapter 5 the properties that are 
purportedly used to rank different study designs within hierarchies are 
analysed. In Chapter 6 factors, independent of study design, that have 
influenced the development of hierarchies are presented. The critical analysis 
presented increases understanding of evidence based medicine and seeks to 
explain some of the variation that is seen amongst them. 
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Chapter 4: Randomised Controlled Trials, Systematic Reviews and Expert 
Opinion: 
 
4.1. Introduction: 
 
Evidence based medicine uses hierarchies of evidence to provide justification 
for knowledge claims that are made. These knowledge claims are important 
because they dictate which treatment interventions are prescribed and 
funded, medicolegal standards and the research agenda. It is interesting that 
there are so many different hierarchies because this suggests that 
knowledge claims may be justified in different ways.  It is therefore important 
to critically analyse the arguments that are used to support the different 
hierarchies. 
 
The systematic review presented in the previous chapter identified 42 
different hierarchies that can be used to determine the effectiveness of 
treatment interventions. However, although significant variation was identified 
amongst these hierarchies, some common themes emerged when they were 
considered collectively. Randomised controlled trials provide the highest level 
of evidence in many early hierarchies, systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
provide the highest level of evidence in many later hierarchies, expert opinion 
usually provides the lowest level of evidence and observational studies 
usually provide an intermediate level of evidence. A hierarchy that ranks 
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randomised controlled trials above observational studies above expert 
opinion may be considered a standard hierarchy of evidence27. A hierarchy 
that ranks systematic reviews/meta-analyses above randomised controlled 
trials above observational studies above expert opinion may be considered a 
modified standard hierarchy of evidence28. 
 
This chapter, which is divided into three main sections, critically analyses the 
arguments that have used by evidence based medicine to support the 
standard hierarchy of evidence and the modified standard hierarchy of 
evidence. In the first section the design of the randomised controlled trial is 
explained.  Then the two arguments that are used to support the claim that 
randomised controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence are 
analysed: randomised controlled trials control for confounding factors and 
randomised controlled trials can be blinded. The section concludes by 
considering other arguments that have not been used by the hierarchies of 
evidence, but are relevant to the discussion (Worrall 2002, Worrall 2007, 
Howick 2011, Blunt 2015). 
 
In the second section, the difference between systematic reviews and meta-
analyses is explained. The two arguments that have been used to support 
the claim that systematic reviews or meta-analyses should provide the 
                                                          
27
 Examples of standard hierarchies of evidence include those proposed by Cochrane (1972), Spitzer 
et al (1979), Gross et al (1994) and Hadorn et al (1996). 
28
 Examples of modified standard hierarchies of evidence include those proposed by Ball and Phillips 
(2001), Evans (2003) and the Joanna Briggs Institute (2011). 
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highest level of evidence are then analysed: systematic reviews and meta-
analyses produce results that are closer to the truth and systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses allow assessment of the consistency of results. 
 
In the third section, confusion surrounding use of the term expert opinion will 
be highlighted before a working definition of expert opinion is developed. This 
working definition is then used in the analysis of the five arguments that have 
been used to support the claim that expert opinion provides the lowest level 
of evidence: expert opinion does not involve measurement; expert opinion 
does not consider what happens to patients without treatment; expert opinion 
may be affected by measurement bias; expert opinion considers small 
numbers of patients and expert opinion may produce false conclusions29.  
 
4.2. Interpretation of the Hierarchies of Evidence:  
 
The hierarchies of evidence can be interpreted in a number of different ways 
(Blunt 2015) and it is important to clarify some points before the arguments 
that are used to support the standard hierarchy of evidence and modified 
standard hierarchy of evidence are critically analysed. This will allow the 
reader to interpret the concepts and arguments that are analysed within the 
correct context. 
                                                          
29
 The reader will note that there is no section considering observational studies despite the 
inclusion of this study design in most hierarchies. This is because the arguments for the ranking of 
observational studies as an intermediate level of evidence are indirectly considered in the sections 
on randomised controlled trials and expert opinion.  
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Within this chapter a distinction is made between theoretical, practical and 
ethical considerations. This thesis is primarily concerned with the 
epistemology of evidence based medicine and critically analyses the 
theoretical arguments that are used to support the different hierarchies. The 
knowledge claims that are made by evidence based medicine have important 
implications for patients, medical professionals, healthcare regulators and 
purchasers of medical care. It is therefore reasonable to expect that these 
claims should have strong theoretical support. This does not mean that 
practical and ethical considerations are unimportant but they should not 
influence the epistemology of evidence based medicine.   
 
Evidence based medicine is characterised by the use of a hierarchy of 
evidence to guide decision making but it is not committed to including any 
particular study design or form of evidence within the hierarchy of evidence. 
Systematic reviews, meta-analyses and expert opinion are included in many 
hierarchies but they are not universal features. For example, the systems 
proposed by GRADE (Brozek et al 2009) and the Australian National Health 
and Medical Research Council (Merlin et al 2009) exclude expert opinion but 
they are still hierarchies. All hierarchies do include randomised controlled 
trials but this does not necessarily have to be the case. This does not 
diminish the importance of the arguments that are analysed in this chapter as 
this reflects the way that evidence based medicine has historically been 
interpreted.  
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Evidence based medicine is not committed to the claim that certain study 
designs always provide superior or inferior evidence to other study designs 
within a hierarchy of evidence (La Caze 2009). This interpretation would be 
too strong and would not reflect later hierarchies, such as the GRADE 
system that allow upgrading and downgrading of different study designs. 
However, evidence based medicine cannot claim that the study designs that 
occupy the higher levels are simply no worse than the study designs that 
occupy the lower levels. This would be too weak an interpretation as it would 
imply parity of all evidence and the hierarchy of evidence would dissolve. 
Evidence based medicine is committed to the claim that certain study 
designs probably provide superior or inferior evidence to other study designs 
as this claim is inherent within the concept of a hierarchy. This has been 
termed the non-categorical interpretation (Turner 2011). Theoretical or 
empirical support is therefore required for the claim that certain study designs 
probably provide superior evidence to other study designs and this is the 
claim that is analysed in this chapter. 
 
Blunt (2015) has suggested that the hierarchies of evidence make no claims 
about study designs that are not included. Under this interpretation the study 
design that provides the highest level of evidence may not necessarily 
provide the best evidence. This is an interesting interpretation but it is not 
how hierarchies are used within evidence based medicine. The hierarchies 
are used to provide justification for knowledge claims and they would have 
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limited utility if they excluded study designs that were considered to provide 
superior evidence30.   
 
In this section problems associated with the interpretation of hierarchies of 
evidence have been outlined. Evidence based medicine is committed to a 
non-categorical interpretation of hierarchies and should therefore provide 
theoretical or empirical support for the claim that some study designs 
probably provide superior evidence to other study designs. Hierarchies are 
not committed to including any particular study designs but they have 
historically included randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses as the highest levels of evidence and expert opinion as the 
lowest level of evidence. Having clarified the interpretive framework that will 
be used in this chapter we can now consider the arguments that have been 
used to support the standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence.  
 
4.3. Randomised Controlled Trials: 
 
A randomised controlled trial is a prospective study design where participants 
are randomly allocated to one of two groups31. The treatment group receive 
the treatment that is being tested and the control group receive no treatment, 
a placebo or standard treatment. The randomisation process is designed to 
                                                          
30
 This interpretation does not apply to hierarchies that explicitly exclude certain study designs. For 
example the GRADE system explicitly excludes systematic reviews and expert opinion.     
31
 It is acknowledged that this is a simplistic interpretation of randomised controlled trials and that 
they can contain more than 2 groups.  
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produce treatment and control groups with identical characteristics 
(Hackshaw et al 2006, Gosall and Gosall 2012)32. The basic assumption is 
that if the treatment and control groups are identical, except for the treatment 
that is being tested, any difference in outcomes at the end of the trial can be 
attributed to the treatment intervention (Cartwright 2007, Cartwright 2011). 
 
Randomised controlled trials were ranked as the highest level of evidence by 
over half of the hierarchies that were identified in the previous chapter and 
this study design provides the highest level of evidence in the standard 
hierarchy of evidence. The perceived importance of the randomised 
controlled trials is illustrated by this quote from the ‘How to Read Clinical 
Journals’ series: 
‘Evidence from such a randomised controlled trial is the soundest 
evidence we can ever obtain about causation (whether it concerns 
aetiology, therapeutics or any other causal issue)’ (Trout 1981 page 
986). 
The hierarchy proposed by Trout (1981) recognises that other study designs 
can provide evidence of treatment effectiveness because it includes cohort 
studies, case-control studies and case series in the lower levels. However, 
other hierarchies take a more radical view regarding the importance of 
randomised controlled trials. For example, the second hierarchy proposed by 
                                                          
32
 Evidence based medicine also uses randomisation to ensure that study participants are 
representative of the population from which they are drawn. This use of randomisation is not 
relevant to the analysis presented in this chapter.   
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the World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry excluded all study 
designs that were not randomised controlled trials: 
‘Studies without randomisation and double-blinding are outdated in 
psychopharmacology’ (Bandelow et al 2008, page 246). 
Bandelow et al (2008) excluded non-randomised controlled trials because 
they felt that including them within their hierarchy only served to increase the 
importance of ‘sub-optimal’ study designs. 
 
Only two arguments are used by the hierarchies to support the claim that 
randomised controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence: 
randomised controlled trials balance confounding factors equally between the 
treatment group and the control group and randomised controlled trials can 
be blinded. These arguments are directly used to support the claim that 
randomised controlled trials provide superior evidence to observational 
studies but they are also used to assert the superiority of the randomised 
controlled trial study design over expert opinion.  Both of these arguments 
were originally proposed by Cochrane (1972) and are restated by several 
hierarchies (Chestnut et al 1999, Guyatt et al 2000, Guyatt et al 2004). It is 
notable that many later hierarchies present no arguments to support the 
claim that randomised controlled trials should provide the highest level of 
evidence. This may be because the two arguments outlined above are so 
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fundamental to evidence based medicine that they have become implicit and 
unquestioned33.  
 
4.3.1. Randomised Controlled Trials Balance Confounding Factors: 
 
The basic assumption underpinning the randomised controlled trial is that if 
the treatment and control groups are identical, except for the treatment that is 
being tested, any difference in outcomes at the end of the trial can be 
attributed to the treatment (Cartwright 2011). A confounding factor is 
unrelated to the treatment that is being tested but associated with the 
outcome of interest and differentially distributed between the treatment and 
control groups (Straus et al 2011). Confounding factors may be known or 
unknown (Worrall 2002). When a confounding factor is present it is not 
possible to determine whether any difference in outcomes at the end of the 
trial can be attributed to the treatment that is being tested or the confounding 
factor. 
 
The importance of confounding factors can be illustrated with an example. 
Consider a randomised controlled trial undertaken to test whether 
intervention A was an effective treatment for condition X. All patients in the 
treatment group are treated with intervention A and all patients in the control 
group receive no treatment. It is well known that smoking makes condition X 
                                                          
33
 Latour and Woolgar (1986) have argued that once a ‘fact’ is accepted the social circumstances 
around its construction are forgotten. 
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worse. If smokers are not equally distributed between the treatment and 
control groups we will not know if any difference in outcomes can be 
attributed to intervention A or the differential distribution of smokers between 
the two groups. In this situation smoking acts as a known confounding factor. 
Known confounders can be identified by those with relevant background 
knowledge and can be controlled for by exclusion, matching or the use of 
appropriate statistical techniques (Straus et al 2011, Gosall and Gosall 
2012). 
 
Let us assume that condition X is also made worse by alcohol consumption, 
but this is not known. If alcohol consumption is not equally distributed 
between the treatment and control groups any difference in outcomes could 
be caused by intervention A or the differential distribution of alcohol 
consumption. In this situation, alcohol consumption acts as an unknown 
confounding factor. Unknown confounding factors cannot be identified 
because they are by definition unknown. Randomisation is proposed as a 
solution to this problem because it purports to balance unknown confounding 
factors, in this case alcohol consumption, equally between the treatment and 
control groups (Straus et al 2011). 
 
The argument that is used to rank randomised controlled trials as the highest 
level of evidence because they control for confounding factors is shown 
below. This has been considered the most influential argument used by 
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evidence based medicine to assert the superiority of randomised controlled 
trials over other study designs (Worrall 2007). 
 
The Confounding Argument: 
 
If a study design controls for confounding factors it provides the best 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Randomised controlled trials control for confounding factors 
Randomised controlled trials provide the best evidence for determining the 
effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
 
This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We therefore need to 
assess the truth of the premises in order to determine whether the argument 
is sound. However, before this argument is analysed several points need to 
be clarified.  First, it should be clear from the structure of this argument that 
we are not assessing the claim that randomised controlled trials cannot 
provide evidence. It is my contention that all study designs included within 
hierarchies can provide evidence of treatment effectiveness. We are 
assessing the claim that randomised controlled trials probably provide better 
evidence than other study designs because they control for confounding 
factors34. Second, the term ‘best evidence’ is used in the first premise and 
                                                          
34
 This is consistent with a non-categorical interpretation of the hierarchies of evidence (Turner 
2011). 
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the conclusion but the term is not defined. The properties that are used to 
rank different study designs within hierarchies are discussed in Chapter 5. If 
a study design provides the best evidence this must surely reflect the 
property that has been used to rank study designs in a hierarchy. For the 
purposes of the present discussion we will assume that it is possible to 
determine ‘best evidence’ although, as will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter, this assumption is problematic.  
 
The first premise of the confounding argument states that if a study design 
controls for confounding factors it provides the best evidence for determining 
the effectiveness of a treatment intervention. Cartwright (2007) has argued 
that if all confounding factors are equally distributed between the treatment 
group and the control group any difference in the outcome of interest must be 
due to the treatment intervention. In these circumstances we have an ideal 
randomised controlled trial because, if a number of theoretical assumptions 
are met, the conclusion is derived using a deductive inference35. 
 
By definition, confounding factors are associated with the outcome of interest 
independent of the treatment intervention that is being tested. If confounding 
factors are not controlled the effect of the treatment intervention on the 
outcome of interest may be hidden. It is therefore clearly advantageous to 
control confounding factors in any study design. Whether control of 
                                                          
35
 Cartwright (2007) only claims that the conclusions are deductively derived for the group of 
subjects within that study and does not claim that they can be deductively applied to a different 
population. 
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confounding factors provides us with the best evidence will depend upon the 
property that is used to rank different study designs within a hierarchy. As 
this discussion has been side-lined until Chapter 5, for the purpose of the 
present discussion, we will accept that the first premise is true.  
 
The second premise of the confounding argument claims that randomised 
controlled trials control for confounding factors. Randomisation is considered 
superior to other strategies that can be used to manage confounding factors, 
such as exclusion, matching and statistical techniques, because it controls 
for both known and unknown confounding factors (Straus et al 2011). The 
earliest hierarchies clearly claimed that randomisation could be used to 
create identical treatment and control groups. This is illustrated by the 
following quote from the ‘How to Read Clinical Journals’ series: 
‘(randomised controlled trials) are investigations in which identical 
groups of individuals, generated through random allocation, are or are 
not exposed to the putative causal factor’ (Trout 1981 page 988). 
 
If randomisation produced identical treatment and control groups we would 
have an ideal randomised controlled trial, the second premise would be true 
and the confounding argument would be sound.  In order to determine 
whether the confounding argument is sound we therefore need to determine 
whether randomisation balances confounding factors between the treatment 
group and the control group. 
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In a randomised controlled trial study participants are randomly allocated to 
either the treatment group or the control group. Randomisation is a chance 
event and it is possible that a confounding factor will be equally distributed 
between the two groups. However, it is more likely that a confounding factor 
will be differentially distributed between the two groups. When there are 
multiple confounding factors it is unrealistic to expect randomisation to 
balance all confounding factors. It is far more likely that multiple confounding 
factors will be imbalanced between the treatment and control groups (Worrall 
2002, Worrall 2007). A look at any published randomised controlled trial will 
reveal imbalances between the baseline characteristics of the treatment and 
control groups. If randomisation cannot balance baseline characteristics we 
should not expect it to balance confounding factors.  
 
A number of different techniques are available to medical researchers, in 
addition to randomisation, to control known confounding factors (Straus et al 
2011). Background knowledge can be used to identify potential confounding 
factors and then study participants with these confounding factors can either 
be excluded from the study or matched so they are evenly distributed 
between the treatment and control groups (Worrall 2002). When known 
confounding factors are unevenly distributed between the treatment and 
control groups this can be accounted for during data analysis if the 
confounding factors have been identified. Exclusion, matching and 
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appropriate statistical techniques provide greater control over known 
confounding factors than randomisation which is effectively a chance event. 
 
Some proponents of evidence based medicine accept that non-randomised 
clinical trials (also known as pseudo-randomised or controlled clinical trials) 
can balance known confounding factors and provide evidence of equivalent 
value to randomised controlled trials (Howick 2011). It is considered more 
problematic to balance confounding factors in observational studies because 
the researcher does not determine which study participants receive the 
treatment intervention (Gosall and Gosall 2012). However, this does not 
mean that confounding factors cannot be balanced in observational studies. 
Exclusion, matching and statistical techniques can be employed in 
observational studies if sample sizes are large enough and confounding 
factors are identified and recorded.  
 
The second premise of the confounding argument claims that randomised 
controlled trials control for confounding factors but randomisation does not 
balance known confounding factors and these are surely better controlled by 
statistical techniques, exclusion and matching. These tools are not restricted 
to randomised controlled trials and can also be used by controlled clinical 
trials and observational studies. In order to use these tools known 
confounding factors must be identified and recorded but this uses 
background knowledge and is independent of study design. Known 
confounding factors may be easier to record when a prospective study 
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design is used but this is a practical consideration and would not differentiate 
between randomised controlled trials and any observational studies that used 
a prospective design.  
  
It has also been claimed that randomised controlled trials should provide the 
highest level of evidence because they balance unknown confounding factors 
between the treatment and control groups. However, the truth of this claim is 
difficult to ascertain because unknown confounders are by definition 
unknown. Empirical evidence could be provided to support this claim if 
historical randomised controlled trials were found to have balanced 
previously unknown confounding factors between the treatment and control 
groups but this evidence is currently unavailable. If it is unlikely that 
randomisation balances known confounding factors it is also surely unlikely 
that unknown confounding factors will be balanced between the two groups. 
If randomisation does not balance known or unknown confounding factors 
the second premise is false and the confounding argument is unsound. 
 
Howick (2011) has argued that evidence based medicine has never made 
the claim that randomisation balances known and unknown confounding 
factors between the treatment and control groups. However, as illustrated by 
the quote from the ‘How to Read Clinical Journals’ series on the previous 
page, the early hierarchies very clearly made this claim. The following quote 
from the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (2000) provides powerful 
indirect evidence that this idea has persisted: 
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‘Observational studies are inevitably limited by the possibility that 
apparent differences in treatment groups are really due to differences 
in patient prognosis in the treatment and control groups’ (Guyatt et al 
2000, page 1291). 
 
Howick (2011) claimed that randomised controlled trials did not need to rule 
out all confounding factors to provide superior evidence and only needed to 
rule out more confounding factors than other study designs36. He argued that 
randomisation prevented selection bias and allocation bias and that this ruled 
out some confounding factors that were not ruled out by other study designs: 
‘Randomised trials rule out the potentially confounding influence of 
self-selection bias and allocation bias while observational studies do 
not. Hence, randomised trials will usually provide stronger evidence 
than observational studies’ (Howick 2011, page 59). 
 
Allocation bias can occur when researchers are able to control whether study 
subjects are allocated to either the treatment group or control group. Self-
selection bias can occur when study subjects are able to determine whether 
they are allocated to either the treatment or control group. Both allocation 
bias and selection bias can purportedly lead to the preferential allocation of 
study subjects with certain characteristics to a particular study group 
                                                          
36
 I would argue that the results of any study design are either confounded or they are not. The claim 
presented by Howick (2011) relates to the idea that the results of some study designs can be closer 
to the truth that other study designs. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 when the property that 
is used to rank different study designs within hierarchies is analysed. 
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(Hackshaw et al 2006). The argument presented by Howick (2011) is 
therefore subtly different to the earlier arguments for the benefits of 
randomisation. Randomisation does not control for confounding factors 
directly it purports to control confounding factors indirectly by controlling 
allocation bias and selection bias. This is not a new argument (Worrall 2002, 
Worrall 2007). 
 
The argument proposed by Howick (2011) is associated with a number of 
problems. First, it assumes that if clinicians or patients are able to determine 
whether study subjects are placed in the treatment or control group 
confounding factors will be imbalanced between the two groups. This 
assumption is widely accepted as true but it is unclear whether it has any 
theoretical or empirical support. Second, randomisation may prevent 
researchers or study subjects determining whether study subjects are 
allocated to the treatment group or control group but it does not necessarily 
follow that this will balance confounding factors between the two groups. This 
is no different to the claim that randomisation balances confounding factors 
between the treatment and control groups. Third, even if allocation bias and 
selection bias can lead to an imbalance in confounding factors between study 
groups in interventional studies it does not automatically follow that 
randomisation is the only way, or even the best way, to prevent this. Surely 
we just need to prevent researchers and study subjects having any influence 
over group allocation. The allocation process does not need to be 
randomised it just needs to be concealed from patients and clinicians. 
Randomisation does not have any special epistemic property in this sense 
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and is no better than other methods that can be used to conceal the 
allocation sequence.    
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may accept that allocation 
concealment can be achieved in a number of different ways but argue that 
randomisation is the simplest way of ensuring that clinicians and patients 
have no influence over the allocation process. Allocation concealment is only 
relevant to interventional studies so this argument can only be used to claim 
that randomised controlled trials are superior to controlled clinical trials. 
However, although randomisation may be simple this is a practical 
consideration and it should not influence any theoretical arguments that are 
used to support hierarchies.  
 
Observational studies cannot employ allocation concealment because the 
researcher does not determine which subjects receive the treatment 
intervention. The modified argument presented by Howick (2011) may 
provide support for the claim that randomised controlled trials provide 
superior evidence to observational studies if we accept that allocation and 
selection bias may lead to an imbalance of confounding factors between 
treatment and control groups and this imbalance can be prevented by 
randomisation. However, it has already been argued that randomisation does 
not prevent an imbalance of confounding factors so this argument would only 
appear to offer weak support if it offers any support at all. 
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There appears to be limited support for the claim that randomisation 
balances known and unknown confounding factors between the treatment 
and control group in a randomised controlled trial. It is therefore interesting to 
consider why has this idea has persisted. Randomisation could balance 
confounding factors in a probabilistic sense if cumulative frequencies were 
reported after an indefinite number of repetitions (Worrall 2007)37. However, 
this is a theoretical interpretation that has no practical use as each participant 
in the study must be in either the treatment or control group and cannot be 
spread across the different groups in some probabilistic sense. Repeated 
randomisation, rather than a single episode of a randomisation, has been 
suggested as a solution to the problem of confounders but repeated 
randomisation will not balance confounders. A mistaken probabilistic 
interpretation of randomisation may explain why the belief that randomisation 
balances known and unknown confounding factors has persisted. 
 
In this section, the argument that randomised controlled trials provide the 
best evidence for determining the effectiveness of treatment interventions 
because they control for confounding factors has been considered. I have 
argued that randomisation is unlikely to balance known confounding factors 
and these can be better balanced by matching, exclusion or statistical 
analysis. These tools can also be used by observational studies. The claim 
that randomisation balances unknown confounding factors is unlikely and 
problematic to assess. The claim that randomisation balances confounding 
factors because it controls selection bias and allocation bias has also been 
                                                          
37
 This has been termed the limiting average effect. 
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analysed. However, it is unclear that randomisation prevents any imbalance 
of confounders that may occur when study participants and researchers are 
able to determine whether they are entered into the treatment group or 
control group. I would therefore argue that the confounding argument offers 
little support for the claim that randomised controlled trials should provide the 
highest level in the standard hierarchy of evidence.  
 
4.3.2. Randomised Controlled Trials Can Be Blinded: 
 
The second argument that is used to support the claim that randomised 
controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence is that 
randomised controlled trials can be blinded. This argument was originally 
presented by Cochrane (1972) and has been restated in support of a number 
of later hierarchies (Sackett 1989, Guyatt et al 1995, Guyatt et al 2004). 
 
In a clinical trial, study participants are allocated to either the treatment group 
or the control group. Blinding ensures that individuals involved with the 
clinical trial are unaware whether study participants are in the treatment 
group or the control group after they have been allocated. Seven groups of 
individuals can potentially be blinded in any clinical trial: patients, clinicians, 
data collectors, outcome assessors, data analysts, trial monitoring committee 
members and manuscript writers (Haynes 2006) although none of the 
hierarchies specify which of these groups of individuals need to be blinded 
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for blinding to be effective. Blinding is considered important because if 
individuals involved with a study are aware whether a study participant is in 
the treatment or control group this may influence the way that treatment is 
provided, outcomes are measured or the study is reported. Blinding is 
considered particularly important to prevent performance bias and 
measurement bias (Higgins and Green 2011). The blinding argument is 
presented below. 
 
The Blinding Argument: 
 
If a study design can be blinded it provides the best evidence for determining 
the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Randomised controlled trials can be blinded 
Randomised controlled trials provide the best evidence for determining the 
effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
 
The blinding argument is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We 
therefore need to assess the truth of the premises to determine whether the 
argument is sound. The second premise of the blinding argument claims that 
randomised controlled trials can be blinded. A randomised controlled trial can 
only be blinded if the interventions given to the treatment group and the 
control group are indistinguishable. If the interventions can be distinguished 
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blinding is broken. Blinding may be broken because the interventions are 
different, require different aftercare or have different adverse effects. 
Proponents of evidence based medicine acknowledge that blinding of 
randomised controlled trials is difficult in many trials (Haynes et al 2006). 
However, unless the treatment and control interventions are indistinguishable 
blinding is not difficult, it is impossible. Consider a randomised controlled trial 
where the treatment group receive a new surgical procedure. Even if the 
control group receive mock surgery, at some point, blinding must be broken 
so that the surgeon can perform the correct procedure38.  
 
Randomised controlled trials that investigate pharmacological interventions 
can potentially be blinded when the treatment and control interventions 
appear identical. However, even within this subset of randomised controlled 
trials, blinding is broken where the treatment drug and control drug have 
different side effects. The claim that all randomised control trials can be 
blinded is false. If this claim is restricted to randomised control trials where 
the interventions given to the treatment group and control group are 
indistinguishable the claim may be true. However, this restricts the claim to a 
small subset of randomised controlled trials and significantly weakens the 
argument. 
 
The first premise of the blinding argument claims that if a study design can 
be blinded it provides the best evidence for determining the effectiveness of a 
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 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the ethics of mock surgical procedures. 
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treatment intervention. Randomisation is not a necessary condition for a 
study to be blinded. Blinding simply means that individuals involved in a 
study are unaware whether study participants are in the treatment group or 
control group. As long as the method that is used to allocate patients to each 
group is concealed, blinding can be achieved. This is termed allocation 
concealment. For example, study participants could be allocated to the 
treatment group or control group based upon their date of birth, shoe size or 
hair colour. As long as none of the individuals involved with the study were 
aware of the allocation process that was used blinding could be achieved. 
This means that any controlled clinical trial can potentially be blinded. It may 
be argued that randomisation is the simplest method of generating a 
concealable allocation sequence but this is a practical consideration and 
should not influence any theoretical arguments underpinning the standard 
hierarchy of evidence. 
 
Any study design where the investigator is able to control the treatment 
intervention that study participants receive has the potential to be blinded. 
Prospective case series are often considered to be observational studies but 
this study design has the potential to be interventional. A prospective case 
series could be envisaged where study participants were given a new drug 
but none of the individuals involved in the trial were informed. This study 
design could be blinded and, using the blinding argument, would be ranked 
as the highest level of evidence. It could be argued that a prospective case 
series conducted in this way was unethical. However, this is an ethical 
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consideration and we are considering the theoretical basis of the hierarchy of 
evidence. 
 
The blinding argument is usually used to support the claim that randomised 
controlled trials provide superior evidence to observational studies. In an 
observational study the researcher does not allocate study participants to the 
treatment group or the control group and outcomes are simply observed. 
Observational studies cannot be blinded because the patient and clinician 
are already aware which group the study participant has entered. This leads 
us to an interesting question: should observational studies be ranked as a 
lower level of evidence than interventional studies because they cannot be 
blinded? 
 
One reason that blinding is considered important is because it prevents 
knowledge of whether the patient has been allocated to the treatment group 
or the control group influencing the way that outcomes are measured. It is 
reasoned that if the outcome assessor is aware that the study participant is in 
the treatment group they may report outcomes more favourably. This is 
termed measurement bias and may be either conscious or unconscious 
(Haynes et al 2006, Straus et al 2011, Higgins and Green 2011). However, 
measurement bias is only problematic when the outcome assessor is able to 
interpret the outcome in different ways. Measurement bias is not a problem 
when objective outcome measures, such as tooth loss or death, are used. In 
these situations it does not matter if the outcome assessor has been blinded 
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as the tooth is either present or absent or the patient is alive or dead. This 
was recognised by Cochrane (1972): 
‘The best index in these sorts of comparisons is the fact of death 
where there is little possibility of bias due to observer difference’ 
(Cochrane, 1972, page 20). 
 
It is true that observational studies cannot be blinded but this is not a problem 
if objective outcome measures are used because these studies are not 
susceptible to measurement bias. Observational studies that do use 
subjective outcome measures are susceptible to measurement bias and 
would benefit from blinding. However, this does not mean that all 
observational studies need to be blinded to prevent measurement bias. 
 
Blinding is also considered important because it prevents performance bias 
(Higgins and Green 2011). However, if observational studies are conducted 
according to strict protocols, and any deviations from these protocols are 
recorded and accounted for during statistical analysis of the results, 
performance bias should not be problematic. We trust researchers to observe 
best practice when they undertake randomised controlled trials so why 
should we not trust them to follow treatment protocols in observational 
studies that cannot be blinded? 
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Howick (2011) considered the importance of blinding in ‘The Philosophy of 
Evidence Based Medicine’. He was concerned that the effectiveness of many 
accepted interventions, for example adrenalin for the management of 
anaphylaxis, had never been confirmed by blinded studies. He termed this 
‘Phillip’s paradox’. Howick (2011) resolved this paradox by claiming that 
dramatic treatment effects could override the importance of blinding. This 
provides further evidence that blinding is unnecessary to determine the 
effectiveness of treatment interventions and undermines the first premise of 
the blinding argument.  
 
In this section, the argument that randomised controlled trials provide the 
best evidence for determining the effectiveness of treatment interventions 
because they can be blinded has been considered. I have argued that 
randomised controlled trials can only be blinded when the treatment and 
control interventions are indistinguishable and shown that the blinding 
argument does not separate randomised controlled trials from controlled 
clinical trials. Observational studies cannot be blinded but this is not always 
problematic as measurement bias, can be controlled through the use of 
objective outcome measures. The argument that all randomised controlled 
trials should provide the highest level of evidence because they can be 
blinded is therefore unsound. This argument could be modified. It could be 
restricted to the small subset of randomised controlled trials that use 
subjective outcome measures, where the treatment and control interventions 
are indistinguishable. However, this would significantly restrict the scope of 
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the blinding argument and would not support the standard hierarchy of 
evidence. 
 
4.3.3. Further Arguments for Randomised Controlled Trials: 
 
Two other arguments have been used to support the claim that randomised 
controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence for determining 
the effectiveness of treatment interventions (Worrall 2002, Worrall 2007). 
Interestingly, neither of these arguments is directly used by any of the 
hierarchies that were identified by the systematic review presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The first of these arguments claims that randomisation is necessary to 
guarantee the validity of classical significance testing (Worrall 2007). 
Classical significance testing is used to determine the probability that the 
observed difference in outcomes between the treatment and control groups 
would be observed by chance if the null hypothesis, that there is no 
difference between the treatment intervention and control intervention, was 
correct. Classical significance testing assumes that the treatment and control 
groups are identical. However, the treatment and control groups can only be 
identical if known and unknown confounding factors are equally balanced 
between the two groups. This argument is actually the confounding argument 
in a different guise and has already been considered.  
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The second argument claims that it is an empirical fact that observational 
studies overestimate the effectiveness of treatment interventions when 
compared with randomised controlled trials (Worrall 2002, Worrall 2007, 
Howick 2011). A number of historical examples are used to support this 
claim39. In each of these examples treatment interventions supported by 
observational studies are subsequently shown to be ineffective or harmful 
once randomised controlled trials are conducted. 
 
The results of randomised controlled trials and observational studies 
conducted to answer the same question can vary substantially. However, the 
results of randomised controlled trials and observational studies conducted to 
answer the same question can also agree and the results of different 
randomised controlled trials conducted to answer the same question can vary 
substantially. The variability amongst the results of randomised controlled 
trials is the rationale for meta-analyses and is exemplified by the logo of the 
Cochrane Collaboration.  
 
When observational studies and randomised controlled trials investigating the 
effectiveness of the same treatment intervention produce different results it 
does not necessarily follow that the observational studies have overestimated 
the treatment effect (La Caze 2009). It is also possible that the randomised 
                                                          
39
 Commonly used examples include the use of hormone replacement therapy in postmenopausal 
women to reduce the risk of adverse cardiovascular events and the use of the antiarrhythmic drugs 
encainide and flecainide following myocardial infarction (Guyatt et al 2008, Howick 2011). 
116 
 
controlled trials have underestimated the treatment effect or that neither 
study design provides a true estimate of treatment effect. In order to decide 
which of these interpretations is correct we need a standard that we can 
compare the results of the different studies against. In the standard hierarchy 
of evidence the randomised controlled trial provides this standard. However, 
the results of randomised controlled trials cannot be used to support the 
claim that observational studies overestimate the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions relative to randomised controlled trials because this would be a 
circular argument. This has been termed the calibration problem (Blunt 
2015). 
 
Blunt (2015) has argued that a number of different studies with consistent 
results could be used to provide an external standard40. However, if this 
evidence is available surely it should provide the highest level of evidence. 
Even if an external standard was available, and this could be used to show 
that observational studies had overestimated treatment effects in the 
historical examples highlighted in the evidence based medicine literature, this 
would not provide strong support for the argument that observational studies 
overestimated treatment effects in general. This is because there would still 
be a number of alternative explanations for the historical examples that are 
used. For example, the observational studies may have been poorly 
conducted, the study participants may not have been representative of the 
population or the data may have been misreported. It has been 
                                                          
40
 Hierarchies that include systematic reviews as the highest level of evidence are considered in the 
next section. 
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acknowledged that observational studies can produce similar results to 
randomised controlled trials when they are well conducted (Worrall 2007). If 
this claim is true the historical examples used by proponents of evidence 
based medicine carry little weight. 
 
If the argument that observational studies overestimate treatment effects 
relative to randomised controlled trials is accepted, we should have less 
confidence in the results of an observational study, than a randomised 
controlled trial, that shows a positive treatment effect. We may have more 
confidence that the treatment intervention, investigated in the observational 
study, has some positive effect, if there is a large treatment effect, and this is 
recognised by the GRADE hierarchy of evidence (Guyatt et al 2008). 
However, this argument is only applied to studies that produce positive 
results. When randomised controlled trials and observational studies both 
show that a treatment intervention is not effective we have no reason to be 
more confident in the results of the randomised controlled trial. This is a 
paradox that is not explained by the hierarchies (Blunt 2015).  
 
In this subsection we have considered two further arguments that have been 
advanced to support the claim that randomised controlled trials provide the 
highest level of evidence. The first argument claims that randomisation is 
necessary for classical significance testing. However, this is a restatement of 
the confounding argument and this argument has already been considered. 
The second argument claims that observational studies overestimate the 
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effectiveness of treatment interventions. However, this argument is 
problematic because it is a circular argument, there are alternative 
explanations for the historical examples that provide empirical support and it 
does not apply to observational studies that show a treatment intervention is 
ineffective.  
 
4.3.4. Summary: 
 
In this section we have considered the different arguments that have been 
used to rank randomised controlled trials as the highest level of evidence 
when determining the effectiveness of treatment interventions. The 
confounding argument is problematic because randomisation is unlikely to 
balance known confounding factors and this is better achieved by tools that 
are available to observational studies. There is also no theoretical or 
empirical evidence to support the claim that randomisation balances 
unknown confounding factors. The arguments that randomisation is 
necessary for the validity of classical significance testing and can prevent an 
imbalance in confounding factors by controlling selection bias and allocation 
bias are effectively the confounding argument in different guises. These 
arguments provide no further support for the claim that randomised controlled 
trials should provide the highest level of evidence.  
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The blinding argument offers no support for the claim that all randomised 
controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence because many 
randomised controlled trials cannot be blinded. Blinding is primarily designed 
to prevent performance and measurement bias but these types of bias may 
be unproblematic in observational studies when treatment protocols are 
followed and objective outcome measures are used. The blinding argument 
may be sound if it is limited to randomised controlled trials where the 
treatment intervention and control intervention are indistinguishable but this 
severely restricts the scope of the argument and does not support the 
standard hierarchy of evidence. 
 
It has also been argued that randomised controlled trials should provide the 
highest level of evidence because observational studies overestimate the 
effectiveness of treatment interventions. However, this requires an external 
standard of reference to avoid criticisms of circularity and this is not available. 
The results of randomised controlled trials and observational studies do 
sometimes disagree but this does not necessarily reflect a fundamental 
problem with the design of observational studies. The results of different 
randomised controlled trials can also disagree and this is the rationale for 
meta-analyses. 
 
The different arguments that have been analysed in this section provide little 
support for the claim that randomised controlled trials should provide the 
highest level in hierarchies of evidence. This may explain why systematic 
120 
 
reviews and meta-analyses provide the highest level of evidence in many 
later hierarchies. The arguments that have been used to rank systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses atop the modified standard hierarchy of evidence 
are considered in the next section.  
 
4.4. Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: 
 
The modified standard hierarchy of evidence ranks systematic reviews and/or 
meta-analyses above randomised controlled trials above observational 
studies above expert opinion. The American College of Chest Physicians 
(Cook et al 1992) were the first group to rank meta-analyses as the highest 
level of evidence. This group modified their original hierarchy because they 
recognised that meta-analyses, termed scientific overviews41, provided 
superior evidence to randomised controlled trials: 
‘The (old) Levels of Evidence were developed prior to the recognition 
of the power of rigorous scientific overview’. (Cook et al 1992 page 
305S-306S) 
Systematic reviews first appeared as the highest level of evidence in 1995 in 
the hierarchy used by the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council (Gugiu and Gugiu 2010). Since this time meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews have increasingly appeared as the highest level of 
evidence in different hierarchies (Appendix 3). 
                                                          
41
 This provides another example of proponents of evidence based medicine using words with 
powerful perlocutionary force. 
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Different hierarchies rank meta-analyses (Cook et al 1992, Stetler et al 
1998), systematic reviews (Ball and Phillips 2001, Merlin et al 2009) and both 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Meltzer et al 1998, Harbour and 
Miller 2001) as the highest level of evidence. Other hierarchies purposefully 
exclude systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Guyatt el al 1995, Atkins et 
al 2004). It is therefore important to clarify exactly what systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses are before analysing the arguments that are used to 
support the claim that they should provide the highest level of evidence. 
 
A systematic review is a process that is used to identify, appraise and 
summarise individual studies addressing a focussed question in a structured 
way (Pope et al 2007, Guyatt et al 2008, Straus et al 2011). A meta-analysis 
is a statistical technique for quantitatively combining the results of individual 
studies measuring the same outcome to generate a pooled estimate for that 
outcome (Pope et al 2007, Guyatt et al 2008). A meta-analysis may be 
undertaken as part of a systematic review if the individual studies identified 
by the systematic review are considered sufficiently similar (Guyatt et al 
2008). 
 
Systematic reviews encompass a wide range of different processes including 
thematic analyses and meta-analyses (Pope et al 2007, Hammersley 2013). 
Systematic reviews are not restricted to randomised controlled trials and can 
be used to summarise the results of other study designs (Stroup et al 2000). 
122 
 
The technique of meta-analyses can also be used to generate a pooled 
estimate for a treatment outcome even when individual studies have been 
identified using a non-systematic process. However, when the hierarchies 
refer to systematic reviews it is explicitly clear that they refer to a process that 
can be used to identify, appraise and summarise the results of randomised 
controlled trials and that these systematic reviews should use meta-analysis 
when the randomised controlled trials are considered sufficiently similar. The 
hierarchies therefore consider meta-analyses to be a subset of systematic 
reviews of randomised controlled trials. 
 
Some hierarchies (Guyatt el al 1995, Guyatt et al 1998, Atkins et al 2004) 
purposefully exclude systematic reviews. This is not because these 
hierarchies consider systematic reviews to be unimportant. On the contrary, 
the systematic review is integral to the way that these hierarchies are used. 
These hierarchies exclude systematic reviews so that users are able to 
control the randomised controlled trials that are included, appraised and 
summarised. Systematic reviews are effectively excluded because they can 
be poorly conducted. However, this position is paradoxical because any 
review process or study design can be poorly conducted. These hierarchies 
all include randomised controlled trials and observational studies despite the 
fact that these study designs can also be poorly conducted. Proponents of 
evidence based medicine may argue that it is more difficult to assess 
whether a systematic review has been well conducted than a randomised 
controlled trial. However, this is a practical consideration that is not relevant 
when we consider the theoretical support for hierarchies of evidence.  
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The systematic reviews valued by the hierarchies summarise the results of 
randomised controlled trials and undertake meta-analysis when the 
randomised controlled trials are sufficiently similar. A systematic review may 
identify no randomised controlled trials, one randomised controlled trial or 
multiple randomised controlled trials. A systematic review that identifies no 
randomised controlled trials provides no evidence although it may identify an 
area where research is required. A systematic review that identifies one 
randomised controlled trial provides no greater support for a treatment 
intervention than that one trial although it may appear to do so if ranked as a 
systematic review. Therefore, when we consider the claim that systematic 
reviews provide the highest level of evidence, we need to restrict the claim to 
systematic reviews that summarise the results of at least two randomised 
controlled trials. 
 
When the hierarchies of evidence are considered collectively only two 
arguments are presented to support the claim that systematic reviews and/or 
meta-analyses should provide the highest level of evidence. The first 
argument claims that meta-analyses produce an estimate of treatment effect 
that is closer to the truth that the results of individual randomised controlled 
trials. The second argument claims that systematic reviews allow 
assessment of the consistency of treatment effect. These arguments are 
considered below. 
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4.4.1. Meta-analyses produce Results that are closer to the Truth: 
 
The first argument that is used to support the claim that systematic reviews 
and/or meta-analyses should provide the highest level of evidence is that 
meta-analyses produce results that are closer to the truth than individual 
randomised controlled trials. This is illustrated by the following quote from the 
American College of Chest Physicians:  
‘The most compelling rationale for meta-analysis is its ability to 
generate more precise estimates of the true treatment effect’ (Cook et 
al 1992 page 307S) 
The truth argument is summarised below: 
 
The truth argument: 
 
If a process or study design produces an estimate of treatment effect that is 
closer to the truth that other processes or study designs it provides the best 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Meta-analysis produces an estimate of treatment effect that is closer to the 
truth that other processes or study designs 
Meta-analyses provide the best evidence for determining the effectiveness of 
a treatment intervention 
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This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. In order to determine if 
the truth argument is sound we therefore need to assess the truth of the 
premises. However, before the truth argument is analysed in detail it is 
important to stress that this argument is restricted to meta-analyses and 
cannot be used to support the wider claim that systematic reviews should 
provide the highest level of evidence. This is because although systematic 
reviews summarise component studies only meta-analyses provide a pooled 
estimate of treatment effect. The truth argument only provides support for the 
claim that a small subset of systematic reviews should provide the highest 
level of evidence. 
 
The truth argument is immediately problematic because it uses the concept 
of truth. Although a number of different theories of truth have been proposed 
within philosophy they all agree that propositions are either true or false 
(Simmons 2005)42. It is therefore unclear how the conclusions of any process 
or study design can take us closer to the truth. The conclusions of 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are often expressed as 
numerical values which may produce the illusion that you are closer or further 
away from the true value but each conclusion can only ever be true or false. 
Unless proponents of evidence based medicine are able to articulate a theory 
of truth that allows conclusions to be closer to the truth the first premise of 
the truth argument is false and the argument is unsound.  
                                                          
42
 It is generally accepted that evidence based medicine uses a correspondence theory of truth. 
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An underlying principle of analytical philosophy is that any arguments should 
be interpreted using the principle of charity. We will therefore assume that the 
conclusions of different processes and study designs can be closer to the 
truth and that conclusions that are closer to the truth provide superior 
evidence. If these assumptions are accepted we then need to consider any 
empirical or theoretical support for the second premise that meta-analyses 
produce conclusions that are closer to the truth that randomised controlled 
trials. 
 
Meta-analysis presumes that if we combine the results of several randomised 
controlled trials the pooled estimate of treatment effect will be closer to the 
true treatment effect. This is an inductive argument and does not provide 
strong support for the claim because it is not necessarily true. Empirical 
support for the claim could be provided if there was a standard that we could 
compare the results of meta-analyses against. However, other meta-
analyses cannot provide this standard as this would be a circular argument. 
Another study design could potentially provide an external standard but this 
study design would then surely provide the highest level of evidence.  
 
The inductive argument that is used to support the claim that meta-analyses 
provide the highest level of evidence is associated with additional problems. 
First, if the total number of observations is the most important factor then 
randomised controlled trials with large numbers of participants should be 
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ranked as the highest level of evidence alongside meta-analyses. This 
approach was adopted by Hadorn et al (1996) but this is unusual amongst 
hierarchies. Second, meta-analyses only quantitatively combine the results of 
randomised controlled trials but, as demonstrated in the previous section, 
there is little empirical of theoretical evidence to support the claim that 
randomised controlled trials provide superior evidence to observational 
studies. It is therefore not clear that we will get closer to the truth if we 
quantitatively combine randomised controlled trials and not observational 
studies.   
 
In this subsection we have considered the argument that meta-analyses 
provide the highest level of evidence because they provide results that are 
closer to the truth. This argument is restricted to meta-analyses and uses one 
particular concept of truth. Even when the argument is interpreted charitably 
it derives no empirical support from an external standard and relies on 
inductive reasoning. Furthermore, the claim that randomised controlled trials 
provide superior evidence to other study designs underlies the truth 
argument and, as argued in the previous section, this claim has limited 
support. I would therefore argue that the truth argument is unsound. 
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4.4.2. Systematic Reviews Allow Assessment of Consistency of Treatment 
Effect: 
 
The second argument that is used to support the claim that systematic 
reviews should provide the highest level of evidence is that systematic 
reviews can be used to assessment the consistency of treatment effect. 
Consideration of consistency of treatment effect was clearly important to the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group when they developed their first 
hierarchy: 
‘When differences in treatment effect across studies are greater than 
one would expect by chance alone, and varying populations, 
interventions, outcomes, or study methods cannot explain the 
differences, inferences become weaker’ (Guyatt et al 1995 page 1800) 
 
Consideration of consistency of treatment effects is important because 
treatment interventions usually produce variable effects in study participants. 
The results of randomised controlled trials and observational studies are 
presented as average treatment effects but this hides the fact that many 
patients do better or worse than average (Blunt 2015). When different 
randomised controlled trials or observational studies are undertaken 
investigating the same treatment intervention each study will usually produce 
a different average treatment effect. This inconsistency in treatment effect, 
both within and between studies, can be explained by a number of factors 
including differences in the study participants, clinicians, study designs and 
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outcome measures. Consistency in treatment effect is important from a 
clinical perspective because clinicians need to be confident that treatment will 
benefit patients, particularly when treatments have potential adverse effects. 
The consistency argument is summarised below: 
 
The Consistency Argument 
 
If a process or study design allows assessment of the consistency of 
treatment effects it provides the best evidence for the effectiveness of a 
treatment intervention 
Systematic reviews allow assessment of the consistency of treatment effects 
Systematic reviews provide the best evidence for determining the 
effectiveness of a treatment intervention. 
 
This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We therefore need to 
analyse the truth of the premises to determine if the argument is sound. The 
second premise claims systematic reviews can be used to show that a 
treatment intervention has inconsistent treatment effects across different 
studies. However, what does it mean for treatment effects to be inconsistent? 
Unless the different studies produce identical treatment effects the results are 
inconsistent. Some hierarchies provide rules to guide interpretation of 
inconsistency but they provide no arguments or empirical evidence to support 
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these rules. For example, the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 
claimed that inconsistent treatment effects became problematic when the 
point estimates of treatment effect in the two most disparate randomised 
controlled trials differed by greater than 20% (Guyatt et al 1995). Most 
hierarchies leave the interpretation of inconsistent treatment effects to the 
reviewer:  
‘By homogeneity we mean a systematic review that is free from 
worrisome variations in the direction and degrees of results between 
individual studies. Not all systematic reviews with statistically 
significant heterogeneity need be worrisome, and not all worrisome 
heterogeneity need be statistically significant’. (Ball and Phillips, 2001, 
page 7) 
The hierarchies appear to value systematic reviews because they allow the 
consistency of treatment effects to be assessed but these systematic reviews 
use arbitrary rules and opinion to determine when treatment effects are 
consistent. This makes it difficult to assess the second premise but we will 
assess it charitably and accept that systematic reviews can assess 
consistency of treatment effect.  
 
The first premise of the consistency argument claims that we need to be able 
to assess the consistency of treatment effects in order to determine whether 
a treatment intervention is effective. Assessment of consistency is important 
but I would argue that explanation of any inconsistency is more important. 
When a treatment intervention produces inconsistent treatment effects, but 
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this inconsistency can be explained, the inconsistency is not troublesome 
and the treatment intervention can be used with confidence. This is implicit in 
the quote from Ball and Phillips (2001) on the previous page. 
 
Systematic reviews may be able to identify inconsistency in treatment effects 
but they do not explain that inconsistency. The results of systematic reviews 
have to be interpreted and expert opinion, biological plausibility, 
pathophysiological rationale and findings from randomised controlled trials 
and observational studies are often used to explain any inconsistency. The 
explanation of any inconsistency is surely more important that the initial 
discovery of that inconsistency. It is therefore unclear why systematic reviews 
should be ranked as the highest level of evidence simply because they may 
identify inconsistent treatment effects. I would argue that the first premise of 
the consistency argument is false because identification of inconsistency is 
clearly less important than explanation of inconsistent treatment effects. 
 
In order to assess the consistency of any treatment effect we need to assess 
treatment outcomes in large groups of study participants. However, 
systematic reviews are not the only processes or study designs that can 
provide this information. Narrative reviews are often considered inferior to 
systematic reviews but narrative reviews can nonetheless be rigorous. 
Indeed methodologies for narrative reviews have advanced significantly in 
the last ten years (Hammersley 2013). A single randomised controlled trial or 
observational study, involving a large number of subjects can also provide 
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this information. Proponents of evidence based medicine may argue that 
large studies are difficult to undertake (Howick 2011) but this is a practical 
consideration that should not influence the theory underpinning hierarchies. 
This has important implications because even if the consistency argument is 
sound it does not differentiate systematic reviews from narrative reviews and 
large primary studies.  
 
The systematic reviews valued by the hierarchies of evidence only consider 
the results of randomised controlled trials. However, systematic reviews that 
are not restricted to randomised controlled trials can identify greater numbers 
of studies (Stroup et al 2000). This can provide more information about the 
consistency of treatment effects. If a systematic review that includes both 
randomised controlled trials and observational studies shows a consistent 
treatment effect this surely carries greater evidential weight than a systematic 
review based upon randomised controlled trials alone. The systematic 
reviews that are valued by the hierarchies of evidence may therefore be 
inferior to other types of systematic reviews at assessing consistency of 
treatment effect. If this is the case they should not be ranked as the highest 
level of evidence. 
 
In this subsection we have considered the claim that systematic reviews 
should provide the highest level of evidence because they allow assessment 
of consistency of treatment effect. I have argued that the inconsistency 
argument is unsound because explanation of inconsistency is more important 
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than identification of inconsistency. The inconsistency argument is also 
problematic because it does not differentiate systematic reviews from 
narrative reviews and large primary studies. It therefore cannot be used to 
claim that systematic reviews are probably superior to these study designs. 
   
4.4.3. Summary: 
 
In this section the two arguments that have been used to rank systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence have been 
considered: the truth argument and the consistency argument. The truth 
argument can only be applied to meta-analyses, uses one particular concept 
of truth and is underpinned by the problematic claim that randomised 
controlled trials provide superior evidence to observational study designs. 
The consistency argument is not restricted to systematic reviews and can be 
used to support the wider claim that narrative reviews and studies with large 
numbers of participants should provide the highest level of evidence. I have 
also argued that the consistency argument is unsound because explanation 
of inconsistent treatment effects is more important than identification of 
inconsistent effects. The claim that systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses 
should provide the highest level of evidence would therefore appear to have 
little theoretical support. In the next section we will move to the bottom of the 
hierarchies and consider the arguments that have been used to rank expert 
opinion as the lowest level of evidence. 
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4.5. Expert Opinion  
 
When the hierarchies of evidence are considered collectively expert opinion 
is most commonly ranked as the lowest level of evidence. However, this is 
not a universal finding and many hierarchies either exclude expert opinion or 
rank a different form of evidence as the lowest level of evidence. For 
example, both of the hierarchies produced by the American Association of 
Critical Care Nurses (Armola et al 2009) rank manufacturer’s 
recommendations below expert opinion. Other hierarchies attribute greater 
evidential value to expert opinion. For example, the Oncology Nursing 
Society hierarchy (Mitchell and Friese 2007) allows expert opinion to reach 
the highest level of evidence in some circumstances. In this section we will 
analyse the arguments that have been used to rank expert opinion as the 
lowest level of evidence in hierarchies. 
  
Five arguments have been used to support the claim that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence: expert opinion does not involve 
measurement; expert opinion is susceptible to measurement bias; expert 
opinion does not consider what happens to patients without treatment; expert 
opinion does not consider large numbers of patients and expert opinion may 
be incorrect. These arguments repeatedly appear in the evidence based 
medicine literature although no hierarchy uses all of the arguments and many 
hierarchies provide no arguments to justify the ranking of expert opinion as 
the lowest level of evidence. Each of the arguments can be identified in the 
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following quotes from ‘Effectiveness and Efficiency’ (Cochrane 1972) and the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1995): 
‘The oldest, and probably still the commonest form of evidence 
proffered, is clinical opinion. This varies in value with the ability of the 
clinician and the width of his experience, but its value must be rated 
low, because there is no quantitative measurement, no attempt to 
discover what would happen if the patients had no treatment, and 
every possibility of bias affecting the assessment of the result.’ 
(Cochrane, 1972, page 20). 
‘The unsystematic observations of the individual clinician constitute 
one source of evidence, and physiological experiments another. 
Unsystematic clinical observations are limited by small sample size, 
and more importantly, by limitations in human processes of making 
inferences. Predictions about intervention effects on clinically 
important outcomes from physiological experiments are usually right, 
but occasionally disastrously wrong’ (Guyatt et al, 2000, page 1291) 
 
The ranking of expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence has been 
considered confusing. Worrall (2007) could not understand why expert 
opinion was ranked below randomised controlled trials when randomised 
controlled trials had no place in established sciences such as physics. 
Thompson (2010) argued that explanatory theory, which would be 
categorised as expert opinion within most hierarchies, should provide the 
highest, not the lowest, level of evidence. It is therefore important to critically 
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analyse the arguments that have been used to rank expert opinion as the 
lowest level of evidence. 
 
4.5.1. Defining Expert Opinion: 
 
Before we can analyse the arguments that are used to rank expert opinion as 
the lowest level of evidence we need to clarify exactly what expert opinion is. 
This is surprisingly difficult because although hierarchies commonly include 
expert opinion few of them provide a definition of this term. The picture is 
further complicated by the use of terms such as clinical opinion (Cochrane 
1972), clinical experience (Chestnut et al 1999), mechanism based reasoning 
(Howick et al 2011), rational conjecture and common sense (American Heart 
Association 2000) which may, or may not, be synonymous with expert 
opinion. For example, Cochrane (1972) ranks clinical opinion as the lowest 
level of evidence but does not define the term. Spitzer et al (1979), Harbour 
and Miller (2001) and Evans (2003) rank expert opinion as the lowest level of 
evidence but do not define the term and Chestnut et al (1999) differentiates 
between expert opinion and clinical experience, suggesting that they are 
different concepts, but neither term is defined and the distinction does not 
influence hierarchal position. 
 
Some hierarchies are restricted to different study designs and exclude expert 
opinion altogether (Trout 1981, Sackett 1989, Cook et al 1992, Guyatt et al 
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1995, Brozek et al 2009). The GRADE system explicitly excludes expert 
opinion because expert opinion is considered integral to the interpretation of 
all evidence, including the results of randomised controlled trials and 
observational studies (Brozek et al 2009). None of the other hierarchies that 
exclude expert opinion provide an explanation for this decision. 
 
When the hierarchies do provide a definition for expert opinion they often 
imply that expert opinion is unsystematic, uncritical and anecdotal. For 
example, the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group equate expert 
opinion with: 
‘Unsystematic observations from clinical experience’ (Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group, 1992, page 2421 and Guyatt et al 2000) 
The Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine hierarchy specifies that 
expert opinion has not undergone explicit critical appraisal (Ball and Phillips 
2001) and Djulbegovic and Hadley (1998) equate expert opinion with 
anecdotal data. If expert opinion is unsystematic, uncritical and anecdotal it 
may deserve to be ranked as the lowest level of evidence or even excluded 
from hierarchies altogether.  
 
Not all hierarchies characterise expert opinion as unsystematic, uncritical and 
anecdotal. The Oncology Nursing Society (Mitchell and Friese 2007) are 
explicit that expert opinion is produced using a systematic process. Their 
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hierarchy allows expert opinion to be ranked as the highest level of evidence. 
They define expert opinion in the following way: 
‘Recommendations from a panel of experts that derive from an explicit 
literature search strategy, and include thorough analysis, quality rating 
and synthesis of evidence’ (Mitchell and Friese 2007) 
Some hierarchies would categorise evidence produced in this way as a 
systematic review. However, the Oncology Nursing Society defines a 
systematic review as a process that collates information from research 
studies. 
 
Some hierarchies differentiate between different types of expert opinion: 
Cochrane (1972) claimed that the value of expert opinion depended upon the 
ability and experience of the expert offering the opinion; the John Hopkins 
Evidence Rating Scale differentiated between the opinion of a group of 
experts and individual expert opinion (Newhouse et al 2007) and Braunwald 
et al (1994) excluded individual expert opinion and ranked expert consensus 
as the lowest level of evidence. These hierarchies provide no arguments to 
support the claim that the opinion of a group of experts should carry greater 
evidential weight than the opinion of an individual expert. 
 
Expert opinion is included in many of the hierarchies although the term is 
often not defined. When expert opinion is defined a number of different 
definitions are provided. Many of these definitions have negative 
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perlocutionary force as they equate expert opinion with an unsystematic or 
uncritical approach. It has been recognised that expert opinion may vary in 
quality but this is not generally acknowledged by most of the hierarchies. 
Overall the hierarchies of evidence paint a confusing picture about expert 
opinion. This complicates analysis of the arguments. However, in order to 
progress with our analysis we need to develop a working definition of expert 
opinion. 
 
The standard hierarchy of evidence contains randomised controlled trials, 
observational studies and expert opinion. A clear distinction is made between 
interventional and observational study designs and expert opinion. This 
allows us to define expert opinion in a negative sense: expert opinion is what 
remains once evidence from different study designs has been excluded. This 
definition is consistent with the way that the hierarchies are designed to be 
used. When clinicians are faced with a clinical problem, evidence based 
medicine instructs them to search the medical literature in a structured way 
for a solution. Expert opinion is only used if there are no interventional or 
observational studies to guide them (Guyatt et al 2000, Straus et al 2011).  
 
Cochrane (1972) was concerned that expert opinion could vary in quality but 
this is true of any study design that can be included in a hierarchy. 
Systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials and observational studies 
can all vary in quality if they are poorly conducted. In this chapter we are 
analysing the theoretical basis of the hierarchy of evidence. We therefore 
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have a duty to interpret expert opinion in the most charitable light. Expert 
opinion does not have to be unsystematic, uncritical or anecdotal and when 
expert opinion is interpreted in this way it is easily denigrated. I would argue 
that there is a significant difference between the gut feeling of an expert 
based upon no evidence and the consensus opinion of a group of experts 
following detailed consideration of an evidence base. The characterisation of 
expert opinion as unsystematic and uncritical is unhelpful and may explain 
why this form of evidence is not valued by many hierarchies. 
 
Fricker (2005) has argued that any expert opinion must be sincere and 
competent. Previous track record, credentials, reputation and possible 
distorting factors can provide a guide to sincerity and competence (Goldman 
2001, Fricker 2002). However, these factors are generally ignored by the 
hierarchies. Manufacturer’s recommendations provide the lowest level of 
evidence in the hierarchies developed by the American Association of Critical 
Care Nurses (Armola et al 2009) because they may be susceptible to 
distorting factors but no other hierarchies consider this factor. The ‘How to 
Read Clinical Journals’ series did advocate consideration of the track record 
of study authors but their hierarchy did not include expert opinion (Trout 
1981). Where the hierarchies make a distinction between individual expert 
opinion and expert group consensus this may reflect perceived sincerity and 
competence.  
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Expert opinion has been defined in a number of different ways by the 
hierarchies of evidence and this complicates our understanding of the 
concept. A number of the definitions characterise expert opinion in a negative 
way and this may have reinforced negative perceptions of this type of 
evidence. In order to proceed with this analysis expert opinion has been 
interpreted charitably and a working definition has been developed. Expert 
opinion is the evidence that remains once evidence from different study 
designs has been excluded. We will now consider the five different 
arguments that have been used to rank expert opinion as the lowest level of 
evidence. 
 
4.5.2. The Measurement Arguments: 
 
The first two arguments that are used to support the claim that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence relate to the measurement of 
treatment effects. These arguments, which are summarised below, are 
considered together because they are inter-related.  
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The Measurement Argument: 
 
If a form of evidence does not involve measurement it provides the worst 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Expert opinion does not involve measurement 
Expert opinion provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness 
of a treatment intervention 
 
The Measurement Bias Argument: 
 
If a form of evidence is affected by measurement bias it provides the worst 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Expert opinion is affected by measurement bias 
Expert opinion provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness 
of a treatment intervention 
 
These are both valid arguments of the form modus ponens. We therefore 
need to consider the truth of the premises to determine if the arguments are 
sound. The second premise of the measurement argument claims that expert 
opinion does not involve measurement. However, experts in different medical 
fields routinely undertake measurements during the diagnosis, treatment and 
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follow-up of patients. These measurements form part of the clinical record, 
may be a medicolegal requirement and be required by purchasers of medical 
care. There measurements must influence the opinion of the experts and the 
claim that expert opinion does not involve measurement is surely false. 
 
When a randomised controlled trial or observational study is undertaken 
measurements are undertaken in a standardised way according to the study 
protocol. The second premise of the first measurement argument could be 
modified to claim that expert opinion does not involve standardised 
measurement on a series of patients. However, there is no reason why an 
expert cannot make standardised measurements on a series of patients. 
Some hierarchies of evidence characterise expert opinion as unsystematic or 
anecdotal, but this does not have to be the case. It could be argued that 
standardised measurements systematically recorded on a series of patients 
should be categorised as an observational study. However, if the 
measurements are not published as a study, this evidence is surely expert 
opinion. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may accept that expert opinion can 
be informed by systematic measurements undertaken on a series of patient 
but argue that observational studies provide superior evidence because 
readers have access to the measurements themselves43. However, this 
modification fails to recognise the importance of interpretation of any 
                                                          
43
 We will charitably assume that any measurements are accurately reported. 
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measurements. The statement ‘A knows p because A knows p’ is generally 
seen as superior to ‘A knows p because A knows that B knows p’. However, 
if A does not have the knowledge or opportunity to interpret p, knowledge 
acquired through B may be epistemically superior (Hardwig 1991). A series 
of systematic measurements that have been interpreted by an expert and 
presented as opinion may therefore provide superior evidence to the 
uninterpreted results of an observational study. 
 
The first premise of the measurement argument claims that if a form of 
evidence does not involve measurement it provides the worst level of 
evidence. This is inconsistent with the claim that systematic reviews should 
provide the highest level of evidence as this process also does not involve 
measurement. Similarly an expert can offer an opinion following a rigorous 
and systematic assessment of an evidence base without making any 
measurements. This would be consistent with the definition of expert opinion 
offered by Mitchell and Friese (2007). Proponents of evidence based 
medicine may be uncomfortable with this definition of expert opinion because 
it equates expert opinion with a well conducted systematic review. However, 
it only becomes a systematic review when the process that has been used to 
identify and summarise the evidence is made explicit. Both premises of the 
measurement argument are false and the argument is unsound. 
 
We will now turn our attention to the measurement bias argument. Both the 
measurement argument and measurement bias argument are originally 
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derived from the same passage in ‘Effectiveness and Efficiency’ (Cochrane 
1972). However, they are incompatible with each other because if expert 
opinion does not involve measurement it cannot be affected by measurement 
bias. The measurement bias argument can only be sound if the 
measurement argument is unsound. 
 
The second premise of the measurement bias argument claims that expert 
opinion is affected by measurement bias. This restricts the scope of the 
argument to expert opinion that involves some form of measurement as it 
does not apply to expert opinion informed by a rigorous, systematic appraisal 
of any underlying evidence base. Within randomised controlled trials blinding 
is used to control measurement bias. Expert opinion that is informed by 
measurement cannot be blinded and is potentially susceptible to 
measurement bias. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
observational studies and many randomised controlled trials, are also 
susceptible to measurement bias. The measurement bias argument does not 
therefore distinguish between expert opinion, observational studies and many 
randomised controlled trials. More importantly, proponents of evidence based 
medicine recognise that the use of objective outcome measures is more 
important than study design in the control of measurement bias (Cochrane 
1972). There is no reason that objective outcome measures cannot be used 
to inform expert opinion.  
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In this subsection we have considered the arguments that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence because it does not involve 
measurement and it may be affected by measurement bias. The 
measurement argument is unsound because expert opinion can involve 
measurement and measurement is not required for expert opinion to have 
value. The measurement bias argument limits the scope of the argument to 
expert opinion informed by measurement. However, this argument also 
provides little support for the claim that certain types of expert opinion should 
provide the lowest level of evidence. This is because observational studies 
and many randomised controlled trials are also susceptible to measurement 
bias and measurement bias is not problematic when objective outcome 
measures are used. 
 
4.5.3. Expert Opinion does not Consider Outcomes in Large Numbers of 
Patients: 
 
The third argument that is used to support the claim that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence is that expert opinion does not 
consider treatment outcomes in large numbers of patients. This argument is 
summarised below:  
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The Numbers Argument: 
 
If evidence does not consider treatment outcomes in large numbers of 
patients it provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness of a 
treatment intervention 
Expert opinion does not consider treatment outcomes in large numbers of 
patients 
Expert opinion provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness 
of a treatment intervention 
 
This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We therefore need to 
consider the truth of the premises to determine whether the argument is 
sound. The first premise of the numbers argument claims that any study 
design that does not consider treatment outcomes in large numbers of 
patients provides poor evidence. However, there is only one study design 
that cannot consider treatment outcomes in large numbers of patients: the n-
of-1 study. No other study designs or processes are defined by the number of 
patients that they involve. The first premise of the numbers argument does 
not therefore discriminate between systematic reviews, randomised 
controlled trials, observational studies and expert opinion. It could be argued 
that randomised controlled trials should provide the lowest level of evidence 
because they usually involve small numbers of patients. However, this would 
be unfair as low patient numbers within randomised controlled trials reflect 
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practical difficulties associated with the study design (Rawlins 2008). There is 
no theoretical reason that randomised controlled trials cannot include large 
numbers of patients.     
 
The second premise of the numbers argument claims that an expert does not 
consider treatment outcomes in a large number of patients. An expert has 
been defined as a person who possesses a substantial body of truths in a 
target domain and has a skill set that allows them to exploit this information 
to form new true beliefs (Goldman 2001). According to this definition it is not 
necessary to observe treatment outcomes in large numbers of patients to 
become an expert. However, I would argue that it would be very difficult to 
become a medical expert without considering outcomes in large numbers of 
patients. There is certainly no reason that an expert cannot consider 
outcomes in large numbers of patients. The numbers argument is therefore 
unsound because the second premise is false and it fails to discriminate 
expert opinion from other study designs and review processes. 
 
4.5.4. Expert Opinion may Produce False Conclusions: 
 
The fourth argument that is used to support the claim that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence is that expert opinion may 
produce false conclusions. This argument is summarised below: 
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The Error Argument: 
 
If a method of producing evidence may produce false conclusions it provides 
the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment 
intervention 
Expert opinion may produce false conclusions 
Expert opinion provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness 
of a treatment intervention 
 
This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We therefore need to 
consider the truth of the premises to determine whether the argument is 
sound. The first premise of this argument is problematic because, although 
expert opinion can produce false conclusions, all other study designs and 
review processes can also produce false conclusions. Meta-analyses and 
randomised controlled trials are not infallible and randomised controlled trials 
have been published with conclusions that cannot possibly be true (Leibovici 
2001)44. The error argument does not therefore discriminate expert opinion 
from other study designs included within hierarchies. If this argument is 
followed to its logical conclusion all forms of evidence would be ranked as the 
lowest level of evidence and there would be no hierarchy. 
                                                          
44
 Leibovici (2001) concluded that duration of fever and length of hospital stay were reduced in 
septicaemia patients when a group prayer was recited for the treatment group several years after 
the event. It is generally agreed that this conclusion cannot be true because the treatment 
intervention tested is biologically implausible. This randomised controlled trial appears to have been 
published as a joke but it demonstrates the fallibility of the study design. 
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The error argument could be modified to support the weaker claim that expert 
opinion is more likely to produce false conclusions than observational 
studies, randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses. However, this would 
require an external standard that the conclusions of expert opinion and 
different study designs could be compared against. Randomised controlled 
trials or meta-analyses cannot provide this standard as this would lead to a 
circular argument.   
 
The conclusions of meta-analyses, randomised controlled trials and 
observational studies are reached using an inductive process and are not 
necessarily true. Only a deductive process produces a conclusion that is 
necessarily true (Smith 2003). If deductive processes were ranked using 
hierarchies they would be included within expert opinion. Paradoxically, 
expert opinion may be the only type of evidence that can produce a 
conclusion that is necessarily true. This does not mean that expert medical 
opinion derived using a deductive process will be true as this will depend 
upon the truth of the premises. However, expert opinion produced using a 
deductive process does at least have the potential to produce a conclusion 
that is necessarily true. I would therefore argue that the error argument is 
unsound because all forms of evidence may produce false conclusions and 
expert opinion is the only type of evidence that has the potential to produce 
conclusions that are necessarily true. 
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4.5.5. Expert Opinion does not have a Control Group: 
 
The final argument that is used to support the claim that expert opinion 
should provide the lowest level of evidence is that expert opinion does not 
consider what happens to patients who do not receive the treatment 
intervention. Superficial consideration of this argument suggests that it is 
unsound. This is because in order to become a medical expert it is likely that 
an individual will encounter large numbers of patients with a particular 
medical condition. These patients will present in different ways, receive a 
variety of different interventions and some may even refuse treatment. It is 
therefore highly likely that an expert will be aware of the probable outcome if 
patients do not receive a particular treatment intervention and that this will 
influence their opinion. However, this would be a simplistic and uncharitable 
interpretation of the argument. What proponents of evidence based medicine 
are actually claiming is that expert opinion should provide the lowest level of 
evidence because it does not employ a control group. This argument is 
summarised below: 
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The control group argument: 
 
If a study design or process has no control group it provides the worst 
evidence for determining the effectiveness of a treatment intervention 
Expert opinion has no control group 
Expert opinion provides the worst evidence for determining the effectiveness 
of a treatment intervention 
 
This is a valid argument of the form modus ponens. We therefore need to 
consider the truth of the premises to determine whether the argument is 
sound. This argument is subtly different from the other arguments considered 
in this section because it appears to make a distinction between study 
designs that employ a control group and both expert opinion and study 
designs that do not employ a control group. 
 
Prospective case series do not employ a control group. However, it is well 
recognised that this study design can provide strong evidential support for 
the effectiveness of a treatment intervention when that treatment intervention 
is universally successful (Howick 2011). This is the ‘all-or-none’ effect. 
Cochrane (1972) claimed that clinical studies were not required to justify the 
use of penicillin for pneumonia because the treatment had such obvious 
beneficial effects and the original Oxford Centre for Evidence Based 
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Medicine hierarchy ranked ‘all-or-none’ studies as one of the highest levels of 
evidence (Ball and Phillips 2001).  These examples immediately weaken the 
claim that study designs without a control group should provide the lowest 
level of evidence in any hierarchy. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may be able to solve the problem 
with the control group argument created by prospective case series by 
claiming that the results of ‘all-or-none’ studies only have strong evidential 
value because they are compared with a historical control group (Rawlins 
2008). On this interpretation treatment intervention X may be successful in all 
patients with condition Y but this finding only has strong evidential value 
because all patients with condition Y died prior to the development of 
treatment intervention X. There is therefore a historical control group that the 
results of the prospective case series can be implicitly compared against. 
The control group argument can survive in this modified form so we need to 
consider why the hierarchies value study designs with control groups. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine value control groups because they 
are concerned that outcomes observed in patients following a treatment 
intervention may be attributed to the intervention when they are actually 
caused by other factors. Evidence based medicine is particularly concerned 
by confounding factors, regression to the mean, the placebo effect and the 
tendency of many conditions to spontaneously improve with time (Howick 
2011). Evidence based medicine would like to observe the different treatment 
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outcomes with the same group of patients in both the treatment group and 
the control group. However, this is a theoretical impossibility and the 
counterfactual position can never be observed (Shadish et al 2002). Study 
designs with a control group are used as a substitute for the counterfactual 
position but they can only serve this purpose if all confounding factors are 
balanced between the treatment and control groups45. This is problematic as 
was argued in the section on randomised controlled trials. 
 
One reason that a control group is considered important is because 
measurements of treatment outcomes are susceptible to regression to the 
mean. Regression to the mean is the concept that every measurement varies 
by chance around the true measurement (Shadish et al 2002). Proponents of 
evidence based medicine are concerned that without a control group, any 
improvement in treatment outcome may be mistakenly attributed to the 
treatment intervention when the improvement actually reflects initial extreme 
values that have regressed to the mean.  
 
The problem of regression to the mean is not prevented by employing study 
designs with a control group because any measurement may be affected. 
Outcomes in the treatment group of a randomised controlled trial are just as 
susceptible to regression to the mean as expert opinion based upon 
treatment outcomes observed in a series of patients. Proponents of evidence 
                                                          
45
 A control group can only ever approximate the counterfactual position because although all 
confounding factors could theoretically be balanced each patient must ultimately be in either the 
treatment or control group. There will therefore always be an imbalance with regard to patients. 
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based medicine may claim that regression to the mean is balanced across 
the treatment and control groups by the randomisation process but this 
appears similar to the confounding arguments and there is no empirical 
evidence to support this claim. Regression to the mean is best controlled by 
multiple pre-test measurements made prior to providing treatment (Shadish 
et al 2002). These multiple pre-test measurements can be made by an expert 
prior to providing treatment interventions or incorporated within different 
study designs. Expert opinion should not therefore be ranked as the lowest 
level of evidence because it is more susceptible to regression to the mean. 
 
A control group is also considered important because some diseases can 
spontaneously resolve with time. This argument can be traced back to Archie 
Cochrane who recognised that soldiers in German prison camps in World 
War II often recovered despite limited medical supplies (Cochrane and Blythe 
2009). However, expert opinion will not be misled by the spontaneous 
resolution of diseases if multiple pre-test measurements are recorded. 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may argue that multiple pre-test 
measurements are not possible for some conditions but this is a practical 
consideration not a theoretical consideration. 
 
The final reason that a control group is considered important is because it 
allows the use of a placebo comparison. A placebo comparison is a situation 
in which we compare two groups that are identical in all but one 
therapeutically relevant respect (Howick 2011). A ‘placebo’ is usually 
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conceptualised as an intervention in itself but this is incorrect. The control 
group do not receive a ‘placebo’ they receive an intervention which is missing 
a particular component that is additionally present in the test group. A 
placebo comparison is simply a control group set up in a certain way (Turner 
2012). The claim that expert opinion does not allow the use of placebo 
comparison therefore adds nothing to the claim that expert opinion does not 
use a control group.  
 
A placebo comparison should not be confused with the placebo effect. The 
placebo effect recognises that patient expectations and beliefs can influence 
treatment outcomes independent of any ‘true’ underlying effect (Howick 
2011)46. However, the use of a control group does not prevent patient 
expectations and beliefs influencing treatment outcomes. Patient 
expectations and beliefs can be controlled by blinding but this is only possible 
in a few randomised controlled trials where the treatment intervention and 
control intervention are indistinguishable. The use of objective outcome 
measures is considered a far better way of preventing patient expectations 
and beliefs influencing treatment outcomes (Cochrane 1972, Haynes et al 
2006). Objective outcome measures are not dependent upon study design 
and can be used to inform expert opinion. 
 
                                                          
46
 It has been suggested that if expectations and beliefs can influence the treatment outcome they 
should be considered part of the treatment intervention and not separated from any underlying 
biological effect (Howick 2011). 
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In this subsection we have considered the claim that expert opinion should 
provide the lowest level of evidence because it does not consider what 
happens to patients without treatment. This claim has been interpreted 
charitably and reformulated as the claim that expert opinion does not have a 
control group. A control group is considered important because it balances 
confounding factors, allows placebo comparisons and controls for regression 
to the mean and spontaneous improvement. However, each of these 
arguments is problematic. Control groups do not ensure that confounding 
factors are controlled, placebo comparisons are effectively control groups 
and regression to the mean and spontaneous improvement are better 
controlled by multiple pre-test measurements. I would therefore argue that 
the control group argument provides little support for the claim that expert 
opinion should provide the lowest level of evidence in hierarchies of 
evidence.    
 
4.5.6. Summary: 
 
In this section we have considered the arguments that have been used to 
rank expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence in hierarchies of evidence. 
Critical analysis of these arguments has been complicated by the different 
definitions of expert opinion that have been used. Some of these definitions 
have been criticised because they characterise expert opinion as 
unsystematic or uncritical when this is not necessarily the case. A working 
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definition of expert opinion has been developed which defines expert opinion 
as any evidence that is not derived from a study.  
 
The five arguments that have been used to support the claim that expert 
opinion should provide the lowest level of evidence were then considered: 
expert opinion does not involve measurement; expert opinion is susceptible 
to measurement bias; expert opinion does not consider treatment outcomes 
in large numbers of patients, expert opinion may produce false conclusions 
and expert opinion does not consider what happens to patients without 
treatment. The first argument is unsound because expert opinion can involve 
measurement. The second argument has restricted scope and does not 
discriminate expert opinion based upon measurement from other study 
designs and processes that are susceptible to measurement bias. The third 
argument is unsound because one would expect expert opinion to consider 
treatment outcomes in large numbers of patients. The fourth argument is 
unsound because all forms of evidence may produce false conclusions. The 
final argument was reformulated as expert opinion should provide the lowest 
level of evidence because it does not use a control group. However, the 
presence of a control group does not ensure that confounding factors are 
balanced, and regression to the mean and spontaneous improvement, are 
preferably controlled by multiple pre-test measurements. Collectively, these 
arguments provide little support for the claim that expert opinion should 
provide the lowest level of evidence in hierarchies of evidence. 
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4.6. Conclusions: 
  
In this chapter we have critically analysed the arguments that have been 
used to rank meta-analyses, systematic reviews and randomised controlled 
trials as the highest level of evidence, and expert opinion as the lowest level 
of evidence, within hierarchies of evidence. The importance of practical 
considerations has been acknowledged but it has been reasoned that the 
hierarchies should have strong theoretical support because they are 
fundamental to the knowledge claims made by evidence based medicine. 
The theoretical arguments that have been analysed are either unsound or 
only survive critical analysis when their scope is restricted. This is worrisome 
as knowledge claims made by evidence based medicine have significant 
importance within medicine.  
 
Inherent within the concept of a hierarchy of evidence is the claim that some 
study designs probably provide superior evidence to other study designs. 
The analysis presented in this chapter has revealed that evidence from meta-
analyses, systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials is not 
epistemically superior, and evidence from expert opinion is not epistemically 
inferior, to evidence from other study designs. This does not mean that meta-
analyses, systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials and expert opinion 
cannot provide evidence to support decision making. It is my contention that 
evidence from a variety of different processes and study designs can provide 
evidence to support decision making. However, no study design or form or 
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evidence is epistemically superior and there appears to be limited theoretical 
support for hierarchies. It would be more appropriate to view expert opinion 
and different study designs as a level playing field.  
 
Epistemological problems associated with the ranking of different forms of 
evidence have been recognised, to a limited extent, by some hierarchies. 
This is exemplified by the GRADE system which excludes expert opinion and 
systematic reviews and ranks observational studies above randomised 
controlled trials under certain conditions (Guyatt et al 2008). Once we accept 
that no study design is epistemically superior this should not seem 
controversial. However, the GRADE system is still predicated on the 
assumption that evidence from randomised controlled trials is epistemically 
superior to evidence from observational studies. 
 
Within hierarchies of evidence a number of apparently unconnected 
arguments are used to rank observational studies above expert opinion and 
below randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews/meta-analyses. 
The use of the term hierarchy implies that the different study designs are 
ranked according to some property. If this is the case the arguments that are 
used should reflect that property. In the next chapter we will therefore 
consider the different properties that the hierarchies claim to use to rank 
different study designs. This should improve our understanding of evidence 
based medicine and may explain some of the differences between the 
hierarchies that have been identified.  
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Chapter 5: Ranking Properties 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
 
As we have seen evidence based medicine uses a number of different 
hierarchies of evidence to determine the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions. These hierarchies most commonly rank systematic reviews 
and randomised controlled trials as the highest level of evidence, 
observational studies as the intermediate level of evidence and expert 
opinion as the lowest level of evidence. However, this is not a universal 
finding and some hierarchies rank these study designs in different orders or 
include other study designs. There is also considerable variation in the 
number of levels contained within different hierarchies. The simplest 
hierarchies have only 3 levels of evidence (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 
1979, Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998, Ebell et al 2004) whereas the most 
complicated hierarchies have 10 or more levels and sub-levels (Hadorn et al 
1996, Ball and Phillips 2001). 
 
The use of the term ‘hierarchy’ implies that the different study designs are 
ranked according to some property. It is important to investigate this property 
as this will improve our understanding of the hierarchies and may explain 
why apparently unconnected arguments are used at different levels. 
Knowledge of the property will also facilitate our understanding of the 
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arguments that were analysed in the preceding chapter. These arguments 
claimed that different study designs could provide superior or inferior 
evidence but did not explore what this meant. If different study designs can 
provide superior or inferior evidence this should relate to the property that is 
used to rank them within hierarchies. This property should also influence the 
number of levels contained within hierarchies. 
 
When the hierarchies of evidence are considered collectively a number of 
different properties are used to rank study designs. Some hierarchies do not 
mention the property that is used whereas other hierarchies have claimed to 
use nebulous qualities, such as ‘evidence strength’, ‘quality of evidence’, 
‘international standards’ or ‘robustness of evidence’, without explicitly 
defining these terms (Spitzer et al 1979, Armola et al 2009). These properties 
have powerful perlocutionary force but they are meaningless if they are not 
defined. 
 
Other hierarchies are clear about the property that they use. However, they 
purport to use a variety of different properties. The properties that are most 
commonly used are bias, validity, confidence, trustworthiness and truth. 
Some hierarchies appear to use more than one property. This is exemplified 
by the hierarchy proposed by Evans (2003) that claims to use 11 different 
properties: risk of error, bias, validity, minimisation of confounding, closeness 
to the truth, confidence, trust, caution, generalisability, reliability and 
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robustness. Many of these properties can be identified from the following two 
quotations:  
‘It has long been recognised that not all research designs are equal in 
terms of the risk or error and bias in their results. When seeking 
answers to specific questions, some research methods provide better 
evidence than that provided by other methods. That is the validity of 
the results of research varies as a consequence of the different 
methods used.’ (Evans 2003, page 78) 
‘(The RCT) is considered the most reliable evidence because the 
processes used during the conduct of an RCT minimise the risk of 
confounding factors influencing the results. As a result of this, the 
findings generated by RCTs are likely to be closer to the true effect 
than findings generated by other methods. This confidence in the 
findings of research has important implications’ (Evans 2003, page 
78). 
 
In this chapter, the five properties that are most commonly used by 
hierarchies of evidence to rank different study designs are considered. These 
properties are truth, bias, validity, confidence and trust. This chapter aims to 
further improve our understanding of the hierarchies and resolve some of the 
confusion that surrounds them. 
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5.2. Truth: 
 
A number of hierarchies purport to use truth or closeness to the truth to rank 
different study designs (Cook et al 1992, Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998, 
Waugh 1999). This is clearly illustrated by the following quotes: 
‘Some evidence is closer to the truth than other evidence.’ 
(Djulbegovic and Hadley 1998, page 313) 
‘The grading of evidence so far is mainly about how certain we can be 
that the evidence presented equates to truth.’ (Waugh 1999 page 56) 
 
It is important to appreciate that the hierarchies are designed to rank different 
study designs. Study designs are methodological tools and do not have any 
truth content. It is therefore not possible to rank different study designs 
according to the truth or falsity of the study design (Djulbegovic et al 2009). 
When the hierarchies claim to use truth they are not actually ranking the 
study designs themselves they are ranking the conclusions that are produced 
by the different study designs. 
 
A number of different theories of truth have been proposed. These include 
the correspondence theory of truth, coherence theory of truth and pragmatic 
theory of truth. All theories of truth are considered problematic and none of 
them have been universally accepted. However, all theories of truth agree 
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that a proposition can only ever be true or false. Whether a particular 
proposition is true may depend upon whether it corresponds to a ‘fact’ about 
the external world (correspondence theory of truth), coheres with existing 
beliefs (coherence theory of truth) or has practical use (pragmatic theory of 
truth), but any proposition can only be true or false (Simmons 2005). 
 
The different theories of truth dictate that any hierarchy that ranks the 
conclusions produced by different study designs according to truth can only 
have two levels: true and false. This is because any intermediate levels will 
be meaningless within theories of truth. This creates an immediate problem 
for all of the identified hierarchies because they all have at least three levels. 
For example, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network hierarchy claims 
to use truth but it contains 8 different levels (Harbour and Miller 2001). If the 
property used by this hierarchy is truth what do the intermediate levels of 
evidence represent? None of the hierarchies that claim to use truth consider 
this problem. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may argue that the intermediate 
levels in these hierarchies reflect closeness to the truth. This would imply that 
as we ascend the hierarchy the different study designs can be used to 
produce conclusions that take us closer and closer to the truth47. The idea 
that hierarchies may be ordered to reflect closeness to the truth has some 
similarities with the philosophical concept of verisimilitude. 
                                                          
47
 This assumes a correspondence theory of truth and an external reality that can be accessed. 
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Verisimilitude is the concept that scientific theories become increasingly true 
as old theories are replaced. Verisimilitude has been proposed as a potential 
solution to the pessimistic induction thesis. According to the pessimistic 
induction thesis we have good inductive grounds to believe that all current 
scientific theories, regardless of how successful they are, will eventually be 
shown to be false. The pessimistic induction theory is supported by 
numerous historical examples within science (Ladyman 2002, Chalmers 
2010). Newton-Smith (1981) has argued, using inference to best explanation, 
that new scientific theories must have increasing truth content relative to the 
theories that they replace otherwise science does not progress. However, he 
was unable to explain what it meant to be closer to the truth or how we could 
determine closeness to the truth. This is a major problem for the concept of 
verisimilitude. 
 
The concept of verisimilitude may be applicable to scientific theories but it is 
not applicable to study designs or the conclusions produced by those study 
designs. Scientific theories are used to explain phenomena and make 
predictions which can be confirmed or falsified through experiment. A 
scientific theory may appear to have greater truth content if it explains 
phenomena that were previously unexplained or it makes more successful 
predictions than a preceding theory48. However, the same reasoning cannot 
                                                          
48
 Unfortunately this is an illusion as all theories can be used to make an infinite number of 
predictions and explanations. A greater number of successful predictions and explanations do not 
therefore translate to greater truth content of a theory (Newton-Smith 1981). 
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be applied to the conclusion of a study because this can only be true or false 
and cannot have a variable degree of truth content. 
 
It could be argued that study designs within hierarchies are ranked to reflect 
the probability that the conclusions are true. Probability has been defined as 
a quantitative estimate of the likelihood that an event will occur (Guyatt et al 
2008). The concept of probability is routinely employed by evidence based 
medicine when null hypotheses are accepted or rejected and confidence 
intervals are presented. The truth of a conclusion can be more or less 
probable so this interpretation of hierarchies would allow intermediate levels. 
However, none of the hierarchies explicitly claim to rank study designs based 
upon the probability that the conclusions are true. It is also unclear how a 
probabilistic interpretation can be justified without returning to the arguments 
that were analysed in Chapter 4. If the arguments for the superiority of 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are unsound, restricted in 
scope and lack empirical support how can these study designs produce 
conclusions that are more probably true?   
 
If truth is the property that is used to rank different study designs within 
hierarchies the study designs at the top of the hierarchy should produce true 
conclusions. However, there are a several problems with this claim. Consider 
the standard hierarchy of evidence which ranks randomised controlled trials 
as the highest level of evidence. Empirical evidence shows that different 
randomised controlled trials investigating the same treatment intervention 
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can produce variable results. This is the rationale for meta-analyses. The 
conclusions of some of these randomised controlled trials must therefore be 
false. If randomised controlled trials can produce false conclusions, and the 
property that is used to rank different study designs is the truth of the 
conclusions, randomised controlled trials should not provide the highest level 
of evidence. Empirical research also shows that meta-analyses investigating 
the same treatment intervention can produce different conclusions. This 
means that meta-analyses should also not provide the highest level of 
evidence. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may argue that randomised 
controlled trials produce true conclusions when they are ideally conducted. 
However, this argument is unsound because randomisation does not 
guarantee that confounding factors are balanced between the treatment and 
control group. The results of any randomised controlled trial are always 
underdetermined because they may be attributed to the treatment 
intervention under investigation or an imbalance in confounding factors. Even 
ideally conducted randomised controlled trials can produce false conclusions.  
 
I would argue that no study design that tests a null hypothesis should be 
ranked as the highest level of evidence in a hierarchy that uses the truth of 
the conclusion to determine hierarchical position. This is because the null 
hypothesis is rejected based upon the probability of the observed results if 
there really is no difference between the interventions given to the treatment 
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and control groups. Therefore even when the null hypothesis is rejected, 
there is always a small probability that the null hypothesis is actually true and 
that the conclusion of the study is false. Meta-analyses, randomised 
controlled trials, cohort studies and case-control studies are all designed to 
test null hypotheses based upon probability. The conclusions or all of these 
study designs are underdetermined and are not necessarily true when the 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the lower levels of hierarchies. Expert 
opinion is often ranked as the lowest level of evidence but expert opinion is 
not always false. Expert opinion may be informed by randomised controlled 
trials and meta-analyses and may agree with the conclusions of randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses. Expert opinion also includes deductive 
reasoning and this is the one process that can produce conclusions that are 
necessarily true. If the property that is used to rank different study designs 
within hierarchies is the truth of the conclusions, expert opinion does not 
deserve to be ranked as the lowest level of evidence. 
 
Several hierarchies claim to rank different study designs using the property of 
truth. However, this claim is difficult to sustain because all hierarchies have at 
least 3 levels whereas the conclusion of any study can only be true or false. It 
is therefore unclear what any intermediate levels of evidence represent as 
the conclusions of different study designs cannot have increasing truth 
content. A hierarchy with two levels could use the property of truth to rank 
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different study designs but it is uncertain which forms of evidence would 
provide the highest level as no study design produces conclusions that are 
necessarily true. It would appear difficult for hierarchies to use truth to rank 
different study designs so we need to consider the other properties that have 
been proposed. 
 
5.3. Bias:  
 
A number of different hierarchies have claimed that study designs are ranked 
to reflect susceptibility to bias. These include the hierarchies proposed by the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (Guyatt et al 1995), Institute for 
Clinical Systems Improvement (Greer et al 2000) and the Australian National 
Health and Medical Research Council (Merlin et al 2009). Cochrane (1972) 
was also concerned by bias although he never explicitly stated that his 
hierarchy was designed to reflect susceptibility to bias. The importance of 
bias is illustrated by the following quotations: 
‘The hierarchy of design types is fairly consistent amongst evidence 
grading systems and reflects the fact that different study designs vary 
in the likelihood that an individual study will be biased’  (Greer et al 
2000 page 5). 
‘In this hierarchy interventional study designs were ranked according 
to the likelihood that bias had been eliminated’ (Merlin et al 2009 page 
1) 
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In order to analyse the claim that hierarchies rank study designs to reflect 
susceptibility to bias we must first define what bias is. Evidence based 
medicine consistently defines bias as ‘systematic deviation from the truth’ 
(Sackett 1979, Guyatt et al 2002, Straus et al 2011). Therefore any hierarchy 
that uses bias ranks study designs based upon their ability to produce 
conclusions that are closer and closer to the truth. Any hierarchy measuring 
bias assumes that we are able to get closer to the truth if we employ certain 
study designs. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘systematic’ in the definition 
of bias implies that different study designs produce conclusions that deviate 
from the truth in a transparent or reproducible way.   
 
It is not clear how the conclusion of any study can systematically deviate 
from the truth and this is not explained by any of the 14 hierarchies that claim 
to use bias. I would argue that if a conclusion has deviated from the truth it is 
false. This is because all accepted theories of truth agree that conclusions 
can only ever be true or false (Simmons 2005). Any hierarchy that uses bias 
therefore faces the same difficulties that were encountered in the previous 
section when we considered a hierarchy of truth. Unless evidence based 
medicine is able to articulate a theory of truth that allows varying degrees of 
truth a hierarchy based on bias is difficult to sustain.  
 
Even if proponents of evidence based medicine were able to articulate a 
theory of truth that allowed varying degrees of truth a hierarchy measuring 
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the susceptibility of different study designs to bias would face further 
problems. Evidence based medicine recognises over 30 types of bias 
(Sackett 1979, Guyatt et al 2002) but the hierarchies are primarily concerned 
with selection bias and measurement bias. Other types of bias are rarely 
mentioned. The hierarchies appear preoccupied with selection bias and 
measurement bias because they believe that the randomised controlled trial 
study design can be used to control these types of bias. However, if bias is 
systematic deviation from the truth then all types of bias should be of equal 
importance.  
 
It is also unclear how different types of bias should interact to determine 
evidence rank. As the hierarchy is ascended are the study designs 
susceptible to fewer types of bias or is overall bias reduced? Any attempt to 
quantify overall bias would be problematic because it would require access to 
an external standard of truth and some method of quantifying deviation from 
that truth. It would therefore make more sense if study designs were ranked 
based upon the number of different types of bias that they were susceptible 
to. This appears to be the rationale behind the hierarchy presented in the 
‘How to Read Clinical Journals Series’: 
‘The case-control study is susceptible not only to the bias from the 
angina patient we noted in the cohort study, but also to several other 
sorts of bias’. (Trout 1981 page 987) 
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However, ranking study designs according to the number of different types of 
bias that they are susceptible to creates a problem for hierarchies that 
contain systematic reviews. This is because systematic reviews are 
susceptible to a number of biases, such as language bias, selective outcome 
reporting bias and publication bias that are not relevant to primary study 
designs (Higgins and Green 2011). Systematic reviews are actually 
susceptible to more types of bias than randomised controlled trials and some 
of these biases, particularly publication bias, are considered difficult to 
identify (Guyatt et al 2011a). If the number of different types of bias that a 
study design is susceptible to determines hierarchical position then 
systematic reviews would surely not be ranked above randomised controlled 
trials. 
 
A number of hierarchies claim to rank study designs according to 
susceptibility to bias where bias is defined as systematic deviation from the 
truth. These hierarchies do not explain how conclusions can deviate from the 
truth without being false or how this deviation can be measured. It is also 
unclear whether these hierarchies of evidence are organised to reflect 
susceptibility to overall bias or different types of bias. A hierarchy organised 
in either way appears problematic. It is therefore not clear how a hierarchy of 
evidence can rank different study designs according to susceptibility to bias. 
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5.4. Validity: 
  
Thirteen hierarchies of evidence claim to use validity to rank different study 
designs. These include the hierarchies proposed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Policy and Research (Hadorn et al 1996) and the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (Guyatt et al 2000): 
‘The present system is based on the tenet that flaws in research 
design are serious to the extent they threaten the validity of the study 
results.’ (Hadorn et al, 1996, page 749) 
‘Underlying these steps are 2 fundamental principles. One, relating 
primarily to the assessment of validity, posits a hierarchy of evidence 
to guide clinical decision making.’ (Guyatt et al 2000, page 1291) 
 
Within analytical philosophy, validity is a property of deductive inferences. An 
argument form is valid if there is no possible situation in which the premises 
can be true and the conclusion false. An argument can only ever be valid or 
invalid and it is not possible to have increasing degrees of validity (Smith 
2003). This would appear to restrict hierarchies that use validity to two levels: 
valid and invalid. Furthermore, the hierarchies of evidence are composed of 
empirical study designs which rely on inductive inferences and validity is not 
a property of inductive inferences. The hierarchies cannot therefore use 
validity to rank different study designs, where validity is defined as a property 
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of deductive inferences. We therefore need to consider how the hierarchies 
define validity. 
 
Unfortunately, few of the hierarchies that claim to use validity actually define 
this term. Where this term is defined, validity is consistently equated with 
proximity to the truth. For example, the Strength of Recommendation 
Taxonomy claimed that validity was synonymous with bias (Ebell et al 2004). 
The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group defined validity as closeness 
to the truth (Oxman et al 1993) and the ‘How to Read Clinical Journals 
Series’ defined validity as the absence of systematic deviation from the truth 
and the presence of precision (Haynes 1981)49. The ‘Users’ Guides to the 
Medical Literature’ defined validity in two different ways: 
‘In critical appraisal terms, validity reflects the extent to which the 
study results are likely to be subject to systematic error and thus be 
more or less likely to reflect the truth.’ (Guyatt et al 2002, page 
807)…In health status measurement terms, validity is the extent to 
which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure’ (Guyatt 
et al 2002, page 807). 
 
When validity is equated with proximity to the truth or systematic deviation 
from the truth we encounter the same problems that were discussed with 
regard to bias. These hierarchies do not explain how conclusions can deviate 
                                                          
49
 The definition of validity provided by Haynes (1981) is interesting because it suggests that validity 
is more than proximity to the truth. However, it is derived from an article on diagnostic tests and 
may not be applicable to hierarchies of evidence. 
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from the truth without being false or how this deviation can be assessed. The 
second definition provided by the ‘Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature’ is 
not enlightening unless the property that is being measured is specified.  
 
Thirteen hierarchies of evidence claim to use validity to rank different study 
designs. However, validity is a property of deductive inferences and the 
hierarchies comprise empirical study designs that make inductive inferences. 
Several hierarchies have equated validity with closeness to the truth but, as 
analysed in the sections on truth and bias, no theories of truth allow degrees 
of truth. It is therefore unclear how a hierarchy can use validity to rank 
different study designs. 
 
5.5. Confidence and Trust: 
 
Eleven hierarchies of evidence claim to measure confidence or trust in the 
conclusions produced by different study designs. These include the 
hierarchies proposed by the ‘How to Read Clinical Journals Series’ (Trout 
1981), GRADE Working Group (2004) and the Joanna Briggs Institute 
(2011): 
‘Readers can place considerable confidence in estimates of strength 
from a randomised trial, fair confidence in an estimate of strength from 
a cohort study and only a little confidence in an estimate of strength 
from a case-control study’ (Trout 1981 page 988). 
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‘The quality of evidence indicates the extent to which we can be 
confident that an estimate of effect is correct’ (GRADE Working Group 
2004 page 1490).  
‘The aim of assigning levels of evidence is to provide an element of 
trustworthiness of the findings of the review.’ (Joanna Briggs Institute, 
2011, page 15) 
 
The hierarchies often use the terms trust and confidence synonymously. 
However, Hawley (2012) has argued that trust and confidence are different 
concepts. Trust can be defined as the optimistic acceptance of a vulnerable 
situation in which the truster believes that the trustee will care for the truster’s 
interests (Goudge and Gilson 2005). Trust requires a relationship between a 
truster and a trustee and is not a property associated with inanimate objects 
or processes. Confidence can be defined as the feeling or belief that one can 
have faith in or rely on someone or something. Confidence is a property that 
can be associated with inanimate objects or processes (Hawley 2012).  
 
The hierarchies include a variety of different review processes, study designs 
and expert opinion. Review processes and study designs are inanimate 
processes that are used to generate conclusions. Therefore, if we accept the 
definition of trust proposed by Goudge and Gilson (2005), a hierarchy cannot 
measure trust because we cannot trust inanimate process. This does not 
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mean that we do not trust researchers to conduct and report studies 
accurately50. Simply that it is not possible to trust a study design per se.  
 
Expert opinion may be trusted because there is a relationship between the 
expert (the trustee) and the user of the opinion (the truster). Some 
hierarchies differentiate between consensus expert opinion and individual 
expert opinion (Braunewald et al 1994, Newhouse et al 2007). This may be 
because the opinion of a group of experts is considered more trustworthy 
although Fricker (2005) has argued that sincerity and competence are more 
important determinants of trustworthiness than consensus opinion. However, 
once expert opinion and different study designs are combined within the 
same hierarchy the property that is used to determine hierarchical position 
cannot be trust. 
 
Confidence is a property that can be associated with both individuals and 
inanimate processes (Hawley 2012). It is therefore possible to have 
confidence in both expert opinion and the ability of different study designs to 
determine the effectiveness of a treatment intervention. This means that 
confidence can potentially be used to determine hierarchical position. A 
hierarchy using confidence can have multiple levels because it is possible to 
be more or less confident about the effectiveness of a treatment intervention. 
The 12 levels and sublevels in the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality hierarchy (Hadorn et al 1996) could therefore reflect varying degrees 
                                                          
50
 Lipton (1998) has argued that trust in researchers is essential to the progression of science 
because without this trust we would have to verify everything ourselves. 
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of confidence. Unlike a hierarchy that claims to use truth, a hierarchy that 
claims to use confidence to determine hierarchical position is not restricted to 
two levels. 
 
If hierarchies are ordered to reflect confidence in the ability of different study 
designs to determine treatment effectiveness they should explain why we 
should have greater confidence in the results of some study designs. When 
we investigate this we encounter the same arguments that were analysed in 
Chapter 4. For example, The Joanna Briggs Institute (2011) claims that we 
should have greater ‘trust’ in study designs that minimise bias and (Trout 
1981) places greatest confidence in randomised controlled trials because of 
features inherent to the study design. These hierarchies use confidence as a 
surrogate term for bias (Joanna Briggs Institute 2011) or purported ability to 
control confounding factors and be blinded (Trout 1981). 
 
Study designs within the GRADE system are also ranked to reflect 
confidence in the estimate of treatment effect (GRADE Working Group 2004). 
This hierarchy initially ranks randomised controlled trials higher than 
observational studies because of factors inherent within the different study 
designs, although the final ranking is determined following consideration of a 
variety of factors including risk of bias, imprecision, inconsistency of results 
and publication bias (Balshem et al 2011). Guyatt et al (2011) accepted that 
there was little empirical evidence to support the use of these factors and 
emphasised that they should be interpreted subjectively. However, although 
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the GRADE system considers a number of different factors that may 
influence confidence in the overall effectiveness of a treatment intervention, it 
provided no additional reasons to support the initial claim that we should 
have greatest confidence in the results of randomised controlled trials. 
 
The GRADE hierarchy clearly demonstrates that a number of different factors 
can influence our confidence in the estimate of treatment effect. These 
factors include consistency of results, biological plausibility and magnitude of 
treatment effect51. If this is the case why should we not primarily rank 
evidence according to consistency of results, biological plausibility or 
magnitude of treatment effect rather than study design? Such a hierarchy 
would not need to ignore study design as this could be included at a later 
stage. A hierarchy that ranked evidence primarily according to biological 
plausibility would be particularly interesting. Biological implausibility is usually 
recognised as providing strong evidence against a treatment effectiveness 
claim (Howick 2011, Blunt 2015). However, biological plausibility or 
implausibility is usually determined by laboratory based studies, 
pathophysiological rationale and expert opinion. These types or evidence are 
typically ranked in the lower levels of traditional hierarchies.    
 
Any hierarchy that measures confidence in the results of a particular study 
design can be interpreted from a Bayesian perspective. This has important 
implications for hierarchies because confidence in the conclusion of a study 
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 Every-Palmer and Howick (2014) have proposed that hierarchies should downgrade evidence if 
there is industry bias although this is not done by any hierarchies at present. 
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is not just influenced by factors such as study design, biological plausibility 
and magnitude of treatment effect. Confidence in the conclusion is also 
influenced by our prior confidence in the conclusion before the study is 
considered. This prior confidence will be influenced by a variety of other 
factors including the existing evidence base and previous experience and will 
vary between individuals (Chalmers 2010). The confidence of different 
individuals in the conclusions of the same study may therefore vary 
depending upon prior confidence52. From a Bayesian perspective, confidence 
in the conclusion of a particular study cannot be determined in isolation 
based upon study design.  
 
The importance of prior confidence to a Bayesian interpretation of hierarchies 
of evidence can be illustrated with an example. A well conducted randomised 
controlled trial is undertaken that concludes that intervention Y is an effective 
treatment for condition Z. Clinician A has successfully used intervention Y to 
treat a number of patients, he believes that intervention Y is effective and the 
conclusion of the randomised controlled trial reinforces this belief. He has a 
high degree of confidence in the effectiveness of intervention Y for condition 
Z following consideration of the randomised controlled trial. Clinician B has 
found intervention Y to be an unsuccessful treatment for condition Z, he 
believes that treatment Y is ineffective and although the randomised 
controlled trial may slightly increase his confidence in the effectiveness of 
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 When there is a large body of pre-existing evidence there may be convergence of belief so that 
most individuals have similar prior confidence but this is not necessarily the case and can never be 
true of a new intervention. 
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intervention Y, he still has little confidence in this intervention53. Both of these 
interpretations of the conclusion of the randomised controlled trial are correct 
but they result in differing degrees of confidence in the treatment intervention. 
 
A Bayesian interpretation of hierarchies of evidence allows different 
interpretations of the conclusions of the same studies by different appraisers. 
Some readers may be concerned by this as evidence based medicine 
dictates the treatment interventions that can be prescribed and funded, 
medicolegal standards of care and the research agenda. On a practical level 
the problem created by Bayesian interpretations of hierarchies may be solved 
by attributing greater weight to the degree of confidence ascribed by an 
expert or group of experts. However, this uses expert opinion, the form of 
evidence that is usually least valued by hierarchies, to solve the problem 
created by a Bayesian interpretation. Consistency of decision making within 
evidence based medicine is considered in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
 
A number of hierarchies claim to rank study designs based upon trust or 
confidence in the conclusions of the studies. Hierarchies cannot use trust 
because this is not a property that is associated with inanimate processes. 
Hierarchies can use confidence and these hierarchies can have multiple 
levels reflecting differing degrees of confidence. However, the hierarchies 
that do claim to use confidence do not explain why we should have greater 
confidence in certain study designs without using the arguments that were 
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 For the purpose of this example it does not matter if intervention Y is effective or ineffective. 
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analysed in Chapter 4. These arguments were either unsound, unsupported 
by empirical evidence or only survived critical analysis with restricted scope. 
Further empirical or theoretical evidence is therefore required to support the 
claim that we should have greater confidence in the conclusions of some 
study designs. Even if empirical or theoretical evidence could be provided for 
the superiority of some study designs it is not clear why study design is 
prioritised over other factors that may potentially affect confidence in any 
conclusions. 
 
5.6. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter we have considered the properties that have been used to 
rank different study designs within hierarchies. Many hierarchies do not 
describe the property that they use. Where the property is described there is 
considerable variation with different hierarchies purporting to use truth, bias, 
validity, trust and confidence to rank study designs. Hierarchies that use 
truth, bias or validity are problematic because conclusions are either true or 
false and cannot have increasing truth content. Hierarchies that use trust are 
also problematic as this is not a property that is applicable to inanimate study 
designs. Hierarchies can potentially rank different study designs based upon 
confidence in the truth of conclusions. However, empirical or theoretical 
support for the claim that we should have increased confidence in 
conclusions produced by certain study designs is required. These hierarchies 
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also do not explain why they prioritise study design over other factors that 
can also influence our confidence in conclusions. 
 
The analysis of the arguments that was presented in the previous chapter 
was complicated by a lack of clarity over the meaning of ‘superior’ and 
‘inferior’ evidence. A hierarchy that uses confidence in the truth of 
conclusions to rank different study designs can produce ‘superior’ and 
‘inferior’ evidence because we can have variable degrees of confidence in 
evidence claims. However, unless further theoretical or empirical support is 
provided, the arguments analysed in Chapter 4 appear circular. We are 
effectively expected to have most confidence in the conclusions of 
randomised controlled trials because the conclusion was derived using a 
randomised controlled trial study design. Similarly, we should have the least 
confidence in expert opinion because expert opinion is expert opinion. 
 
In Chapter 4 we analysed the arguments that have been used to support the 
standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence. These arguments 
were shown to be unsound, restricted in scope or lacking empirical support. 
This chapter aimed to further increase our understanding of hierarchies by 
analysing the properties that are used to rank study designs within them. 
However, this analysis has revealed a significant amount of confusion. Study 
designs can potentially be ranked to reflect increasing confidence in the truth 
of their conclusions but it is unclear why we should have greater confidence 
in the conclusions of certain study designs. If the property that is used to rank 
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study designs cannot be justified it is unclear whether hierarchies have any 
utility. 
 
The analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 has revealed that there is little 
theoretical or empirical support for hierarchies of evidence. This analysis 
provides a foundation for the remainder of the thesis. In the next chapter I will 
consider a variety of factors that have influenced the development of 
hierarchies. I will argue that the absence of a firm theoretical foundation has 
allowed the hierarchies to proliferate under the influence of factors that are 
independent of study design. This may explain why we have so many 
different hierarchies of evidence. 
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Chapter 6: Explaining Variation amongst Hierarchies of Evidence 
 
6.1. Introduction: 
 
The systematic review presented in Chapter 3 identified 45 different 
hierarchies of evidence. These hierarchies are used to provide justification 
for the knowledge claims that are made by evidence based medicine. 
Furthermore, these knowledge claims dictate the treatment interventions that 
can be used, healthcare funding, medicolegal standards and the research 
agenda. It is therefore important to understand why there are so many 
different hierarchies. The analysis presented in this chapter seeks to explain 
the variation that is seen amongst hierarchies and improve our understanding 
of evidence based medicine. 
 
Hierarchies of evidence rank the importance of evidence primarily according 
to the study design that is used to produce the evidence (Upshur 2009). 
However, the hierarchies have also been influenced by a variety of others 
factors that are independent of study design54. These factors have led to an 
increase in the total number of hierarchies that can be used within evidence 
based medicine. Five factors that have had a significant influence on the 
hierarchies are considered in depth in this chapter. These factors are 
recognition of the importance of different questions; attempts to establish 
                                                          
54
 Factors independent of study design that have influenced the development of hierarchies of 
evidence have been termed conditions (Blunt 2015). 
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professional jurisdiction; failure to separate the hierarchy of evidence and 
grade of recommendation; practical considerations and standardisation. 
These are not the only factors that have influenced the development of 
hierarchies but it will be demonstrated that they have all had a significant 
influence. 
 
Once the five factors that have influenced the development of the hierarchies 
have been analysed we will consider why these factors have been able to 
exert significant influence. It will be argued that the lack of theoretical and 
empirical support for the standard and modified standard hierarchies of 
evidence has allowed factors that are independent of study design to assume 
greater importance. This is because it is difficult for the standard and 
modified standard hierarchies of evidence to assume a normative role if they 
are undermined by a lack of theoretical and empirical support. This is 
advanced as a possible explanation but it is hoped that the analysis that is 
presented will persuade the reader to accept this argument. 
 
6.2. Recognition of the Importance of Different Questions: 
 
The first factor that has led to an increase in the number of different 
hierarchies of evidence is recognition of the importance of different questions 
within medicine. The earliest hierarchies all presented a single hierarchy and 
were designed to determine the effectiveness of a treatment intervention. 
188 
 
This changed in 1999 with the introduction of the Oxford Centre for Evidence 
Based Medicine Levels of Evidence (Ball and Phillips 2001) which presented 
different hierarchies for prognosis, diagnosis, economic evaluations and 
treatment interventions55.  
 
Since 1999 a number of other systems have been developed with different 
hierarchies for different questions (Evans 2003, Ebell et al 2004, Merlin et al 
2009, Sayre et al 2010, Joanna Briggs Institute 2011 and Howick et al 2011). 
All of these systems present a hierarchy for determining the effectiveness of 
treatment interventions alongside other hierarchies addressing different 
questions. Collectively these systems consider questions of diagnosis, 
prognosis, harms, screening, aetiology, frequency of a condition, feasibility, 
appropriateness, meaningfulness and economic evaluations although no 
system considers all of these questions. When these systems are used to 
determine the effectiveness of a treatment intervention, systematic reviews56 
or randomised controlled trials often provide the highest level of evidence. 
When other questions are considered, systematic reviews and randomised 
controlled trials rarely feature. We find that these questions are best 
answered by a variety of different studies including cohort studies, systematic 
reviews of cohort studies, validated clinical decision rules or economic 
evaluations.  
                                                          
55
 The Canadian Hypertension Society had previously proposed ‘hierarchies of evidence’ for 
prognosis and diagnosis (Carruthers et al 1993). However, these ‘hierarchies’ simply recognised 
factors that could affect the methodological quality of studies and made no attempt to rank different 
study designs in a hierarchical manner. These were therefore not true hierarchies of evidence. 
56
 When the term systematic review is used in an unqualified sense it is used to refer to a systematic 
review of randomised controlled trials. This was considered in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Prior to 1999 hierarchies only considered treatment interventions and they 
prioritised the results of systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials. 
However, there appears to have been an increasing realisation that 
randomised controlled trials could not be used to answer all questions that 
were important within medicine: 
‘Some health service activities (e.g. prognosis or diagnosis) may not 
be best evaluated using the randomised controlled trial approach and 
other evidence grading taxonomies may be appropriate in these 
instances’ (Eccles and Mason 2001, page 8). 
‘The levels of evidence used by the Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (prior to 2005) for intervention studies, is 
restrictive for guideline developers, especially where the areas of 
study do not lend themselves to randomised controlled trials.’ 
(Coleman et al 2005 page 1) 
 
This created a problem for evidence based medicine as there was a risk that 
large areas of medicine would be considered non-evidence based. How 
could answers to questions regarding prognosis, diagnosis or 
appropriateness be considered ‘evidence based’ if they were not supported 
by the conclusions of systematic reviews or randomised controlled trials? 
Evidence based medicine solved this problem by developing different 
hierarchies for different questions with each individual hierarchy prioritising 
different study designs:  
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‘The different axes allow for questions related to diagnosis, aetiology 
and prognosis to be considered as 'evidence-based' as well as 
traditionally intervention-orientated recommendations’. (Ball and 
Phillips 2001 page 2) 
 
The development of systems with different hierarchies for different questions 
had interesting implications for evidence based medicine. Prior to the 
development of these systems the highest level of evidence could only be 
provided by evidence from systematic reviews or randomised controlled 
trials. After the development of these systems a wide variety of different 
study designs could provide the highest level of evidence. Any intervention, 
diagnostic test or economic decision could be considered ‘evidence based’ if 
it was supported by the results of the study design prioritised by the relevant 
hierarchy. Importantly, this study design no longer needed to be a systematic 
review or randomised controlled trial. This effectively changed the definition 
of ‘evidence based’ and allowed Ball and Phillips (2001) to claim that the 
answers to questions of diagnosis, aetiology and prognosis were ‘evidence 
based’ when they were not supported by randomised controlled trials or 
systematic reviews57.  
 
                                                          
57
 An alternative perspective on the development of multiple hierarchies of evidence can be 
provided by systems theory (King 2009). Here the different hierarchies represent subsystems which 
each reinterpret the environment differently using their own rules which are encoded within their 
hierarchy. From this perspective different hierarchies of evidence are a product of functional 
differentiation. 
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The systems with multiple hierarchies consider a variety of different 
questions but no systems consider exactly the same questions. For example, 
the Joanna Briggs Institute (2011) presents hierarchies for feasibility, 
appropriateness, meaningfulness, effectiveness and economic evaluations 
whereas the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council 
present hierarchies for treatment, diagnosis, aetiology, screening and 
prognosis (Merlin et al 2009). It is unclear why many of the systems include 
or exclude particular hierarchies as little justification is provided. Where 
justification is provided it is rarely persuasive. For example, Howick et al 
(2011) included hierarchies for common and rare harms simply because they 
considered these questions to be clinically relevant and important. 
 
Hierarchies for economic evaluations are particularly interesting as they have 
been excluded from the latest Oxford Levels of Evidence because of 
uncertainty over what constitutes good evidence (Howick et al 2011). Further 
research, in conjunction with economists and policy makers, is advocated 
before a new hierarchy is developed. This has uncertain implications for any 
economic evaluations made using the original Oxford Levels of Evidence 
(Ball and Phillips 2001) and the current Joanna Briggs Institute (2011) 
hierarchy for economic evaluations.  
 
When the hierarchies that consider questions that do not relate to the 
effectiveness of treatment interventions, are considered collectively, it is 
notable that few arguments are provided to support the ranking of different 
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study designs within them. It is also unclear what property is used to rank 
different study designs. This is troublesome as these hierarchies provide 
justification for knowledge claims that are made. These hierarchies may be 
supported by sound arguments but if these arguments are not presented they 
cannot be analysed. Some of these hierarchies do appear questionable. For 
example, the first hierarchy for assessing economic evaluations has been 
withdrawn (Ball and Phillips 2001, Howick et al 2011) and the Joanna Briggs 
Institute (2011) included qualitative research in several hierarchies despite 
claiming that this type of evidence could not be ranked hierarchically:  
‘There is no hierarchy of evidence amongst methodologies for 
qualitative studies … The synthesis or “pooling” of the findings of 
qualitative research remains a contested field’ (JBI Reviewers’ Manual 
2011 page 20). 
 
Considerable variation is seen amongst hierarchies that are designed to 
answer the same question. This can be illustrated if we consider the different 
hierarchies that can be used to determine the accuracy of diagnostic tests. 
The highest level of evidence may be provided by a systematic review of 
studies of test accuracy with an independent blinded comparison and a valid 
reference standard (Ball and Phillips 2001, Merlin et al 2009); randomised 
controlled trial (Schunemann et al 2008); validating cohort studies, meta-
analysis of validating cohort studies, validated clinical decision rule (Sayre et 
al 2010) or a systematic review of cross sectional studies with a consistently 
applied reference standard and blinding (Howick et al 2011). Only 
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Schunemann et al (2008) provided any justification for the study design that 
they ranked as the highest level of evidence. They argued that the 
randomised controlled trial should provide the highest level because 
diagnosis was only important if effective treatment was available. I would 
argue that this argument is unsound because accurate diagnosis can provide 
reassurance and allow planning for the future even if effective treatment is 
unavailable. None of the other hierarchies provide any justification for the 
study designs that they rank as the highest level of evidence. If arguments 
are not presented they cannot be analysed. It is therefore unclear which of 
the different study designs listed above should provide the highest level of 
evidence to determine the accuracy of diagnostic tests. 
 
Recognition of the importance of different questions has led to a significant 
increase in the number of hierarchies to ensure that answers to these 
questions remain ‘evidence based’. Many questions of importance within 
medicine cannot be answered by systematic reviews or randomised 
controlled trials and it was realised that answers to these questions could be 
devalued because they were not supported by evidence from these study 
designs. This problem was resolved by the creation of new hierarchies that 
prioritised other study designs. However, these hierarchies lack consistency, 
address different questions and, where they do address the same question, 
rank different study designs as the highest level of evidence. These 
hierarchies are also difficult to analyse as few arguments are presented to 
support them. When arguments are presented they appear problematic and it 
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is concerning that one hierarchy of evidence (Ball and Phillips 2001) has 
been withdrawn.   
  
6.3. Establishment of Professional Jurisdiction: 
 
The second factor that has led to an increase in the number of hierarchies of 
evidence is the attempt by some professional groups to establish their 
professional jurisdiction. Most hierarchies rank systematic reviews and 
randomised controlled trials as the highest level of evidence. However, not all 
professional groups rely on these study designs to inform their practice. This 
may be because randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews are 
unavailable to these groups or because they value other types of evidence 
such as qualitative research. These professional groups are threatened by 
evidence based medicine because if they do not engage with hierarchies 
they risk losing control over their professional domain. Nursing and 
occupational therapy have reacted to this threat by developing hierarchies 
that include the types of evidence that they value (Stetler et al 1998, Mitchell 
and Friese 2007, Armola et al 2009, Tomlin and Borgetto 2011)58. 
 
Stetler et al (1998) presented the first hierarchy that included qualitative 
research. This hierarchy did still rank meta-analyses as the highest level of 
evidence. However, qualitative studies with consistent findings were also 
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 Interestingly no hierarchies of evidence appear to have been developed for the dental profession.  
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able to lead to the strongest treatment recommendation. This group were 
concerned that many nursing interventions were not supported by the results 
of meta-analyses and randomised controlled trials: 
‘Neither this language or the routine reliance on large scale 
randomised controlled trials or meta-analyses was a fit for the division 
of nursing….In many cases within nursing, researchers have yet to 
accumulate a sufficient body of knowledge’ (Stetler et al 1998 page 
47).  
Stetler et al (1998) claimed that meta-analyses and randomised controlled 
trials were impractical, poorly understood and often unavailable within 
nursing. However, they also recognised that nursing practice may not be 
funded and could be challenged because it was not supported by these study 
designs. This potential problem was solved by the introduction of a new 
hierarchy that was more applicable to nursing. 
 
The hierarchies produced by the Oncology Nursing Society (Mitchell and 
Friese 2007) and the American Association of Critical Care Nurses (Armola 
et al 2009) are also aimed at nursing. The Oncology Nursing Society system 
is the only hierarchy that allows expert opinion to provide the highest level of 
evidence. The hierarchy proposed by Armola et al (2009) allows qualitative 
research to provide the highest level of evidence: 
‘Meta-syntheses should be placed at the highest hierarchical level with 
well-designed meta-analyses, thereby acknowledging the value that 
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qualitative studies provide about phenomenon of concern to 
professional nurses’ (Armola et al 2009 page 407). 
These hierarchies value expert opinion and qualitative research primarily 
because they are important to nursing (Steelman et al 2011). The second 
hierarchy produced by the American Association of Critical Care Nurses is 
actually termed an ‘evidence-levelling system’ (Armola et al 2009). This 
suggests that the group have purposefully created a hierarchy that values the 
forms of evidence that are important to nursing. 
 
Nursing is not the only professional group that has developed novel 
hierarchies of evidence. The Research Pyramid (Tomlin and Borgetto 2011) 
was developed for use within occupational therapy because traditional 
hierarchies were considered to neglect the importance of qualitative research 
and external validity. Tomlin and Borgetto (2011) claimed that this hierarchy 
represented: 
‘A beginning attempt to order evidence-based practice in accordance 
with the epistemology of the profession.’ (Tomlin and Borgetto 2011 
page 189) 
 
A consistent theme can be seen underlying the hierarchies that are described 
in this section. Nursing and occupational therapy would like to establish 
themselves as evidence-based. However, the treatment interventions that 
are used by these professional groups are rarely supported by systematic 
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reviews and randomised controlled trials. Support is instead often provided 
by expert opinion and qualitative research. This creates a problem when 
traditional hierarchies are used as treatment interventions may be considered 
non-evidence based. Nursing and occupational therapy have reacted to this 
challenge by creating novel hierarchies of evidence that value expert opinion 
and qualitative research59.  
 
Not all of the hierarchies of evidence used by the nursing profession have 
responded to the challenge posed by traditional hierarchies in the same way. 
Some of these hierarchies still prioritise systematic reviews and randomised 
controlled trials (Evans 2003, Joanna Briggs Institute 2011)60. These 
hierarchies encourage the nursing profession to undertake systematic 
reviews and randomised controlled trials in order to become more ‘evidence-
based’. However, the fact that some of the hierarchies used by the nursing 
profession still rank randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews as 
the highest level of evidence does not detract from the fact that other nursing 
groups have developed novel hierarchies in response to the challenge posed 
by the modified standard hierarchy of evidence. 
 
                                                          
59
 None of the hierarchies that include qualitative research explain how quantitative and qualitative 
research can be included in the same hierarchy of evidence. No arguments are presented to support 
the rank allocated to qualitative research and the property that is used to rank different study 
designs is unclear. 
 
60
 Both of these systems recognise evidence as more than just evidence of treatment effectiveness 
and include different hierarchies for different questions. 
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In this section I have argued that some professional groups have developed 
novel hierarchies in order to protect professional jurisdiction. This has 
allowed these professional groups to claim that treatment interventions that 
are not supported by systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials are 
still supported by a high level of evidence. This has led to a demonstrable 
increase in the number of hierarchies and provides support for the claim that 
factors, unrelated to study design, have influenced the development of 
hierarchies of evidence. 
 
6.4. Failure to Separate Study Design and Treatment Recommendation:  
 
The third factor that has led to an increase in the total number of hierarchies 
is a failure to separate study design from other factors that can influence the 
final treatment recommendation. In order to consider this factor in detail it is 
important to clarify the distinction between the hierarchy of evidence, grade 
of recommendation and system that is used in this thesis. The hierarchy of 
evidence is primarily used to rank evidence according to study design. The 
grade of recommendation considers other factors, excluding study design, 
which may influence the final treatment recommendation. The term system is 
used as an overarching term to include all factors, including study design, 
which may influence the final treatment recommendation. 
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The basic principle underpinning a hierarchy of evidence is that certain study 
designs provide superior evidence to other study designs. However, this is 
not the only factor that is considered when evidence is evaluated to 
determine whether a treatment intervention is appropriate. Other factors that 
may be considered include, but are not limited to, methodological quality, 
biological plausibility, clinical significance, risks and benefits associated with 
treatment, applicability of the treatment intervention in a particular setting and 
financial costs. The importance of both study design and the risks and 
benefits associated with treatment, to recommendations made by the 
American College of Chest Physicians is illustrated by the following quote: 
‘Depending on the balance between benefits and risks, 
methodologically strong studies suggesting a benefit of one agent over 
a placebo or another agent may lead to a strong recommendation to 
administer the more effective agent, to conflicting recommendations 
and practice, or even to recommendations for administration of the 
less effective agent’ (Guyatt et al 1998 page 441S). 
 
Prior to 1998 most systems only presented a hierarchy of evidence. A few of 
these systems purported to present both a hierarchy and a grade of 
recommendation (Sackett 1989, Cook et al 1992, Carruthers et al 1993). 
However, in these systems the hierarchy led directly to the treatment 
recommendation without consideration of other factors. The grade of 
recommendation was therefore superfluous. The system proposed by the 
Canadian Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979) did allow three factors to influence 
200 
 
the final grade of recommendation61. However, the effectiveness of the 
treatment intervention, as determined by the hierarchy of evidence, was 
considered the most important factor:  
‘Because the effectiveness of treatment or of the preventive measure 
for a condition was of such importance to the task force, the final 
recommendation for each condition relied heavily on our assessment 
of the evidence for effectiveness of treatment. Thus a class A 
recommendation was rarely made in the absence of grade I evidence’ 
(Spitzer et al 1979 page 1195-1196). 
 
The first system to allow factors other than study design to significantly 
influence the final treatment recommendation was the system proposed by 
the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (Guyatt et al 1995). Since 
1998, most systems have allowed multiple factors, in addition to study 
design, to influence the final treatment recommendation (Greer et al 2000, 
Harbour and Miller 2001, Ebell et al 2004, Brozek et al 2009, Merlin et al 
2009). A clear distinction between study design and other factors is actually 
valued by some of the later systems (Guyatt et al 1998).  
 
Most of the systems developed prior to 1998 concentrated on study design. 
They either ignored other factors that could influence the final treatment 
recommendation or assigned them little significance. This was not because 
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 The 3 factors considered by the Canadian Task Force were the burden of suffering, validity and 
acceptability of the manoeuvre used to detect or prevent the condition and the effectiveness of the 
treatment intervention. 
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the developers of these systems did not recognise the importance of other 
factors. Cochrane (1972) was very clear that treatment provided by the 
National Health Service should be both cost-effective and beneficial to 
patients and Trout (1981) discussed different factors which could influence 
decision making. These early systems simply concentrated on study design 
and made no attempt to include other factors. This was not wrong but we 
need to be very clear about what these systems were designed to achieve. 
These systems could be conceptualised as trying to clarify one of the inputs 
that influenced treatment recommendations. 
 
As time progressed systems became increasingly complex. They no longer 
restricted themselves to study design and they tried to account for other 
factors that could influence the decision-making process62.  This was 
unproblematic when study design, as determined by a hierarchy of evidence, 
was retained as a discrete input, into the decision-making process. However, 
many systems did not retain study design as a discrete input and other 
factors became entwined within hierarchies. This led to a significant increase 
in the total number of hierarchies. This can be illustrated if we consider the 
ways that different systems have incorporated assessment of methodological 
quality into the decision-making process. 
 
Methodological quality is a measure of the rigour with which a study is 
conducted. A study can be well conducted and have high methodological 
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 A detailed discussion regarding which factors should be considered and how they may be 
quantified is beyond the scope of this work. 
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quality or poorly conducted and have low methodological quality. 
Methodological quality is independent of study design: we can have a well 
conducted randomised controlled trial and a poorly conducted randomised 
controlled trial. The rigour with which any study is conducted is clearly 
important and should be considered when any evidence is evaluated. 
Methodological quality may even be the most important factor that should be 
considered when evidence is assessed. 
 
Although many systems consider methodological quality we must appreciate 
that this is a problematic concept to measure. It is easy to envisage a study 
that is perfectly conducted that produces useful conclusions within any 
limitations imposed by the study design. It is also easy to envisage a study 
that is so poorly conducted that the conclusions are useless. However, how 
should we interpret the conclusions of studies that lie between these two 
extremes? It is unclear how well conducted a study needs to be before the 
results are useful and how this can be assessed.  
 
It is also important to appreciate that we can only usually make an 
assumption about methodological rigour based upon the way that a study is 
reported. Reporting is influenced by the publication process and a well 
conducted study may be poorly reported whereas a poorly conducted study 
may be dishonestly reported. Measurement of methodological quality is 
clearly problematic. However, this is incidental to the present discussion as 
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we are interested in the way that methodological quality is incorporated into 
different systems not the way that it is measured. 
 
A number of systems do not consider methodological quality. These systems 
have been criticised (Hadorn et al 1996, Waugh 1999) although this criticism 
may be unfair. The developers of these systems may think that 
methodological quality is unimportant. However, it is more plausible that they 
have chosen to concentrate on one discrete input into the decision making 
process or feel that it is self-evident that studies of poor methodological 
quality studies should be excluded. 
 
Some systems explicitly exclude studies that are deemed to be of poor 
methodological quality. These systems usually present checklists or stipulate 
criteria that studies must fulfil before they are considered. In these systems, 
studies of poor methodological quality are never ranked by the hierarchy of 
evidence. This approach was used by the American College of Chest 
Physicians in 1992:  
‘An overview which incorporates low-quality studies is worse than 
useless, for it may mislead. An overview that is not rigorously 
conducted adds little to the evaluation of evidence by traditional 
means and should not be considered’ (Cook et al, 1992, page 308S).  
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Some systems classify methodological quality independently of the hierarchy 
of evidence. The United States Preventative Services Task Force63 (Harris et 
al 2001) categorised methodological quality as good, fair or poor.  This 
information was considered alongside study design, as determined by the 
hierarchy of evidence, and a number of other factors when the final treatment 
recommendation was determined. In this system, methodological quality is 
retained as a discrete input into the decision making process.  
 
Other systems have included assessment of methodological quality within 
the actual hierarchy of evidence (Hadorn et al 1996, Wilkinson 1999, Ariens 
et al 2000, Bandelow et al 2002, Ebell et al 2004). In these systems, study 
design and methodological quality, are no longer discrete inputs into the 
decision making process. Study design and methodological quality have 
become entwined. This approach is epitomised by the system proposed by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (Hadorn et al 1996). In this 
system only randomised controlled trials that are well conducted can attain 
the highest levels of evidence. Randomised controlled trials with one or more 
major methodological flaws or three or more minor methodological flaws are 
relegated to the lower levels.  
 
Some of the systems that combine study design and assessment of 
methodological quality within hierarchies have focused on particular aspects 
                                                          
63
 The hierarchy used by the United States Preventative Services Task Force was excluded from the 
systematic review reported in Chapter 3 because it was identical to the one used by the Canadian 
Task Force. 
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of study design. For example, the Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy 
(Ebell et al 2004) relegated any study that used surrogate outcomes64 to the 
lowest level of evidence: 
‘Recommendations based only on improvements in surrogate or 
disease-oriented outcomes are always categorized as level C, 
because improvements in disease-oriented outcomes are not always 
associated with improvements in patient-oriented outcomes’ (Ebell et 
al 2004). 
 
Different systems have incorporated assessment of methodological quality in 
different ways. Some systems maintain a clear distinction between 
assessment of methodological quality and ranking of study design. This has 
not led to an increase in the number of hierarchies. However, other systems 
have entwined assessment of methodological quality and study design within 
their hierarchies. This has directly led to an increase in number of hierarchies 
because we now have some ‘hierarchies of evidence’ that consider 
methodological quality and others that do not. The problem has been 
exacerbated because methodological quality is problematic to assess and 
different ‘hierarchies’ have chosen to focus on different elements of study 
conduct. 
                                                          
64
 Surrogate outcomes do not directly measure how a patient feels, functions or survives and are 
usually considered to be less valuable than patient orientated outcomes. Surrogate outcomes are 
often used because they are easier, quicker, or cheaper to achieve, obtain, or monitor than patient 
orientated outcomes (Lassere, 2008). Richards (2005) has argued that, in some situations, surrogate 
markers can be directly predictive of patient orientated outcomes. If this argument is accepted 
studies that employ surrogate outcomes should not be automatically downgraded.  
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Methodological quality is not the only factor that has become entwined with 
study design within hierarchies. Some systems have incorporated 
assessments of clinical significance (Cook et al 1992, Guyatt et al 1995, 
Brozek et al 2009) and applicability of evidence (Wilkinson 1999, Brozek et al 
2009) within their ‘hierarchies of evidence’. For example, the first hierarchy 
proposed by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (Guyatt et al 
1995) differentiated between studies where the results lay beyond a 
predetermined threshold number needed to treat and those that did not. 
Every time a different factor becomes entwined with study design within 
hierarchies they are likely to increase in number. 
  
Hierarchies of evidence rank the importance of evidence according to the 
study design that is used to produce that evidence. Methodological quality, 
clinical significance of results and the applicability of evidence to a target 
population are clearly important considerations when any evidence is 
appraised. However, these factors are independent of study design and 
should not be incorporated within hierarchies when they are designed to rank 
evidence primarily according to study design. Once these factors become 
entwined with study design within ‘hierarchies’ they must increase in number. 
This is because you have some ‘hierarchies’ that include factors that are 
unrelated to study design and other hierarchies that do not. The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that some of these factors are problematic to assess 
and can be incorporated in a variety of different ways. This provides further 
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support for my claim that factors unrelated to study design have influenced 
the development of hierarchies of evidence and led to their proliferation. 
 
6.5. Practical Considerations: 
 
The fourth factor that has influenced the development of hierarchies, and led 
to an increase in their number, is practical considerations. These practical 
considerations relate to the feasibility of using different hierarchies and 
specifically exclude theoretical considerations. The potential importance of 
practical considerations was suggested in Chapter 4 when the theoretical 
arguments that have been used to support the claim that randomised 
controlled trials should provide the highest level of evidence were analysed.   
 
In order to understand how practical considerations have influenced the 
hierarchies of evidence we need to consider the three groups who have 
developed and used the hierarchies: clinical epidemiologists, guideline 
developers and clinicians. Hierarchies are developed by clinical 
epidemiologists; used by guideline developers to develop clinical guidelines; 
and used by clinicians to treat patients. These groups have different practical 
requirements and this has led to the development of different hierarchies. 
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Before practical considerations are considered in detail two important points 
need to be clarified. Firstly, the nomenclature of the groups is unimportant. It 
is not my intention to claim that only clinical epidemiologists can develop 
hierarchies or that only guideline developers can develop clinical guidelines. I 
only claim that there are three distinct groups that have different practical 
requirements. The nomenclature simply reflects the individuals traditionally 
associated with each of these groups. Secondly, an individual can belong to 
each group at different times. Indeed, many proponents of evidence based 
medicine have occupied each of these groups at different times. Individuals 
often belong to different social groups at different times and the fact that an 
individual can belong to each of the groups is not incompatible with the claim 
that different practical considerations are important to each of the three 
groups.  
 
One group that is conspicuously absent from this discussion is patients. 
However, none of the hierarchies have been specifically designed for 
interpretation by patients. Atkins et al (2004) recognised that existing 
hierarchies were unsuitable for patients during the development of the 
GRADE system but this finding was not addressed. 
 
Clinical epidemiologists are often concerned by the time and resources that 
will be required for the implementation of a hierarchy and the type of studies 
that are likely to be available. The hierarchy proposed by the United States 
Community Preventative Services Task Force ranked controlled clinical trials 
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without randomisation as the highest level of evidence even though 
randomised controlled trials were considered to provide superior evidence 
(Briss et al 2000). This was because randomisation was considered 
impractical in population based research: 
‘Randomisation is sometimes not feasible or ethical in population 
based research. Also, group randomised trials often cannot feasibly 
randomise sufficient numbers of units to ensure even distribution of 
potential confounders among groups’ (Briss et al 2000 page 41).  
The developers of this hierarchy have clearly allowed practical considerations 
to determine hierarchical position and as a consequence we have a new 
hierarchy. 
  
Practical considerations have also influenced the development of other 
hierarchies. The EUR-ASSESS system (Granados et al 1997) allows quasi-
experimental studies to attain the highest level because randomised 
controlled trials are considered too expensive and often impossible to 
conduct. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network (2011) openly 
acknowledge that their system had been influenced by time and resource 
requirements and Ariens et al (2000) include cross-sectional studies, despite 
reservations about this study design, because lots of these studies have 
been published: 
‘In cross-sectional research the temporal relationship between 
exposure and outcome, and thus causality, cannot be firmly 
established. The reason cross-sectional studies were included in this 
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review, despite this disadvantage, was that most research on risk 
factors for neck pain was actually based on a cross-sectional design. It 
would not have been acceptable to neglect the vast amount of 
information obtained from cross-sectional research’ (Ariens et al, 
2000, page 15-16). 
 
These examples demonstrate that clinical epidemiologists must balance 
theoretical and practical considerations when hierarchies are developed. If 
hierarchies are developed using only theoretical considerations they may 
have no utility. In these circumstances clinical epidemiologists may choose to 
give greater weight to practical considerations. However, deciding whether 
different study designs are practical or impractical involves a value 
judgement. Value judgements are not true or false in the same way that 
premises are. In fact value judgements vary depending upon any value 
commitments that are held. Different clinical epidemiologists may therefore 
consider a study design impractical because it is impossible, difficult to 
undertake or simply requires significant resources. Once practical 
considerations are able to influence hierarchical position it is therefore highly 
likely that hierarchies will increase in number because clinical 
epidemiologists will have different value commitments.   
 
The two other main groups that use hierarchies are guideline developers and 
clinicians. Both of these groups use hierarchies to answer questions about 
the effectiveness of treatment interventions. However, although we should be 
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wary about making sweeping generalisations, these two groups often have 
significantly different requirements. Clinical guidelines are usually developed 
by large groups of individuals comprising topic experts and experts in 
research methods. These groups do not have limitless time and resources 
but they can understand and utilise complicated systems and usually have 
sufficient time to consider the evidence base in detail. Clinicians are usually 
individuals or small groups of individuals working in clinical teams. These 
individuals are often topic experts, but they have limited time and may lack 
expertise in research methods. Evidence based clinical pathways have been 
developed to address these problems for clinicians but they are only 
available for common conditions and cannot cover every possible clinical 
situation. 
 
Several hierarchies have clearly been designed to help clinicians make 
decisions about the care of individual patients (Greer et al 2000, Bandelow et 
al 2002, Howick et al 2011). Howick et al (2011) reported that the Oxford 
Levels of Evidence were revised because the original hierarchy was too 
complicated and did not reflect clinical decision making. The new system was 
described both as a hierarchy and a heuristic: 
‘The Levels should be designed in a way that could be used as a 
search heuristic for busy clinicians and patients65 in real time in 
addition to serving as a hierarchy of evidence’. (Howick et al 2011 
page 2) 
                                                          
65
 This is the only time that patients are mentioned as a group who may wish to use hierarchies. 
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Heuristics can be defined as processes that lead to conclusions that are only 
usually true because they are not supported by underlying theory (Blunt 
2015). If heuristics produce conclusions that are only usually true they must 
sometimes produce false conclusions. This is accepted by Howick et al 
(2011) but they claim that their hierarchy is still valuable because it provides 
guidance to busy clinicians who need to make rapid decisions about the care 
of individual patients.  
 
The World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry hierarchy 
(Bandelow et al 2002) was developed because existing hierarchies did not 
make a distinction between inconsistent evidence, negative evidence and the 
absence of evidence. This distinction was considered important because a 
drug without supporting evidence could still reasonably be used in a patient 
unresponsive to standard treatment whereas it would be unreasonable to use 
a drug that was known to be ineffective (Grunze et al 2009). This hierarchy 
can also be viewed as a heuristic because it is unlikely that a drug without 
supporting evidence will be effective in all patients.  
 
The hierarchies proposed by Bandelow et al (2002) and Howick at el (2011) 
have clearly been developed as practical tools to guide clinical decision 
making at the individual patient level. This demonstrates that the practical 
needs of clinicians have resulted in the development of further hierarchies. It 
is interesting that these hierarchies have been categorised as heuristics 
because this acknowledges that conclusions derived using an ‘evidence-
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based’ process may be false. The use of hierarchies as heuristics will be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter when the rationality of decision 
making within evidence based medicine is considered.  
 
Other hierarchies of evidence are very clearly aimed at guideline developers. 
This is exemplified by the GRADE system (Brozek et al 2009). This system 
values transparency and explicitness and seeks to standardise every stage 
of the evidence assessment process. This has resulted in a complicated 
system that has been adopted by some groups such as the World Health 
Organisation and the Cochrane Collaboration (Guyatt et al 2008) but rejected 
by other groups because it is time, training and labour intensive (Richards 
2009, Howick et al 2011, Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network 2011).  
 
Guideline developers often use the GRADE system because they value a 
transparent, comprehensive approach to guideline development. It has been 
suggested that the GRADE system is more accurate than other systems 
(Howick et al 2011) although no theoretical or empirical evidence has been 
provided to support this claim. Empirical evidence actually suggests that the 
GRADE system is difficult to apply and has poor reproducibility (Atkins et al 
2005, Jaeschke et al 2008, Gillis et al 2011) although this does not mean that 
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the GRADE system cannot produce accurate conclusions if it used by 
experienced guideline developers66.  
 
Guideline developers and clinicians appear to have very different 
requirements of hierarchies. Guideline developers value accuracy and are 
prepared to use exhaustive, complicated processes to reach an accurate 
conclusion. Clinicians value heuristics and are prepared to accept some false 
conclusions if the process can be simplified and accelerated. It is only natural 
that these competing requirements have led to the development of very 
different systems resulting in an increase in the overall number of hierarchies 
of evidence. 
 
In this section I have argued that hierarchies of evidence have increased in 
number because clinical epidemiologists, guideline developers and clinicians 
have different practical requirements. Clinical epidemiologists prioritise the 
study designs which they consider most practical but this allows value 
judgements to influence hierarchical position. Guideline developers prefer 
more complex systems as these are believed to produce more accurate 
conclusions whereas clinicians prefer heuristics, which allow rapid decision-
making, but are more likely to produce false conclusions. A number of 
examples have been provided to support my argument. This provides further 
justification for my claim that factors, unrelated to study design, have 
                                                          
66
 Atkins et al (2005) reported that inter-examiner agreement with the GRADE system was worse 
than that expected by chance alone although this did not prevent them concluding that the GRADE 
system was clear, understandable and superior to existing systems. 
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influenced the development of the hierarchies and led to an increase in their 
number. 
 
6.6. Standardisation: 
 
The final factor that has influenced the development of hierarchies is 
standardisation. In this chapter a number of factors, independent of study 
design, that have influenced the development of hierarchies of evidence have 
already been identified. These factors have led to a demonstrable increase in 
the number of hierarchies. This proliferation of hierarchies has not gone 
unnoticed within evidence based medicine and concerns have been 
expressed that the situation is confusing:  
‘Journal readers do not have the time, energy, or interest to interpret 
multiple grading scales, and more complex scales are difficult to 
integrate into daily practice’ (Ebell et al 2004, page 548). 
‘Guideline developers use a bewildering variety of systems to rate the 
quality of evidence underlying their recommendations. Some are 
facile, some confused, and others sophisticated but complex’ (Guyatt 
et al 2008, page 995). 
Several hierarchies have been developed with the stated aim of reducing the 
confusion created by multiple hierarchies of evidence. The developers of 
these hierarchies aim to create a universal hierarchy that can be used by 
everybody.  
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There has been a discussion in the evidence based medicine literature about 
whether a universal hierarchy of evidence should be complex or simple 
(Guyatt et al 1998, Ebell et al 2004, Atkins et al 2004). This discussion 
revolves around the factors that different groups feel should be included. 
Some groups advocate complex hierarchies that explicitly include many 
factors (Atkins et al 2004). Other groups advocate simpler hierarchies that 
consider fewer factors and allow implicit judgement to play a greater role 
(Guyatt et al 1998, Ebell et al 2004). If the different groups are unable to 
agree on the factors that should be considered attempts to create a universal 
hierarchy of evidence are likely to fail. As clinical epidemiologists, guideline 
developers and clinicians have different requirements it may be impossible to 
reach agreement. Attempts to create a universal hierarchy of evidence may 
lead to convergence on fewer hierarchies but it may also lead to an overall 
increase in number. This is because any new ‘universal’ hierarchies are only 
likely to appeal to a limited number of users. 
 
Some groups do not aspire to create a universal hierarchy but do aim to 
ensure that any new hierarchy is compatible with previous hierarchies 
(Baumann and Gutterman 2006, Merlin et al 2009, Morley et al 2010). The 
second Australian National Health and Medical Research Council hierarchy 
was very clearly designed to ensure that it was compatible with the previous 
version: 
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‘The objective of the first stage was to create a framework that aligned 
as closely as possible with the original evidence hierarchy – to 
minimise confusion for current users and maintain consistency with 
previous use of the hierarchy’. (Merlin et al 2009 page 3) 
However, maintaining consistency with previous hierarchies can create 
tension. For example, Merlin et al (2009) expressed concern about the 
quality of evidence provided by systematic reviews because the studies 
included in any systematic review could be of poor quality. Despite this 
concern, systematic reviews maintained their place as the highest level of 
evidence to maintained consistency with the previous hierarchy.  
 
It is interesting to consider why developers of new hierarchies seek to 
maintain consistency with older hierarchies. A new hierarchy is surely only 
needed when there is a problem with the old hierarchy. If there is a problem 
with the old hierarchy it is unclear why you would want to maintain 
consistency as this may perpetuate any failings. It is possible that developers 
of new hierarchies seek to maintain consistency so that clinical guidelines 
and treatment decisions made using older hierarchies remain justified. 
However, as existing hierarchies are significantly different, if new hierarchies 
are continually developed to maintain consistency with previous versions, 
they are unlikely to converge on a universal version. 
 
A universal hierarchy of evidence is appealing because it would resolve the 
confusion that currently exists amongst hierarchies. However, attempts to 
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create a universal hierarchy are unlikely to be successful because there is 
disagreement about which factors should be included and different users 
have different requirements. Many newer hierarchies have been developed 
to maintain consistency with previous versions. However, this may 
perpetuate any failings and ensures that hierarchies remain dissimilar. These 
attempts at standardisation have therefore led to the development of yet 
more hierarchies. This provides further evidence to support my claim that 
factors unrelated to study design have led to an increase in the number of 
hierarchies of evidence. 
 
6.7. Why have different Factors been able to Influence Hierarchies of 
Evidence? 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter has demonstrated that five factors, 
unrelated to study design, have had a significant influence on the 
development of hierarchies of evidence. These factors are recognition of the 
importance of different questions; attempts to establish professional 
jurisdiction; failure to separate study design from other factors that can affect 
treatment recommendations, practical considerations and standardisation. 
These factors have been analysed in detail and it is clear that they have all 
repeatedly influenced the development of different hierarchies. The examples 
presented provide strong support for the claim that factors unrelated to study 
design have caused an increase in the total number of hierarchies of 
evidence. It is not my intention to claim that these are the only factors that 
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have influenced the development of hierarchies and other factors may also 
be important. 
 
Hierarchies of evidence are designed to rank the importance of evidence 
primarily according to study design (Upshur 2009). It is therefore interesting 
to consider why factors that are independent of study design have come to 
exert such a significant influence. It is my contention that the lack of 
theoretical or empirical support for the standard and modified standard 
hierarchies of evidence has allowed factors that are independent of study 
design to assume greater importance. This is because these hierarchies are 
unable to provide a normative role as they are undermined by their lack of 
theoretical and empirical support. This argument is summarised below: 
 
The Normative Argument: 
 
The standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence lack theoretical 
or empirical support. 
If the standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence lack theoretical 
or empirical support they will be influenced by factors that do not relate to 
study design.  
Hierarchies of evidence are influenced by factors that do not relate to study 
design. 
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Throughout this chapter it has been argued that a number of different factors, 
independent of study design, have influenced the development of 
hierarchies. I would therefore claim that the conclusion of the normative 
argument is true. The normative argument also has a valid argument form. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the argument is sound as this 
would make the mistake of affirming the consequent (Smith 2003)67. As with 
all arguments, we need to consider the truth of the premises in order to 
determine whether the argument is sound. 
 
The first premise claims that the standard and modified standard hierarchies 
of evidence lack theoretical or empirical support. The arguments that have 
been used to support these hierarchies were considered in Chapter 4. These 
arguments were shown to be unsound, restricted in scope or lacking 
empirical support. The property used to rank different study designs within 
hierarchies was considered in Chapter 5. It was argued that hierarchies could 
potentially be ordered to reflect increasing confidence in the conclusions of 
certain study designs but it was unclear why we should have greater 
confidence in the conclusions of systematic reviews and randomised 
controlled trials. If these arguments are accepted the first premise of the 
normative argument is true.  
 
                                                          
67
 Modus ponens is a valid argument form: if A then C, A hence C. Affirming the consequent is an 
invalid argument form: if A then C, C hence A. This is because A is only a sufficient condition for C 
(Smith 2003).  
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The second premise claims that if hierarchies lack theoretical or empirical 
support they will be influenced by factors that are independent of study 
design. This is because they cannot provide a normative standard on 
theoretical or empirical grounds. If there was strong theoretical or empirical 
support for the standard or modified standard hierarchy of evidence any 
hierarchy that did not conform to this structure could be rationally rejected. 
For example, it would be difficult to justify a hierarchy that ranked expert 
opinion as the highest level of evidence if there were sound theoretical 
reasons to prefer evidence derived from systematic reviews and randomised 
controlled trials. Any decision that was made using a non-conforming 
hierarchy could therefore be rejected. However, if the standard and modified 
standard hierarchies of evidence lack theoretical and empirical support it is 
more difficult to challenge alternative hierarchies. This is because hierarchies 
that do not conform can be justified by appealing to the arguments that 
undermine the standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence. As a 
consequence there is greater scope for hierarchies to be influenced by 
factors that are independent of study design.  
 
The second premise of the normative argument could be challenged in two 
ways. First, it could be claimed that a normative standard does not 
necessarily require theoretical or empirical support and could be supported 
by practical, ethical or other reasoning. This means that hierarchies could 
resist the influence of other factors even if the normative standard lacked 
theoretical or empirical support. In order for a particular hierarchy to act as a 
normative standard it would simply need to be agreed that study designs 
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should be ranked in a particular order. However, I would argue that the 
standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence should not perform a 
normative role without theoretical or empirical support. This is because 
hierarchies are fundamental to decision-making within evidence based 
medicine and these decisions have important implications. The hierarchies 
should therefore have strong theoretical or empirical support. It is 
acknowledged that this counter-argument involves a value judgement about 
the way that decisions within medicine should be justified. If this value 
judgement is not shared the reader will not be persuaded by the normative 
argument. 
      
The second challenge to the normative argument is the claim that factors, 
independent of study design, would have influenced hierarchies regardless of 
the strength of theoretical and empirical support for the standard and 
modified standard hierarchies of evidence. However, I would argue that it 
would be unlikely for there to be so many different hierarchies if the 
normative standard had strong theoretical or empirical support. This counter-
argument involves a similar value judgement about the importance of 
theoretical and empirical support for hierarchies. If this value judgement is 
not shared, the reader will not be persuaded that the normative argument can 
explain the variation that is seen amongst hierarchies. 
 
The normative argument has attempted to explain how factors that are 
independent of study design have been able to influence the development of 
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hierarchies. This argument is problematic because it requires us to make a 
value judgement about the importance of theoretical and empirical support 
for any normative hierarchy of evidence. This means that the second premise 
is not necessarily true and the argument may be unsound. This problem is 
acknowledged and a lack of theoretical or empirical support is advanced as a 
possible explanation for the influence that factors, independent of study 
design, have had on hierarchies of evidence. The reader may be persuaded 
by the normative argument if they share the value judgements that have 
been highlighted. 
 
6.8. Conclusion: 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter has sought to explain the variation 
amongst hierarchies of evidence. Whilst hierarchies of evidence are 
designed to rank the importance of evidence primarily according to study 
design, they have also been influenced by a variety of others factors. Five 
such factors have been considered in depth in this chapter. Each of these 
factors has led to a demonstrable increase in the overall number of 
hierarchies of evidence. The influence of these factors can explain some of 
the variation that we see amongst the various hierarchies.  
 
Having demonstrated that a number of factors have influenced the 
development of hierarchies, a possible explanation for this has been 
224 
 
advanced. There is a lack of theoretical and empirical support for the 
standard and modified standard hierarchies of evidence. This has prevented 
them from fulfilling a normative role and allowed factors that are independent 
of study design to assume greater importance. This claim is not advanced as 
the only possible explanation for the variation that is seen amongst 
hierarchies. However, the reader may be persuaded that it is a probable 
explanation if they share underlying value judgements about the importance 
of theoretical and empirical support for a normative hierarchy of evidence. 
 
Hierarchies of evidence are fundamental to decision making within evidence 
based medicine. However, they are numerous and have been influenced by 
a number of different factors that are independent of study design. There is a 
possibility that different hierarchies could be used to support different 
conclusions following consideration of the same evidence. This would mean 
that the decision-making process within evidence based medicine was 
inconsistent. This is considered in detail in the next chapter when I analyse 
the rationality of evidence based medicine. 
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Chapter 7: The Rationality of Evidence Based Medicine 
 
7.1. Introduction: 
 
Evidence based medicine can use a number of different hierarchies of 
evidence to support decision-making. These hierarchies have limited 
theoretical support and have been influenced by a number of factors that are 
independent of study design. It is therefore possible that different hierarchies 
could be used to support different conclusions following consideration of the 
same evidence. This would mean that the decision making process used by 
evidence based medicine was not rational. If this is the case then decisions 
about patient care, healthcare funding, medicolegal standards and medical 
research may be made inconsistently. This would mean that patients with the 
same medical condition could receive inconsistent clinical care, healthcare 
professionals could be judged against inconsistent medicolegal standards, 
scarce healthcare resources could be allocated inconsistently and research 
priorities could be judged inconsistently. It is therefore important to consider 
whether the decision making method used by evidence based medicine is 
rational. 
 
The decision making process used by evidence based medicine can be 
considered rational if conclusions are derived in a consistent way given any 
information that is available for consideration (Newton-Smith 1981). A 
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number of different types of rationality are described in the literature including 
practical rationality, theoretical rationality, formal rationality and substantive 
rationality (Kalberg 1980, Brubaker 1984, Audi 2001, Abulof 2015). The type 
of rationality that is used can have a significant influence on the rationality of 
any decision making process. This is particularly important when substantive 
rationality is considered as this is influenced by value commitments. It is 
therefore important to understand the concept of rationality in greater depth 
before the rationality of decision making within evidence based medicine is 
analysed. 
 
In this chapter we will analyse the rationality of decision making within 
evidence based medicine. The concept of rationality will be elucidated and 
the importance of different types of rationality will be highlighted. Decision 
making within evidence based medicine will then be explored using a 
framework that acknowledges the importance of hierarchies. This framework 
will be developed as the chapter progresses. The existence of multiple 
hierarchies suggests that decision making within evidence based medicine 
may be irrational. This is because the use of different hierarchies may result 
in different conclusions following consideration of the same information. 
However, it will be argued that decision making within evidence based 
medicine can still be rational when it is considered from the perspective of 
substantive rationality. This has interesting implications for evidence based 
medicine because substantive rationality is dependent upon value 
commitments.   
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7.2. Rationality: 
 
In order to analyse whether the decision making process that is used by 
evidence based medicine is rational we need to understand the concept of 
rationality. Reasoning can be considered rational if conclusions are derived in 
a consistent way given any information that is available for consideration 
(Newton-Smith 1981). Reasoning that is rational does not have to produce 
conclusions that are true or provide justification for any knowledge claims 
that are made (Audi 2001). This means that deductive reasoning, inductive 
reasoning and inference to best explanation can all be rational reasoning 
processes. Deductive reasoning is always rational because conclusions are 
necessarily true (Annas 2000). Inductive reasoning and inference to best 
explanation do not produce conclusions that are necessarily true, but these 
reasoning processes can still be rational, and often are rational, if 
conclusions are derived in a consistent way (Audi 2001). 
 
The inclusion of inductive reasoning and inference to best explanation 
demonstrates that a rational reasoning process can produce false 
conclusions. This does not mean that a reasoning process that always 
produced false conclusions would be rational, even if the conclusions were 
derived in a consistent way. This is because any reasoning process should 
aim to produce true conclusions. It does mean that a decision making 
process that occasionally produced false conclusions could still be rational. 
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Evidence based medicine would therefore not necessarily be irrational if the 
decision making process, when correctly implemented, occasionally resulted 
in the use of the wrong treatment intervention. 
 
A number of different types of rationality have been described in the literature 
including practical rationality, theoretical rationality, formal rationality and 
substantive rationality. The different types of rationality were originally 
identified by Max Weber (Kalberg 1980, Brubaker 1984, Audi 2001). It is 
important that the type of rationality under consideration is clearly defined 
because different types of rationality have significantly different meanings. A 
reasoning process that is rational from the perspective of formal rationality 
may be irrational from the perspective of substantive rationality and vice 
versa. 
 
Practical rationality is a manifestation of means-ends rational action and 
considers whether ones actions are consistent with ones reasons for action. 
Theoretical rationality provides explanation and considers whether ones 
beliefs are consistent with ones reasons for believing (Audi 2001). Formal 
rationality is indifferent to value commitments and is exemplified by the blind 
following of rules with no consideration of the final outcome. Substantive 
rationality emphasises the importance of value commitments. An action or 
belief can only be considered substantively rational if it is consistent with 
underlying value commitments (Etzioni 1988, Kalberg 1980, Brubaker 1984). 
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Substantive rationality may be guided by individual values or clusters of 
values. These value commitments are essentially overarching principles that 
guide the reasoning process and they may influence both the desired end 
and the means through which that end is achieved (Etzioni 1988). 
Substantive rationality allows a relativist interpretation of rationality where the 
same actions or beliefs can be rational or irrational depending upon the value 
commitments that are held (Brubaker 1984). For example, a decision about 
the allocation of financial resources may be considered substantively rational 
or irrational depending upon whether you value maximising utility for the 
individual or the population. Value commitments are not true or false and 
rationality cannot be used to decide between value commitments that are 
followed in a substantively rational way (Audi 2001). 
 
Irrespective of the type of rationality that is considered, the conclusions of 
any reasoning process are dependent upon the amount of information that is 
available for consideration (Newton-Smith 1981). Abulof (2015) has 
differentiated between minimal rationality, maximal rationality and bounded 
rationality to reflect information availability. Minimal rationality signifies 
calculative intentionality in the absence of any information. Maximal 
rationality requires complete information and produces conclusions that are 
necessarily true. Deductive reasoning is an example of a reasoning process 
with maximal rationality (Kukla 1991). Bounded rationality sits between these 
two extremes. Bounded rationality accepts that information is often 
incomplete and that the conclusions of reasoning processes are not 
necessarily true. Inductive reasoning and inference to best explanation are 
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examples of reasoning processes that use the concept of bounded 
rationality. 
 
When information is incomplete, it may be possible to collect additional 
information to further inform decision making. However, additional 
information does not have to be collected for the reasoning process to be 
rational. The potential value of the additional information, the ease with which 
it can be collected, and time constraints, are important factors that are 
considered prior to deciding whether additional information should be 
collected (Kukla 1991, Abulof 2015). It may therefore be rational to make a 
decision based on information that is available, when collection of further 
information would be too time consuming, even if that further information, if 
collected, would lead to a different decision68.  
 
Maximal and minimal rationality are important concepts but they have limited 
usefulness when we consider the rationality of decision making within 
evidence based medicine. Maximal rationality requires complete information 
and conclusions are necessarily true. However, decisions about medical care 
are rarely guided by complete information69. If medical decision making was 
                                                          
68
 This type of situation can occur in medicine when a patient has an acute infection such as infective 
endocarditis. Blood cultures are required to identify the causative microorganism but these take 
time, and immediate treatment is required, so antibiotic therapy is initiated to target the most likely 
microorganisms. The antibiotic therapy may subsequently be changed once the results of the blood 
cultures are obtained (Habib et al 2015). 
69
 Maximal rationality may exist when a treatment intervention is supported by an ‘all-or-none’ 
study, where all patients survive when treated with a particular treatment intervention when they all 
previously died. This would be a rare situation and requires acceptance of a number of background 
assumptions. 
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informed by complete information there would be little debate about the most 
appropriate treatment intervention. Minimal rationality is also not useful as we 
need to understand how information is processed by evidence based 
medicine to derive conclusions. We must therefore presume calculative 
intentionality70. The rationality of decision making within evidence based 
medicine should therefore be considered within the context of bounded 
rationality. 
 
Rationality may pertain to an individual, a reasoning process or a particular 
decision. When rationality is considered it is essential that the subject that is 
analysed is clearly defined (Abulof 2015). This chapter considers whether the 
reasoning process that underpins decision making within evidence based 
medicine is rational. This chapter does not consider whether it is rational for 
individual clinicians to practice evidence based medicine. This would not be 
an interesting question because evidence based medicine is so widely 
accepted within medicine. It could therefore be argued that any individual 
who practiced evidence based medicine was simply conforming to the 
prevailing culture of the medical profession. If an individual did not practice 
evidence based medicine it is likely that their clinical decisions would be 
challenged, they may fall short of medicolegal standards of care and they 
would struggle to attain professional status or attract research funding. It 
could therefore be argued that it was rational for an individual clinician to 
practice evidence based medicine even if the underlying decision making 
process was irrational. 
                                                          
70
 Abulof (2015) has equated minimal rationality with human nature. 
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In this section we have explored some ideas about the concept of rationality 
to provide a foundation for the analysis that is presented in later sections. 
The importance of different types of rationality, information availability and 
defining the subject of analysis has been recognised. In the rest of this 
chapter the rationality of the decision making process that is used within 
evidence based medicine is analysed from the perspective of different types 
of rationality. In order to move forwards with this analysis we next need to 
understand in greater detail the decision making process that is used by 
evidence based medicine. 
 
7.3. Decision Making in Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
In order to analyse the rationality of any decision making process we need to 
understand the framework within which decisions are made. Newton-Smith 
(1981) used a framework to analyse the rationality of scientific method in 
‘The Rationality of Science’. This framework attributed an aim, method and 
goal to any decision making process. The aim provides direction to the 
decision making process and the process is considered rational if the goal is 
consistently achieved when the method is used. Using this framework, 
Newton-Smith (1981) argued that science was rational because scientific 
method (the method) could be used to decide between competing scientific 
theories (the aim) to select scientific theories with increasing verisimilitude 
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(the goal). This framework can also be used to understand the decision 
making process that is used by evidence based medicine.  
 
The framework developed by Newton-Smith (1981) requires us to attribute an 
aim, method and goal to evidence based medicine. Evidence based medicine 
uses hierarchies of evidence to decide between different treatment 
interventions in order to improve patient care. Therefore the aim of evidence 
based medicine is to decide between different treatment interventions; the 
method uses hierarchies of evidence and the goal is improved patient care. 
Using this framework evidence based medicine can be considered rational if 
patient care is consistently improved when hierarchies are used to decide 
between different treatment interventions. 
 
At this stage, the reader needs to understand that the framework has been 
used to present a simplified model of the decision making process that is 
used. This model will be expanded in the next section. It is assumed that the 
aim ascribed to evidence based medicine is important and uncontroversial. 
The aim will therefore not be considered further. The method ascribed to 
evidence based medicine may be considered an oversimplification and will 
be elaborated upon as the chapter progresses. The goal of evidence based 
medicine is not clearly defined in the literature and the ascribed goal may be 
considered controversial. However, it is not possible to determine whether 
any decision making process is rational unless a goal is defined. The 
importance of alternative goals will be explored as the chapter progresses. 
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7.4. The Rationality of the Decision Making Process used by Evidence Based 
Medicine: 
 
Using our framework, decision making within evidence based medicine can 
be considered rational if patient care is consistently improved when 
hierarchies of evidence are used to decide between treatment interventions. 
However, a number of different hierarchies can be used within evidence 
based medicine. The implication is that different hierarchies may produce 
different conclusions, following consideration of the same information, and 
this may influence the treatment intervention that is provided to patients. If 
there is a ‘best’ treatment intervention, and the treatment intervention that is 
provided to patients is dependent upon the hierarchy that is used, patient 
care may not be consistently improved. It could therefore be argued that 
decision making within evidence based medicine is not rational: 
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The Irrationality Argument: 
 
Hierarchies of evidence are central to decision making within evidence based 
medicine. 
Different hierarchies of evidence can be used to inform decision making. 
Different hierarchies of evidence produce different conclusions following 
consideration of the same information. 
If different conclusions are produced following consideration of the same 
information patient care is not consistently improved. 
If patient care is not consistently improved decision making within evidence 
based medicine is not rational. 
Decision making within evidence based medicine is not rational 
 
This is a valid argument form that builds on the analysis that has been 
presented in previous chapters. We therefore need to consider the truth of 
the premises to determine if the argument is sound. It is not my intention to 
argue that decision making within evidence based medicine is not rational. 
What I wish to explore is under what conditions decision making within 
evidence based medicine can be rational. What we shall see is that the 
soundness of the argument depends upon the type of rationality that is used. 
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The first premise of this argument claims that hierarchies of evidence are 
central to decision making within evidence based medicine. This does not 
mean that hierarchies are the only determinant of the conclusions that are 
produced by evidence based medicine. This would be a misrepresentation of 
the decision making process. It is acknowledged that other factors, 
specifically clinical experience and patient preferences, are also of 
fundamental importance to the decision making process. This is repeatedly 
emphasised by the definitions of evidence based medicine that appear in the 
literature (Sackett et al 1996, Straus et al 2011). However, decision making 
within evidence based medicine is not characterised by consideration of 
clinical experience and patient preferences. These factors were part of the 
medical decision making process prior to the introduction of evidence based 
medicine and are important to decision making within contemporary 
alternative medicine. It is the use of hierarchies of evidence that characterise 
decision making in evidence based medicine71. 
 
The second and third premises of this argument claim that different 
hierarchies of evidence can be used by evidence based medicine and that 
use of different hierarchies will produce different conclusions following 
consideration of the same information. Collectively, the hierarchies allow a 
variety of different study designs to provide the highest level of evidence. 
Randomised controlled trials, observational studies and expert opinion can 
provide both the highest and lowest level of evidence in hierarchies. If the 
                                                          
71
 The importance of the hierarchies of evidence to evidence based medicine is considered in greater 
detail in Chapter 9 when the claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm is analysed. 
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same study designs can provide both the highest and lowest levels of 
evidence the choice of hierarchy may lead to a different conclusion when a 
body of evidence is considered. Hierarchies that prioritise randomised 
controlled trials, observational studies or expert opinion can produce very 
different conclusions following consideration of the same information.  
 
It is important to appreciate that use of different hierarchies will not 
necessarily lead to different conclusions following consideration of the same 
information. Where the results of different study designs and expert opinion 
all support the same treatment intervention the selected hierarchy is unlikely 
to affect the conclusion. However, a hierarchy becomes redundant when the 
results of different study designs all support the same treatment intervention. 
In these situations the treatment intervention that should be provided will be 
obvious. The hierarchy is far more important where the results of different 
study designs and/or expert opinion are conflicting. For example, a situation 
where expert opinion suggests we should use intervention A whereas 
evidence from cohort studies suggests that we should use intervention B. In 
this situation, the choice of hierarchy can very clearly alter the conclusion. 
 
The systematic review presented in Chapter 3 identified 42 hierarchies that 
can be used to guide medical decision making. These hierarchies have 
variable levels and rank study designs differently. Similarities do exist 
between some hierarchies, illustrated by the concept of the standard 
hierarchy of evidence. However, even hierarchies that rank randomised 
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controlled trials as the highest level of evidence are often significantly 
different and may reach different conclusions following consideration of the 
same information. This is because some of these hierarchies rank all 
randomised controlled trials as the highest level of evidence whereas others 
downgrade randomised controlled trials when they are methodologically 
flawed, inadequately powered, or produce results that are not clinically 
significant. 
 
It could be argued that some of the hierarchies of evidence are historical and 
have been superseded by later versions. For example, the hierarchy used by 
the American College of Chest Physicians was modified in 1992, 1998 and 
2001 before it was finally abandoned in 2006 in favour of the GRADE system 
(Baumann and Gutterman 2006). However, even if older hierarchies are 
discounted, users of evidence based medicine are still able to choose 
between a large number of hierarchies at any time. These hierarchies are all 
different and may produce different conclusions following consideration of the 
same information. 
 
Discounting historical hierarchies of evidence may be considered a charitable 
approach72. This is because there is limited theoretical support for any 
individual hierarchy. Although many earlier hierarchies have been 
superseded by later hierarchies there is limited justification for this. If there is 
                                                          
72
 When using analytical philosophy arguments should be presented in the most favourable light to 
avoid accusations of attacking a straw man (Walton 2008). This does not mean that the most 
favourable presentation is the correct or intended presentation. 
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no theoretical justification for later hierarchies it may be considered legitimate 
to use any hierarchy regardless of whether it has been superseded by a later 
version.   
 
The fourth premise claims that if different conclusions are produced following 
consideration of the same information patient care is not consistently 
improved. Different hierarchies have the potential to produce different 
conclusions following consideration of the same information but this may not 
happen in practice. No empirical research appears to have been undertaken 
in this area which suggests that inconsistent conclusions are not perceived 
as a problem. It is therefore important to consider why inconsistent 
conclusions are not perceived as a problem as this suggests that the fourth 
premise may be false. 
 
Different hierarchies may produce different conclusions, following 
consideration of the same information, but this may not lead to different 
treatment recommendations. This is because a number of other factors are 
considered, including methodological quality, biological plausibility and 
clinical significance, before treatment recommendations are made, as part of 
the grading process73. This way the conclusions of study designs valued by 
particular hierarchies may be upgraded or downgraded based upon 
methodological rigour, biologically plausibility or clinically significance in 
some systems. This allows the grading process to effectively iron out any 
                                                          
73
 The distinction between the hierarchy of evidence and the grading process was considered in 
Chapter 6. 
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inconsistency created by the use of different hierarchies. If the grading 
process ensures consistent treatment recommendations, even when different 
hierarchies are used, the decision making process used by evidence based 
medicine may still be rational from the perspective of practical rationality.  
 
The grading process may ensure consistent treatment recommendations 
when different hierarchies are used despite the different hierarchies 
supporting different conclusions. However, this does not mean that decision 
making is rational from the perspective of practical rationality. This is 
because evidence based medicine is characterised by the use of hierarchies 
of evidence, not other factors that are considered during the grading process. 
Decision making would only appear rational, from the perspective of practical 
rationality, because inconsistency created by using different hierarchies was 
corrected by non-characteristic features of evidence based medicine. If the 
characteristic feature of evidence based medicine does not ensure consistent 
conclusions how can decision making be practically rational? I would actually 
argue that decision making within medicine (not evidence based medicine), is 
rational from the perspective of practical rationality, despite the use of 
hierarchies by evidence based medicine. The claim that the fourth premise is 
false because the grading process irons out the inconsistency created by 
using different hierarchies is therefore problematic for evidence based 
medicine. 
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Although a number of different hierarchies of evidence are available to guide 
decision making some hierarchies are more frequently used that others. For 
example, the Oxford Levels of Evidence (Ball and Phillips 2001) have been 
commonly used in dentistry and the GRADE system is commonly used by 
clinical epidemiologists (Guyatt et al 2008). If the same hierarchy is always 
used conclusions may be consistent because the same information is 
processed in the same way74. The fourth premise may therefore be false 
because only a few of the hierarchies are regularly used. 
  
The analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the hierarchies of 
evidence have limited theoretical support. Therefore although the Oxford 
Levels of Evidence (Ball and Phillips 2001) and the GRADE system (Guyatt 
et al 2008) are commonly used, there are no strong theoretical grounds for 
this decision. If there are no strong theoretical grounds for preferring one 
hierarchy over others, decision making cannot be considered rational from 
the perspective of theoretical rationality. It would therefore appear difficult for 
proponents of evidence based medicine to claim that the fourth premise is 
false because theoretical arguments dictate the use of particular hierarchies. 
 
Although there are limited theoretical grounds to support the use of particular 
hierarchies they may be chosen because they reflect the value commitments 
of users. Value commitments are central to the concept of substantive 
                                                          
74
 Interestingly, several studies have suggested that individual hierarchies have poor reproducibility 
and can produce different conclusions when the same body of information is evaluated by different 
assessors (Atkins et al 2005, Turpen et al 2010). In these studies the poor reproducibility is attributed 
to misuse or misunderstanding of the hierarchies by the assessors not the hierarchies themselves. 
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rationality. In Chapter 6 a number of factors that have influenced the 
development of hierarchies were identified. Many of these factors are 
underpinned by value commitments. For example, the nursing profession 
uses hierarchies that value qualitative research and expert opinion; guideline 
developers use complex hierarchies that value transparency and clinicians 
favour simpler hierarchies because they value the ability to make rapid 
decisions. Different groups of users may therefore always use the same 
hierarchy because it is consistent with their value commitments. If the same 
hierarchy is always used, based upon value commitments, conclusions 
should not vary. This means that decision making within evidence based 
medicine may be rational from the perspective of substantive rationality. 
 
Substantive rationality allows decision making within evidence based 
medicine to be interpreted from a relativistic perspective. This means that 
patient care can still be consistently improved when different conclusions are 
derived using different hierarchies. This is because different conclusions can 
legitimately be reached, with different implications for patient care, following 
consideration of the same information. As long as the treatment that is 
recommended is consistent with the value commitments of the user, patient 
care is consistently improved. I would therefore argue that the fourth premise 
is false and the irrationality argument is unsound. 
 
Substantive rationality may explain why there are so many different 
hierarchies of evidence. The problem is however that on this interpretation 
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there would be no normative hierarchy of evidence and it is legitimate to use 
any hierarchy as long as it corresponds to the value commitments that are 
held. Individuals do not therefore use a hierarchy in an instrumental sense to 
conform to the prevailing culture within medicine. They use particular 
hierarchies because they correspond to the value commitments that they 
hold. 
  
Several hierarchies have been presented as heuristics to facilitate rapid 
decision making (Greer et al 2000, Bandelow et al 2002, Howick et al 2011). 
Heuristics are designed to produce conclusions that are usually true when 
information and time are limited (Blunt 2015). These hierarchies are used by 
clinicians to guide urgent decision making. It is accepted that these 
hierarchies may sometimes produce false conclusions but this is outweighed 
by the need to provide urgent treatment when patients are acutely unwell. A 
decision making process does not have to produce conclusions that are 
necessarily true in order to be substantively rational. Bounded rationality 
acknowledges that information is often incomplete and that the conclusion of 
a rational reasoning process may be false. The use of hierarchies of 
evidence as heuristics is an explicit acknowledgement that bounded 
rationality is used.  
 
So far in this section we have examined the decision making method used by 
evidence based medicine but we have not considered the goal of this 
decision making in any great depth. A decision making process can only be 
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considered rational if the goal is consistently achieved. It is therefore 
important to consider the goal of evidence based medicine in greater detail. 
 
Within the literature a number of different goals have been ascribed to 
evidence based medicine. These include superior patient care, prevention of 
harm and control of financial costs (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992, Waugh 1999, Guyatt et al 
2008 page 924, Howick 2011). The Evidence Based Medicine Working 
Group (1992) claimed that the goal of evidence based medicine was superior 
patient care. However, the term ‘superior patient care’ was not defined. This 
term can be interpreted in a number of different ways. It could refer to 
maximisation of survival rates, minimisation of morbidity rates, prevention of 
harm, improved quality of life, more precise estimates of treatment effect, 
clinically significant differences in treatment effects, cost effective care or 
control of financial costs. None of these are unreasonable goals and the list 
is certainly not exhaustive. It is also easy to envisage scenarios where 
different potential goals conflict with one another. For example, a particular 
treatment intervention could maximise survival rates but be expensive, cause 
significant morbidity and have an imprecise estimate of treatment effect. This 
is precisely why decision making in medicine is so complex.  
 
A lot has been written about evidence based medicine but a single goal has 
not been clearly defined. This is problematic when the rationality of decision 
making is considered from the perspective of practical rationality. This is 
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because, without a clearly defined goal, it is difficult to determine whether 
that goal has been consistently achieved. This does not mean that decision 
making within evidence based medicine cannot be rational. We simply have 
insufficient information to make a judgement unless a clear goal is defined. In 
this chapter we have resolved the problem by ascribing a generic goal to 
evidence based medicine. If the reader disagrees with this they may not be 
persuaded by the arguments that have been presented, and we would be 
back to square one. Indeed this might be why the hierarchies have 
proliferated: different groups disagree on the goals. More significantly, they 
might disagree on different goals because they are all seeking to achieve 
different things within medicine. 
 
The absence of a clearly defined goal is less problematic when the rationality 
of decision making is considered using substantive rationality. This is 
because value commitments can influence both the reasoning process and 
the goal (Etzioni 1988). From the perspective of substantive rationality, 
decision making can be guided by a number of different goals. Each decision 
does need to be guided by a goal but this goal does not need to be 
immutable. Each of the possible definitions for ‘superior patient care’ that 
were previously listed could provide the goal for a particular decision. As long 
as the hierarchy that is used and the goal are consistent with value 
commitments, decision making can be substantively rational. This means that 
the fifth premise of the irrationality argument is also false because the goal of 
evidence based medicine does not have to be improved patient care. 
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In this section I have analysed the claim that the decision making process 
used within evidence based medicine is not rational. I have argued that the 
decision making process used is not rational from the perspective of 
theoretical or practical rationality but can be rational from the perspective of 
substantive rationality. This is because hierarchies may be consistently used 
when they reflect the value commitments of users. This does not mean that 
every decision made using the framework imposed by evidence based 
medicine is substantively rational but every decision has the potential to be 
rational. The substantive rationality of any decision can only be determined if 
the value commitments that influence selection of hierarchy of evidence and 
desired goal are clearly stated.  
 
7.5. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter we have considered the rationality of the decision making 
process that is used within evidence based medicine. The concept of 
rationality has been explored and the importance of different types of 
rationality has been highlighted. Decision making can only be rational if 
conclusions are derived in a consistent way following consideration of the 
same information. However, the existence of different hierarchies may allow 
different conclusions to be reached following consideration of the same 
information. This suggests that decision making within evidence based 
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medicine may not be rational and has important implications for patient care, 
healthcare funding, medicolegal standards and medical research.  
 
It has been argued that decision making cannot be rational from the 
perspective of theoretical rationality because the hierarchies have limited 
theoretical support. Decision making may be rational, from the perspective of 
practical rationality, when conclusions derived from different hierarchies are 
modified by the grading process. However, this would mean that decision 
making was only rational when conclusions derived using the characteristic 
feature of evidence based medicine, hierarchies of evidence, were 
overridden by factors that do not characterise the concept. This interpretation 
is problematic for evidence based medicine. Decision making can be rational 
from the perspective of substantive rationality  but this allows a relativistic 
interpretation where treatment recommendations, medicolegal standards and 
decisions about healthcare funding and research can be both rational and 
inconsistent, depending upon the value commitments that are held. This has 
important implications for evidence based medicine and highlights the 
importance of clearly identifying the value commitments that underpin any 
decision.   
 
Evidence based medicine may derive conclusions using a rational process 
when value commitments dictate the hierarchy of evidence that is used. 
Science also derives conclusions using a rational process (Newton-Smith 
1981). Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be science on multiple 
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occasions. However, the limited empirical and theoretical support for 
hierarchies of evidence suggests that this claim may be false. The claim that 
evidence based medicine is science is therefore analysed in the next two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 8: Evidence Based Medicine as Science 
 
8.1. Introduction:  
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be science on a number of 
different occasions (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer 1979, Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group 1992, Guyatt et al 2000, Djulbegovic et al 2009). ‘Scientific 
medicine’ was originally proposed as an alternative name for the concept but 
this name was abandoned because of the implication that medicine had 
previously been unscientific (Howick 2011). Science is often considered 
epistemically superior to other forms of knowledge because it uses scientific 
method to provide justification for knowledge claims that are made (Ladyman 
2002)75. This use of scientific method allows science to attain a privileged 
position in society (Sorell 1991). It is therefore important to analyse the claim 
that evidence based medicine is science because if it is not science it does 
not deserve the privileged status attributed to science. 
 
Within philosophy of science four main theories about the nature of science 
are recognised: inductivism (Ayer 1946), falsificationism (Popper 1963), 
Kuhnian paradigms (Kuhn 1996) and research programmes (Lakatos 1970). 
If evidence based medicine is science the knowledge claims that inform 
decision making should be derived using a process that corresponds to one 
                                                          
75
 Knowledge can be defined as justified true belief. For a belief to constitute knowledge the belief 
must be true and that true belief must be justified (Ladyman 2002). 
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of these theories. However, it is notable that none of these theories propose 
hierarchies of evidence. Pseudoscience can be defined as beliefs or 
practices mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method (Oxford 
English Dictionary 2006, Pigliucci 2015). If evidence based medicine claims 
to be science, but the knowledge claims that inform decision making are not 
derived using a process that corresponds to an accepted theory about the 
nature of science, evidence based medicine may be pseudoscience.  
 
Categorisation of a discipline as pseudoscience is usually considered 
derogatory. Any claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience is 
therefore likely to be contested because it will have negative implications for 
knowledge claims that are made. Within philosophy of science a range of 
different criteria have been developed that can be used to demarcate science 
from pseudoscience (Ayer 1946, Popper 1963, Lakatos 1970, Thagard 1978, 
Ruse 1982, Kuhn 1996). These criteria do not provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for this demarcation but they are considered useful 
(Curd, Cover and Pincock 2013). These demarcation criteria may be used to 
investigate any claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience.  
 
In this chapter we will consider whether evidence based medicine is science 
or pseudoscience. In the first section the four main theories about the nature 
of science: inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research 
programmes will be introduced. In the second section the claim that evidence 
based medicine is science will be reinterpreted as the claim that the 
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knowledge claims that inform decision making within evidence based 
medicine are science. This claim has previously been considered and the 
existing literature will be reviewed. In the third section the justification for the 
knowledge claims that inform decision making within evidence based 
medicine will be considered from the perspective of different theories about 
the nature of science. It will be argued that these knowledge claims are not 
justified using scientific method. This suggests that evidence based medicine 
may be pseudoscience. In the final section, the claim that evidence based 
medicine is pseudoscience is considered using criteria that have been 
developed to demarcate science from pseudoscience. 
 
8.2. Theories about the Nature of Science: 
 
There is a common misconception that there is a single scientific method. 
However, within philosophy of science, four main theories about the nature of 
science are recognised: inductivism (Ayer 1946), falsificationism (Popper 
1963), Kuhnian paradigms (Kuhn 1996) and research programmes (Lakatos 
1970)76. It is important to appreciate that none of these theories are 
universally accepted and they are all considered problematic from an 
epistemological perspective. It is not my intention to discuss these theories in 
any great detail or argue for the superiority of any one theory. This would be 
                                                          
76
 Feyerabend (1975) has argued that there is no such thing as scientific method. On this 
interpretation it is meaningless to consider whether evidence based medicine corresponds to a 
theory about the nature of science. Newton-Smith (1981) has counter-argued that there must be 
scientific method because established sciences like chemistry and physics are so successful in making 
predictions and manipulating the physical world.  
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beyond the scope of this thesis and has been comprehensively undertaken 
elsewhere (Newton-Smith 1981, Ladyman 2002, Chalmers 2010, Curd, 
Cover and Pincock 2013). The different theories are simply presented in 
sufficient detail to provide a foundation for the analysis that is presented in 
the rest of the chapter. 
 
The first theory about the nature of science that will be considered is 
inductivism. Inductivism places a high value on explanatory theory and 
proposes that scientific method involves the confirmation of theory by 
observation. In inductivism, theories are used to generate predictions and 
these are tested in experiments. When a predicted outcome is observed the 
theory is confirmed and the observation is considered to provide justification 
for the knowledge claim made by the theory (Ayer 1946). Theories may also 
be used to explain established phenomenon. Inductivism is considered a 
rational account of science because theories that are confirmed by 
observation are consistently accepted by scientists (Ladyman 2002). This 
theory about the nature of science is considered problematic because 
inductive argumentation is fallible. 
 
The second theory about the nature of science is falsificationism. 
Falsificationism also places a high value on explanatory theory and proposes 
that scientific method involves the falsification of theory by observation. 
Falsificationism employs deductive reasoning therefore any conclusions are 
necessarily true if the premises are true (Popper 1963). Falsificationism is 
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considered problematic because theories are always tested in conjunction 
with auxiliary assumptions and background knowledge. As a result 
falsification does not prove that the theory being tested is false because it is 
also possible that an auxiliary assumption or background knowledge is 
false77. Falsificationism has also been criticised because it only leads to 
negative knowledge as hypotheses are refuted but never proven. 
Falsification is considered a rational theory of science because theories that 
are falsified are consistently rejected by scientists (Lakatos 1970, Ladyman 
2002, Chalmers 2010). 
 
The third theory about the nature of science is Kuhnian paradigms. The 
concept of a paradigm was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in ‘The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’. Kuhn (1996) argued that normal science occurred 
with an established paradigm and was characterised by puzzle solving. 
Puzzle solving is guided by the disciplinary matrix and exemplars. The 
disciplinary matrix includes the general theoretical laws, instruments and 
assumptions that scientists use and governs permissible concepts, problems 
and explanations. Exemplars demonstrate the problem solving techniques 
that can be used to extend and elaborate the scope of a paradigm. Normal 
science is considered a highly determined activity with conceptual, 
theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments. This ensures that 
normal science is a rational activity.  
 
                                                          
77
 This is the Duhem-Quine hypothesis (Ladyman 2002). 
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Puzzle solving by scientists within an established paradigm had three 
important elements: the matching of facts with theory, the articulation of the 
consequences of theory and determination of significant facts (Kuhn 1996). 
The paradigm is assumed to guarantee the existence of a solution to every 
puzzle and failures within normal science are blamed upon individual 
scientists not the paradigm itself. However, as normal science progresses, 
experimental and theoretical anomalies accumulate and a crisis emerges. 
This crisis is resolved by the emergence of a new paradigm and a paradigm 
shift occurs. Paradigm shift is discussed in Chapter 9 when we consider the 
claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm. 
 
The final theory that will be considered is research programmes. This theory 
of scientific method was developed by Imre Lakatos and also emphasises the 
importance of the framework within which science is undertaken. A scientific 
research programme consists of a hard core of fundamental principles 
surrounded by a peripheral protective belt of auxiliary assumptions. Work 
within any research programme is guided by the heuristic and may involve 
falsification and/or confirmation of theory through observation. Work 
undertaken within the confines of a research programme is therefore rational. 
The heuristic drives the research programme and allows the development 
and possible refutations of a research programme to be anticipated in 
advance. This theory solves some of the problems posed by the Duhem-
Quine hypothesis because a methodological decision has been taken to 
unquestioningly accept the hard core (Lakatos 1970). 
255 
 
 
The theory of research programmes differentiates between progressive and 
degenerating research programmes78. A progressive research programme 
continues to produce novel facts. A degenerating research programme only 
accommodates known facts and does not produce novel facts. A new 
research programme is considered to supersede an old research programme 
when it has greater explanatory power than its rival and/or predicts novel 
phenomenon. All research programs have unsolved problems and it is often 
not possible to determine whether a research programme is progressing or 
degenerating contemporaneously (Lakatos 1970). As a consequence, extra-
empirical factors may influence the decision to retain or reject a research 
programme. The theory of scientific research programmes is therefore 
considered an irrational account of science (Newton-Smith 1981, Ladyman 
2002, Curd, Cover and Pincock 2013). 
 
The four theories introduced in this section are all theories about the nature 
of science. However, it is important to make a distinction between inductivism 
and falsificationism on one hand and Kuhnian paradigms and research 
programmes on the other hand. Inductivism and falsificationism are theories 
of scientific method whereas Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes 
are broader theories that emphasise the importance of the framework within 
                                                          
78
 It is acknowledged that this is a simplistic explanation as proto-science and old science have also 
been recognised (Curd, Cover and Pincock 2013). However, this is unimportant to the analysis 
presented in this chapter. 
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which science is undertaken79. Falsificationism or inductivism can actually be 
used within a Kuhnian paradigm to solve puzzles. This distinction between 
the different theories about the nature of science is important when we 
reinterpret the claim that evidence based medicine is science. 
 
Within philosophy of science four main theories about the nature of science 
are recognised: inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and 
research programmes. These theories have been introduced and described 
in sufficient detail to provide a foundation for the analysis that is presented in 
later sections. If evidence based medicine is science knowledge claims 
should be derived using a process that corresponds to one of these theories. 
It is therefore interesting that none of these theories postulate hierarchies or 
appear to value randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses. This 
suggests that evidence based medicine may not be science. However, 
before we analyse the claim that evidence based medicine is science we 
need to establish that proponents of evidence based medicine have indeed 
made this claim. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79
 This also explains why Section 8.2 is entitled ‘theories about the nature of science’ not ‘theories of 
scientific method’. 
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8.3. Evidence Based Medicine as Science: 
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm provides the 
strongest evidence that proponents believe that it is science. Evidence based 
medicine was first claimed to be a new paradigm by the Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group (1992) and this claim has been restated by Guyatt 
et al (2000) and Djulbegovic et al (2009). Each of these groups uses the term 
paradigm in a Kuhnian sense and the Working Group (1992) actually 
reference ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in their original paper. 
These groups all clearly identify evidence based medicine with the theory of 
Kuhnian paradigms. 
 
The early hierarchies provide further evidence that proponents of evidence 
based medicine believed that the concept was science. Cochrane (1972) 
claimed that randomised controlled trials could be used to make scientific 
measurements and the Canadian Task Force claimed that their approach 
was based on the best available scientific evidence (Spitzer et al 1979). The 
‘How to Read Clinical Journals’ series presented rules of scientific evidence 
for the study of treatment (Sackett 1981) and the American College of Chest 
Physicians proposed a new hierarchy (Cook et al 1992) because the 
previous hierarchy did not include ‘scientific’ overviews (systematic reviews): 
‘Moreover, the Levels of Evidence were developed prior to the 
recognition of the power of rigorous scientific overview.’ (Cook et al 
1992 page 305S-306S) 
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Although many of the early hierarchies claimed that their approach was 
science these claims are rarely repeated by later hierarchies. This may 
reflect increasing scepticism, or tacit uncertainty, regarding the claim that 
evidence based medicine is science. Alternatively, the claim that evidence 
based medicine is science may be accepted unquestioned. 
 
Superficial consideration of the claim that evidence based medicine is 
science suggests that the claim may be meaningless. Evidence based 
medicine is used to determine the most appropriate medical care whereas 
the aim of science is to provide explanation and understanding. However, the 
claim can be reformulated so that is meaningful. When proponents claim that 
evidence based medicine is science what they really mean is that the 
knowledge claims that inform decision making within evidence based 
medicine are science. These knowledge claims are derived from the study 
designs that are prioritised by the hierarchies of evidence: randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses. 
 
If randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are science the method 
that these study designs use to produce knowledge claims should 
correspond to an established theory about the nature of science. The 
hierarchies should not themselves be confused with science because they do 
not directly produce explanation and understanding. The hierarchies simply 
rank the knowledge claims produced by different study designs. However, 
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this does not mean that the hierarchies are irrelevant when we assess 
whether knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses are science. The hierarchies are actually fundamental to this 
claim because they dictate the study designs that are preferred within 
evidence based medicine. The hierarchies are particularly important when 
the knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses are considered within the context of theories that emphasise the 
importance of the framework within which science is conducted i.e. Kuhnian 
paradigms and research programmes. 
 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the hierarchies of evidence lack empirical and 
theoretical support and that randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses 
are not epistemically superior to expert opinion or other study designs. These 
arguments are not incompatible with the claim that randomised controlled 
trials and meta-analyses are science. Randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses can still be science if the method that they use to produce 
knowledge claims corresponds to an established theory about the nature of 
science.  
 
There has been a limited discussion in the literature about whether 
randomised controlled trials use the scientific method of inductivism or 
falsificationism (Senn 1991, Shahar 1997, Djulbegovic et al 2009, Thompson 
2010, Kerry et al 2012). However, this discussion is generally predicated on 
the assumption that randomised controlled trials are science. Senn (1991) 
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has argued that the method used by clinical trials corresponds to 
falsificationism. Shahar (1997) has counter-argued that randomised 
controlled trials cannot use falsificationism because the null hypothesis is not 
falsified. Shahar (1997) claimed that the method used by randomised 
controlled trials instead corresponded to inductivism although this claim was 
disputed by Kerry et al (2012) because the results of randomised controlled 
trials were presented in terms of probabilities. Thompson (2010) has claimed 
that randomised controlled trials cannot be science because they do not 
provide explanation. None of these authors have explicitly suggested that 
randomised controlled trials may be pseudoscience80. 
 
Several authors have considered whether evidence based medicine can be 
related to inductivism or falsificationism (Silva and Wyer 2009, Sestini 2010). 
Silva and Wyer (2009) argued that evidence based medicine could not be 
explained using inductivism because the hierarchies contained 
pathophysiological rationale81. Sestini (2010) claimed that evidence based 
medicine corresponded to falsificationism because a correspondence theory 
of truth was used and research evidence could be rejected. I would argue 
that evidence based medicine itself cannot be related to either inductivism or 
falsificationism because it is not scientific method. The claim made by Sestini 
(2010) is also problematic because use of the correspondence theory of truth 
                                                          
80
 Charlton (2009) and Schafranski (2012) suggested that evidence based medicine may be 
pseudoscience but no arguments were presented to support these claim. This claim has not been 
advanced by anybody else. 
81
 This appears to relate to a particular interpretation of inductivism termed logical positivism. In 
logical positivism only statements that are empirically verifiable and deductive inferences are 
meaningful (Ayer 1946). 
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and rejection of research evidence do not differentiate falsificationism from 
other theories about the nature of science.  
 
The theories of Kuhnian paradigms and research programme are broader 
theories than falsificationism and inductivism because they consider the 
framework within which science is undertaken. It is therefore meaningful to 
consider whether evidence based medicine itself is science in relation to 
these theories. The claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian 
paradigm has been discussed in detail in the literature (Couto 1998, Shahar 
1998, Tonelli 1998, Greaves 2002, Sehon and Stanley 2003, Daly 2005, 
Lambert 2006, Djulbegovic et al 2009, Goldenberg 2010). This discussion 
assumes that evidence based medicine is science but this assumption is not 
explicitly considered. There has been no discussion in the literature about 
whether evidence based medicine corresponds to the theory of research 
programmes82. 
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine have claimed that evidence based 
medicine is science. However, this claim is problematic because evidence 
based medicine is used to determine the most appropriate medical care 
whereas the aim of science is to provide explanation and understanding. The 
claim has therefore been reinterpreted as the claim that knowledge claims 
derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are science. 
                                                          
82
 Kulkarni (2005) does acknowledge the theory of research programmes but does not relate this 
theory to evidence based medicine. 
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The hierarchies of evidence are fundamental to this claim because they 
prioritise randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses over other study 
designs. There has been a limited discussion in the literature about whether 
randomised controlled trials use inductivism or falsificationism but this is 
generally predicated on the assumption that they are science. In the next 
section we will therefore consider whether randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses are science from the perspective of the four main theories 
about the nature of science.  
 
8.4. Randomised Controlled Trials and Meta-analyses as Science: 
 
In this section we will consider the claim that randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses are science. Science is characterised by its use of scientific 
method to provide justification for knowledge claims that are made (Newton-
Smith 1981, Ladyman 2002, Chalmers 2010, Curd, Cover and Pincock 
2013). Therefore if randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are 
science the method that they use to justify knowledge claims should 
correspond to one of the four main theories about the nature of science: 
inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes. If 
the method that they use does not correspond to one of these theories they 
are not science. This argument is summarised below: 
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The Science Argument: 
 
Knowledge claims can only be science if they are justified using a method 
that corresponds to a theory about the nature of science  
The method used by randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses to 
justify knowledge claims does not correspond to a theory about the nature of 
science. 
Knowledge claims justified by randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses are not science. 
 
This is a valid argument form so we need to consider the truth of the 
premises to determine whether the argument is sound. The first premise 
claims that knowledge claims can only be science if they are justified by a 
method that corresponds to a theory about the nature of science. This 
premise will be considered uncontroversial and is accepted. We therefore 
need to consider whether the method used by randomised controlled trials 
and meta-analyses, within the framework imposed by hierarchies of 
evidence, corresponds to inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or 
research programmes.  
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8.4.1. Inductivism: 
 
Inductivism places a high value on explanatory theory. In inductivism, 
theories are used to generate predictions and these are tested in 
experiments. When a predicted outcome is observed the theory is confirmed 
and the observation is considered to provide justification for the knowledge 
claim made by the theory (Ayer 1946). If the method use by randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses corresponds to inductivism these study 
designs should test underlying theory. 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are set up to test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in outcome between two treatment 
interventions. If a difference is found, the probability of the observed 
difference occurring by chance, if there really is no difference between the 
two treatment interventions, is calculated. The null hypothesis is then 
accepted or rejected depending upon a preassigned probability value. 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use inductivism 
because they are not designed to confirm the hypothesis that a particular 
treatment intervention is effective. Randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses do not confirm theory by observation. They test the hypothesis that 
there is no difference between two treatment interventions.  
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It is important to appreciate that the treatment interventions that are tested in 
randomised controlled trials, and later collated in meta-analyses, are not 
selected at random. They are selected because they are supported by 
underlying theory and these treatment interventions must undergo rigorous 
laboratory and animal testing before clinical trials on human subjects. In this 
sense the interventions that are tested are supported by underlying theory 
and any claim that basic medical science did not use inductivism would be 
false. However, this underlying theory is not relevant when the null 
hypotheses is accepted or rejected. The null hypothesis is accepted or 
rejected based only on the preassigned probability value83. 
 
Although underlying theory is not relevant when the null hypothesis is 
accepted or rejected this information is considered when the conclusions of 
the study are interpreted. This was illustrated in Chapter 6 when different 
factors that have influenced the hierarchies were considered. Biological 
plausibility is informed by underlying theory and this is important when 
evidence is interpreted (Blunt 2015). However, this is not relevant to the 
present discussion as we are considering whether knowledge claims are 
derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses using 
inductivism not whether underlying theory influences the interpretation of any 
conclusions. Interestingly no hierarchy or grading process differentiates 
between treatment interventions that are biologically plausible and 
                                                          
83
 This criticism is equally applicable to other study designs that compare outcomes in different 
groups such as controlled clinical trials and observational studies. 
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implausible. This may be because it is assumed that all treatment 
interventions that are tested are biologically plausible. 
 
The hierarchies prioritise knowledge claims derived from randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses but they do contain a number of other 
study designs. One of these study designs, the prospective case series, does 
employ inductivism because it uses observations to confirm underlying 
theory. In a prospective case series all patients are given a treatment 
intervention and outcomes are recorded. The theory supporting the treatment 
intervention is then confirmed to a greater or lesser extent depending upon 
the outcomes that are observed. Inductivism can provide compelling 
evidence for the effectiveness of a treatment intervention when all subjects 
benefit from treatment. This is the ‘all-or-none’ study design. However, 
prospective case series are rarely valued by hierarchies. This study design is 
usually excluded or ranked amongst the lowest levels. Only the hierarchy 
developed by the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine (Ball and 
Phillips 2001) ranks the ‘all-or-none’ study design amongst the highest levels. 
Study designs that do employ inductivism are therefore not generally 
prioritised by the hierarchies of evidence.  
 
Inductivism places a high value on explanatory theory. This is in direct 
contrast to the hierarchies that value evidence from empirical study designs. 
Few hierarchies include explanatory theory and those that do tend to devalue 
this form of evidence. For example, the American Heart Association (2000) 
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ranks rational conjecture as the lowest level of evidence. Most hierarchies 
would subsume explanatory theory within expert opinion ranking it as the 
lowest level of evidence. Only the hierarchy developed by Mitchell and Friese 
(2007) would allow explanatory theory to attain the highest level of evidence. 
The fact that expert opinion and prospective case series are not generally 
prioritised by hierarchies does not mean that randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses do not employ inductivism. However, if inductivism was 
important within evidence based medicine we would also expect explanatory 
theory and prospective case series to be prioritised. This provides indirect 
evidence to support the claim that randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses do not use inductivism. 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use inductivism 
because they do not seek to confirm underlying theory through observation. 
They test the hypothesis that there is no difference between different 
treatment interventions. This is fundamentally different to inductivism and 
may be considered a negative characterisation of knowledge. The treatment 
interventions that are tested in randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses are supported by theory but this theory is not directly tested. 
Explanatory theory is fundamental to inductivism and prospective case series 
clearly employ inductivism. However, explanatory theory and prospective 
case series are rarely valued by hierarchies. This suggests that the 
hierarchies do not value the confirmation of theory by observation and 
provides further indirect support for the claim that randomised controlled trials 
and meta-analyses do not use inductivism.  
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8.4.2. Falsificationism: 
 
Falsificationism also places a high value on explanatory theory. 
Falsificationism proposes that science involves the falsification of theory by 
observation. However, although the interventions that are tested in 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are underlain by theory, this 
theory is not directly tested. Randomised controlled trails and meta-analyses 
are set up to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference in outcome 
between two treatment interventions. If the underlying theory is not directly 
tested it cannot be falsified. 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not even falsify null 
hypotheses. When the results of randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses are interpreted the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected 
depending on a preassigned probability value. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected the alternative hypothesis is accepted using inference to best 
explanation. Falsificationism is characterised by its rejection of theory using 
deductive inferences and inference to best explanation is not a deductive 
inference. Randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews cannot use 
falsification because the results of these studies are interpreted 
probabilistically. Even a conclusion that is highly likely to be true is not 
necessarily true.  
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The hierarchies prioritise knowledge claims derived from randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses but they do contain a number of other 
different study designs. The prospective case series study design can be 
used to falsify theory in the same way that it can be used to confirm theory. 
This can be illustrated if we consider infective condition X. Theory proposes 
that treatment A is an effective treatment for this condition in all patients and 
a prospective case series is undertaken. If some patients with infective 
condition X fail to recover after treatment with treatment A, the theory that 
this is an effective treatment for infective condition X in all patients is falsified, 
within the limits imposed by the Duhem-Quine hypothesis. However, the 
hierarchies do not usually value prospective case series. This study design is 
generally ignored or ranked as the lowest level of evidence. In short the 
hierarchies do not value the one study design that can be used to falsify 
theory. 
 
Testing of theory is fundamental to the scientific method of falsificationism. 
However, as demonstrated above, when inductivism was considered, 
explanatory theory is not valued by hierarchies of evidence. Few hierarchies 
include explanatory theory and this form of evidence would normally be 
subsumed within expert opinion, as the lowest level of evidence. The fact that 
expert opinion and prospective case series are not prioritised by hierarchies 
provides indirect evidence that randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses do not employ falsificationism. This is because if falsificationism 
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was valued we would also expect explanatory theory and prospective case 
series to be prioritised by the hierarchies.  
 
Randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews do not use 
falsificationism because the underlying theory is not directly tested and null 
hypotheses are rejected using inference to best explanation not deduction. 
Explanatory theory is fundamental to falsification and the prospective case 
series study can potentially be used to falsify underlying theory but 
explanatory theory and prospective case series are not valued by the 
hierarchies. Randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews do not use 
falsificationism and this scientific method is not valued by hierarchies. 
 
8.4.3. Kuhnian Paradigms: 
 
The theory of paradigms differs from inductivism and falsificationism because 
it emphasises the importance of the framework within which science is 
undertaken. The knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled trials 
and meta-analyses must therefore be considered within the framework 
imposed by evidence based medicine. Evidence based medicine has been 
claimed to be a new paradigm on a number of occasions (Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group 1992, Guyatt et al 2000, Djulbegovic et al 2009) 
and it is important to note that it is evidence based medicine itself, not 
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randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses, that is claimed to be the new 
paradigm.  
 
Superficial consideration of evidence based medicine suggests that it may 
conform to the definition of paradigm proposed by Kuhn (1996). Hierarchies 
of evidence are fundamental to decision making within evidence based 
medicine and these could be considered part of the disciplinary matrix. 
Evidence based medicine textbooks are replete with examples that show 
how the hierarchies should be used and these could be exemplars. However, 
we should be careful not to conflate tools that have been developed to guide 
decision making in medicine with the conduct of science. The hierarchies, 
and the examples provided in evidence based medicine textbooks, have 
been developed to guide medical decision making not the conduct of 
science. 
 
When evidence based medicine is conceived solely as a tool to guide 
medical decision making it cannot be a paradigm but evidence based 
medicine has also driven the medical research agenda. Randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses are more likely to be undertaken, funded 
and published because they are valued by hierarchies (Hammersley 2013, 
Mebius 2014). The idea that certain study designs provide the ‘best evidence’ 
to support medical decision making and the idea that certain study designs 
simply provide the ‘best evidence’ have become conflated. When evidence 
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based medicine is conceived in this way there may still be potential for 
evidence based medicine to be a paradigm. 
 
Evidence based medicine can only be considered a paradigm if it engages in 
puzzle solving. Puzzle solving within an established paradigm has three 
important elements: the matching of facts with theory, the articulation of the 
consequences of theory and determination of significant facts (Kuhn 1996). 
We therefore need to consider whether the study designs prioritised by 
hierarchies of evidence, randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses, can 
be used to match facts with theory, articulate the consequences of theory 
and determine significant facts. 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are designed to test null 
hypotheses. The interventions that are tested are underlain by theory but this 
theory is not directly tested and these study designs do not use inductivism 
or falsificationism. If randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not 
directly test underlying theory it is difficult to see how these study designs 
can match facts with theory or articulate the consequences of underlying 
theory. 
 
Evidence based medicine may still be considered normal science if the 
conclusions of randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are significant 
facts. However, knowledge claims derived from these study designs are 
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based upon a probabilistic interpretation of the results. Null hypotheses are 
rejected when it is unlikely that the treatment intervention and control 
intervention are equally effective. I would suggest that knowledge claims 
derived in this way are not significant facts in the sense that Kuhn intended. 
This does not mean that knowledge claims derived from randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses cannot inform clinical decision making but 
this conflates evidence based medicine as a decision making tool with 
evidence based medicine as science. 
 
Some hierarchies do include the prospective case series and this study 
design can be used to confirm or falsify underlying theory. Theory is rarely 
explicitly included within hierarchies but can be included within expert 
opinion. Evidence based medicine therefore has the potential to match facts 
with theory, articulate the consequences of theory and determine significant 
facts. However, prospective case series and expert opinion are not generally 
valued by hierarchies and these forms or evidence are clearly viewed as 
inferior to randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses. 
 
The argument that evidence based medicine does not engage in puzzle 
solving can be developed further. Kuhn (1996) was clear that scientists 
engaged in normal science assume that the paradigm guarantees a solution 
to every puzzle. Failures in puzzle solving are blamed upon individual 
scientists not the paradigm itself. However, this is not how evidence based 
medicine is presented (Guyatt et al 2008, Straus et al 2011). Randomised 
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controlled trials and meta-analyses are not expected to produce significant 
facts, even when they are undertaken to a high standard, because of bias 
inherent within these study designs84. The hierarchies that purport to rank 
different study designs using bias rank randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses as the highest levels of evidence because they minimise not 
eliminate bias85. If bias is only ever minimised significant facts can surely not 
be established.   
 
It is important to reiterate that I am not claiming that the treatment 
interventions that are tested in randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses are not developed using underlying theory. In fact, the testing of 
underlying theory is of fundamental importance in the development of these 
interventions. New pharmacological agents are often painstakingly developed 
over many years in laboratory and animal studies (Mebius 2014). During this 
development, experiments are repeated, underlying theory may be modified 
and new instruments may be developed. This is puzzle solving activity. 
However, laboratory and animal studies are not valued by the hierarchies 
and the hierarchies dictate the study designs that should be used to justify 
knowledge claims within evidence based medicine. 
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be normal science but the 
study designs prioritised by the hierarchies are not designed to match facts 
                                                          
84
 This does not mean that medical researchers are not blamed when randomised controlled trials 
are considered to be poorly conducted. 
85
 Bias was considered in detail in Chapter 5 
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with underlying theory or articulate the consequences of theory. Moreover, 
knowledge claims derived from these study designs are not significant facts, 
because they are based on a probabilistic interpretation of the null 
hypothesis. Other study designs within the hierarchies can be used to solve 
puzzles but these study designs are rarely valued. I would therefore argue 
that evidence based medicine cannot use the theory of Kuhnian paradigms to 
justify knowledge claims that are made. 
 
8.4.4. Research Programmes: 
 
Similar to the theory of Kuhnian paradigms, this theory also emphasises the 
importance of the framework within which science is conducted. This means 
that randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses cannot be considered 
independently of evidence based medicine. All progressive research 
programmes have a hard core of underlying theory and a heuristic that 
guides research. Progressive research programmes also continue to produce 
novel facts. Therefore, if evidence based medicine is a research programme 
it should have a hard core of underlying theory, a guiding heuristic and 
continue to produce novel facts.  
 
It could be argued that the hierarchies represent the hard core of an evidence 
based medicine research programme. This argument can only be made if the 
hierarchies are conceived as a tool for conducting science not a tool to 
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support medical decision making. The hierarchies do possess some of the 
features of a hard core. They are generally unquestioned and have 
developed with time. However, there are a number of problems with this 
interpretation. Firstly, it is not clear that the hierarchies should be conceived 
as a tool for conducting science. Secondly, although hierarchies have 
proliferated with time it is difficult to claim that they have evolved with time 
because the same study designs consistently provide the highest and lowest 
levels of evidence. Finally, the hard core of a research programme is a hard 
core of underlying theory but, as argued in Chapter 4, the hierarchies have 
limited theoretical support. If the hierarchies have limited theoretical support it 
is difficult to see how they can provide a hard core of underlying theory. I 
would therefore argue that the hierarchies cannot represent the hard core of 
an evidence based medicine research programme. 
 
Hierarchies may not be able to provide the hard core of a research 
programme but they could conceivably provide the heuristic. Several 
hierarchies have been claimed to be heuristics to facilitate rapid decision 
making (Greer et al 2000, Bandelow et al 2002, Howick et al 2011) although 
this claim has not been extended to heuristics within a research programme. 
Heuristics are designed to produce conclusions that are usually true (Blunt 
2015) therefore hierarchies could potentially act as a heuristic with limited 
theoretical support. Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not 
provide superior evidence to other study designs or expert opinion but this 
does not necessarily mean that they provide inferior evidence. There may 
therefore be scope for hierarchies to act as a heuristic within an evidence 
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based medicine research programme although it is unclear how the 
development of such a research programme could be anticipated in advance.  
 
If evidence based medicine is a research programme and the hierarchies 
provides the heuristic there would have to be a separate hard core of 
underlying theory. This hard core has not previously been articulated but this 
does not mean that it could not be articulated. The hard core could include 
axioms such as treatment interventions must be biologically plausible and 
treatment interventions that are tested in humans should be supported by 
laboratory and animal studies. However, even if a hard core could be 
developed it is not clear that it would characterise an evidence based 
medicine research programme. This is because evidence based medicine is 
characterised by the use of hierarchies. If the hierarchies do not form part of 
the hard core, evidence based medicine would surely lose its essence. I 
would therefore suggest that it would be challenging to develop a hard core, 
without the hierarchies, which was limited to evidence based medicine and 
not the broader concept of medical science. 
  
Any research programme must have an underlying hard core, heuristic and 
produce novel facts. Even if a hard core of theory underlying evidence based 
medicine could be articulated, independent of the hierarchies of evidence 
which would provide the heuristic, novel facts would still need to be produced 
for there to be a research programme. This research programme would 
preferentially value evidence claims derived from randomised controlled trials 
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and meta-analyses. However, these study designs reject null hypotheses 
based upon probability and do not produce significant facts. This being the 
case it is difficult to claim that they can produce novel facts within any 
evidence based medicine research programme. If randomised controlled 
trials and meta-analyses do not produce novel facts evidence based 
medicine cannot be a progressive research programme.  
 
In this section we have considered whether evidence based medicine may be 
a research programme. The hierarchies of evidence cannot provide the hard 
core because they have limited theoretical support although they could 
potentially provide a heuristic. This would require articulation of a separate 
hard core of underlying theory that was distinct from medical science. A 
characteristic feature of any research programme is that it should produce 
novel facts yet randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not 
produce novel facts. If the study designs that are prioritised by the 
hierarchies do not produce novel facts it is difficult to envisage how evidence 
based medicine can be a research programme. 
 
8.4.5. Summary: 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses can only be considered 
science if knowledge claims are derived using a method that corresponds to 
a theory about the nature of science. We have therefore considered whether 
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the method used by randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses, within 
the framework imposed by hierarchies of evidence, corresponds to 
inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes. 
Inductivism and falsificationism are theories of scientific method whereas 
Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes are broader theories about 
the nature of science.  
 
The interventions that are tested in randomised controlled trials and meta-
analyses may be supported by underlying theory but this theory is not 
confirmed or falsified when the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected. This 
means that randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use 
inductivism or falsificationism. Treatment interventions that are tested in 
prospective case series can be confirmed or falsified but these study designs 
are not valued by hierarchies. This shows that the hierarchies themselves do 
not value inductivism or falsificationism.  
 
Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes are broader theories about 
the nature of science. Knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled 
trials and meta-analyses have therefore been considered within the 
framework imposed by evidence based medicine when these theories have 
been considered. Evidence based medicine cannot be normal science or a 
research programme because the study designs prioritised by hierarchies, 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses, test null hypotheses not 
underlying theory. Therefore they do not match facts with theory, articulate 
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the consequences of theory, determine significant facts or produce novel 
facts. 
 
The analysis presented in this section has revealed that knowledge claims 
derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses, within the 
framework imposed by hierarchies of evidence, are not derived using a 
process that corresponds to an established theory about the nature of 
science. I would therefore argue that the second premise of the science 
argument is true and the argument is sound. This means that knowledge 
claims derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are not 
science. If the study designs prioritised by hierarchies of evidence, are not 
science, it is difficult to see how evidence based medicine can be science. If 
accepted by the reader, this conclusion has significant implications for 
evidence based medicine because it means that knowledge claims do not 
deserve the status of science. If evidence based medicine is not science it 
may be more appropriately categorised as pseudoscience. This will be 
considered in the final section of this chapter.   
 
8.5. Evidence based medicine as pseudoscience: 
 
If evidence based medicine is not science it may be more appropriately 
categorised as pseudoscience. Pseudoscience can be defined as a collection 
of beliefs or practices mistakenly regarded as being based on the scientific 
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method (Oxford English Dictionary 2006). Pseudoscience is essentially non-
science masquerading as science. Pseudoscience can produce knowledge 
but these knowledge claims are not justified using scientific method. 
Categorisation of a discipline as pseudoscience is usually considered 
derogatory and has negative implications for the status of the discipline in 
society.  
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be science on a number of 
occasions. This claim is implicit in the claim that evidence based medicine is 
a new paradigm (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992, Guyatt et 
al 2000, Djulbegovic et al 2009) and has been made by a number of the 
earlier hierarchies of evidence (Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, Sackett 
1981, Cook et al 1992). However, knowledge claims do not appear to be 
derived using a process that corresponds to an established theory about the 
nature of science. If evidence based medicine claims to be science, but does 
not use scientific method to justify knowledge claims, it may be 
pseudoscience. This would not mean that evidence based medicine could 
not produce knowledge but it would mean that patient care, healthcare 
funding, medicolegal standards and the medical research agenda were 
determined by pseudoscience. Any claim that evidence based medicine is 
pseudoscience is therefore likely to be resisted by proponents of evidence 
based medicine. 
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Within philosophy of science a number of different criteria have been 
developed to demarcate science from pseudoscience (Ayer 1946, Popper 
1963, Lakatos 1970, Thagard 1978, Ruse 1982, Kuhn 1996, Resnik 2000)86. 
These demarcation criteria do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the demarcation of science from pseudoscience but they are still 
considered to have utility (Curd, Cover and Pincock 2013). It is generally 
agreed that some disciplines are science e.g. physics and chemistry, 
whereas other disciplines are pseudoscience e.g. homeopathy and astrology. 
The concepts of science and pseudoscience are therefore useful although 
we may need to accept that there is blurred demarcation area between the 
two concepts and that some disciplines may be difficult to categorise. It is not 
unusual to have a blurred demarcation area between concepts in analytical 
philosophy (Belohlavek et al 2009, Pigliucci 2015). These demarcation 
criteria can be used to support the claim that evidence based medicine is 
pseudoscience. 
  
If evidence based medicine is pseudoscience it should not satisfy the criteria 
that have been used to demarcate science from pseudoscience. As the 
demarcation area between science and pseudoscience is blurred, evidence 
based medicine could still be pseudoscience even if it does satisfy some of 
the demarcation criteria. Failure to satisfy any of the demarcation criteria 
would obviously strengthen the claim that evidence based medicine was 
pseudoscience. Many of the demarcation criteria are related to the theories 
                                                          
86
 Resnik (2000) argued that science is simply what scientists do. However, this demarcation criterion 
is not considered helpful. 
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about the nature of science that have already been described and they will 
not be considered in great detail.  
 
Ayer (1946) claimed that science produced meaningful statements whereas 
pseudoscience did not produce meaningful statements. A statement is 
considered meaningful if it is analytic or empirically verifiable. This relates to 
a particular interpretation of inductivism termed logical positivism. Evidence 
based medicine values knowledge claims derived from randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses. These study designs do not test 
underlying theory and the null hypotheses are accepted or rejected on the 
basis of probability. Prospective case series can be used to empirically verify 
knowledge claims but this study design is not prioritised by hierarchies. 
Analytic statements are also not prioritised by hierarchies of evidence as they 
would be subsumed within expert opinion. I would therefore argue that 
evidence based medicine does not value the production of meaningful 
statements and should be considered pseudoscience using this criterion. 
 
Popper (1963) claimed that science made testable predictions and was 
prepared to abandon beliefs when these predictions were falsified. This was 
in direct contrast to pseudoscience that made vague predictions that could 
not be falsified. Kuhn (1996) claimed that science was characterised by 
puzzle solving whereas Lakatos (1970) claimed that science was 
characterised by the continued production of novel facts. These demarcation 
criteria relate to the theories of falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and 
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research programmes. It was argued in the previous section that randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses do not justify knowledge claims using 
falsificationism and that evidence based medicine does not value puzzle 
solving or the production of novel facts. I would therefore argue that evidence 
based medicine should be considered pseudoscience using the demarcation 
criteria proposed by Popper (1963), Kuhn (1996) and Lakatos (1970).   
 
Thagard (1978) has claimed that science is simple whereas pseudoscience 
is complex. Pseudoscience effectively disguises the fact that it is not science 
by wrapping itself in multiple layers of complexity to hide its true nature. This 
demarcation criterion has been criticised because complexity is a relative 
term, a preference for simplicity often reflects practical concerns or 
ontological beliefs and some science, such a quantum mechanics, is 
complex (Newton-Smith 1981). This criterion is difficult to apply to evidence 
based medicine because it uses hierarchies of varying complexity. Some of 
the earlier hierarchies are simple whereas many later interpretations are 
complex. If evidence based medicine is interpreted charitably this 
demarcation criterion could potentially be used to provide weak support for 
the claim that evidence based medicine is not pseudoscience. 
 
Ruse (1982) claimed that science was prepared to abandon long standing 
beliefs, whereas pseudoscience retained long standing beliefs, when 
confronted with contradictory evidence. This demarcation criterion has been 
criticised because it does not consider the justification for abandonment of 
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belief and the history of science reveals that scientists have often retained 
beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence (Ladyman 2002, Curd, Cover 
and Pincock 2013). Evidence based medicine will abandon long standing 
beliefs when this decision is supported by the results of randomised 
controlled trials and systematic reviews. This is exemplified by the logo of the 
Cochrane Collaboration. In some circumstances evidence based medicine 
will abandon long standing beliefs, based upon other evidence, when that 
evidence is considered particularly convincing. This possibility was first 
recognised by Cochrane (1972) and is implicit in the hierarchies that allow 
other study designs to provide the highest level of evidence. 
 
Although evidence based medicine may abandon long standing beliefs 
based on evidence derived from expert opinion and other study designs, 
collective consideration of the hierarchies reveals a preference for evidence 
derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses. This 
demarcation criterion can be used to support the claim that evidence based 
medicine is not pseudoscience. However, the reader may be troubled by the 
fact that study designs that do not justify knowledge claims using scientific 
method are preferentially used to justify abandonment of long standing belief. 
I would therefore suggest that this demarcation criterion only provides weak 
support for the claim that evidence based medicine is not pseudoscience. 
 
In this section the claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience has 
been considered using criteria developed with philosophy of science to 
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demarcate science from pseudoscience. Evidence based medicine is 
categorised as pseudoscience using the demarcation criteria developed by 
Ayer (1946), Popper (1963), Lakatos (1970) and Kuhn (1996) because it 
does not make meaningful statements, value falsificationism, engage in 
puzzle solving or produce novel facts. This is not surprising as these 
demarcation criteria relate to the four established theories about the nature of 
science that were considered in the previous section. We therefore need to 
be careful about the weight that we attribute to these criteria to avoid ‘double-
counting’ as they have already been used to argue that evidence based 
medicine is not science. The demarcation criteria proposed by Thagard 
(1978) and Ruse (1982) claim that science is simple and prepared to 
abandon long standing beliefs when faced with contradictory evidence. 
Evidence based medicine will abandon long standing beliefs and, when 
interpreted charitably, may be considered simple. However, these 
demarcation criteria are considered problematic from a philosophical 
perspective. These criteria only provide weak support for the claim that 
evidence based medicine is science. 
 
The demarcation criteria outlined in this section do not provide necessary 
and sufficient condition for the demarcation of science from pseudoscience 
and it is accepted that the demarcation area between these concepts is 
blurred. Having considered the different criteria we need to make a decision 
about where evidence based medicine lies. Evidence based medicine does 
not justify knowledge claims using a method that corresponds to an 
established theory of science and it fails to satisfy most of the demarcation 
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criteria. The two criteria that do suggest that evidence based medicine may 
be science, are philosophically problematic, require a charitable interpretation 
of hierarchies and only offer weak support for the claim. I would therefore 
argue that evidence based medicine is not science and is more appropriately 
categorised as pseudoscience. 
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience has negative 
implications for knowledge claims that are made using this concept. These 
knowledge claims determine patient care, healthcare funding, medicolegal 
standards and the medical research agenda. If evidence based medicine is 
pseudoscience it could be argued that knowledge claims derived using 
evidence based medicine should not have such an important role within 
medicine. The claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience is 
therefore likely to be resisted by proponents of the concept.  
 
Proponents of evidence based medicine may respond to this claim in one of 
four ways. Firstly, the claim that evidence based medicine is not science may 
be challenged although it is my contention that the analysis presented in this 
chapter is robust. Secondly, the concept of evidence based medicine may be 
rearticulated so that knowledge claims are justified using a method that 
corresponds to an established theory about the nature of science. This would 
require a significant reworking of the concept and we would likely be left with 
something that was so far removed from the current concept of evidence 
based medicine that it was no longer ‘evidence based medicine’. Thirdly, it 
288 
 
may be accepted that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience. 
Pseudoscience can provide justification for knowledge claims it just does not 
use scientific method to provide that justification. This response is unlikely as 
the term pseudoscience is generally considered derogatory. Finally, evidence 
based medicine could abandon claims to be science. It is notable that later 
hierarchies do not make this claim. If evidence based medicine is conceived 
solely as a tool to guide medical decision making it is neither science nor 
pseudoscience. I would suggest that this final response is the most likely 
response to the claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience. 
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is not science should not have 
negative repercussions for the wider field of medicine. Medicine has been 
defined as the science or practice of the diagnosis, treatment and prevention 
of disease. However, although medicine may be an applied science, it cannot 
be reduced to science because it also requires empathy, ethics, compassion, 
tacit knowledge and clinical judgement (Saunders 2000, Panda 2006).  The 
suggestion that medicine may still be an applied science may surprise the 
reader but we should remember that the interventions tested in randomised 
controlled trials are supported by basic medical science. Medical practice that 
is informed by evidence based medicine can therefore still be applied science 
in an indirect sense. 
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8.6. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter we have considered whether evidence based medicine is 
science or pseudoscience. This is an important consideration because 
science and pseudoscience hold very different positions in society. It has 
been argued that evidence based medicine is not science. This is because 
knowledge claims are preferentially derived from randomised controlled trials 
and meta-analyses and these study designs do not derive knowledge claims 
using a process that corresponds to an established theory about the nature 
of science. The claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience has 
been analysed using criteria that have been used to demarcate science from 
pseudoscience. These criteria provide weak support for evidence based 
medicine as science and suggest that evidence based medicine may be 
pseudoscience. Any claim that evidence based medicine is pseudoscience 
can be avoided if evidence based medicine abandons any claim to be 
science. 
 
In the next chapter we will consider the claim that evidence based medicine 
is a new paradigm in greater detail. This claim is important because it gives 
evidence based medicine powerful perlocutionary force. We should 
immediately be sceptical about the claim that evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm because if evidence based medicine is not science it cannot 
be a new paradigm. The theory of Kuhnian paradigms is also interesting 
because, although normal science is a rational activity, paradigm choice is 
290 
 
irrational. This suggests that the decision to adopt evidence based medicine 
by the medical profession may have been irrational. 
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Chapter 9: Evidence Based Medicine as a new Kuhnian Paradigm 
 
9.1. Introduction: 
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be a new Kuhnian paradigm 
on several occasions (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992, 
Guyatt et al 2000, Djulbegovic et al 2009). This claim was initially made by 
the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group in 1992 when the concept of 
evidence based medicine was first fully articulated. Evidence based medicine 
was claimed to be a new Kuhnian paradigm because it recognised the 
limitations of certain types of evidence, required clinicians to search the 
literature efficiently and used formal rules of evidence:  
‘A new paradigm for medical practice is emerging. Evidence based 
medicine de-emphasises intuition, unsystematic clinical experience 
and pathophysiological rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from 
clinical research. Evidence based medicine requires new skills of the 
physician including efficient literature searching and the application of 
formal rules of evidence evaluating the clinical literature’ (Evidence 
Based Medicine Working Group, 1992, page 2420). 
 
The concept of paradigm was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in ‘The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions’. Kuhn argued that science was characterised by 
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long periods of normal science87 interspersed with revolutionary transitions. 
Normal science occurs within an established paradigm and is characterised 
by puzzle solving. The paradigm is assumed to guarantee a solution to every 
puzzle. However, as normal science progresses, experimental and 
theoretical anomalies accumulate and a crisis emerges. This crisis is 
resolved by the emergence of a new paradigm and a revolutionary transition 
occurs. Revolutionary transitions are called paradigm shifts and they are 
usually rare events (Kuhn 1996). 
 
Kuhn (1996) argued that different paradigms were incommensurable 
because they defined terms and concepts in different ways, used different 
reference frameworks and disagreed about the legitimacy of problems and 
proposed solutions. As different paradigms are incommensurable a new 
paradigm cannot be shown to be superior to a previous paradigm in an 
objective sense (Ladyman 2002). Scientists must therefore be persuaded to 
adopt a new paradigm. The theory of paradigms is considered an irrational 
theory about the nature of science because the decision to adopt a new 
paradigm may be influenced by the ideology, cultural norms and values of 
scientists (Kuhn 1996).   
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm is 
important for several reasons. Firstly, if evidence based medicine is a new 
Kuhnian paradigm, the adoption of evidence based medicine by the medical 
                                                          
87
 Normal science within an established paradigm was considered in greater detail in Chapter 8 when 
the claim that evidence based medicine is science was evaluated. 
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profession may not have been rational. If the adoption of evidence based 
medicine by the medical profession was not rational we need to consider 
which factors persuaded the medical profession to adopt evidence based 
medicine. Secondly, the claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm has powerful perlocutionary force. The claim enhances the status 
of evidence based medicine as it suggest that evidence based medicine is 
somehow superior to the way that medicine was previously practised. If 
evidence based medicine is not a new paradigm it does not deserve this 
status.  
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm has previously 
been discussed in the literature (Couto 1998, Shahar 1998, Tonelli 1998, 
Greaves 2002, Sehon and Stanley 2003, Daly 2005, Lambert 2006, 
Djulbegovic et al 2009, Goldenberg 2010, Gaeta and Gentile 2016)88. 
However, this claim has proved contentious and considerable disagreement 
exists with a number of different arguments being used to both support and 
refute the claim. Some of these arguments relate to evidence based 
medicine itself whereas others relate to the theory proposed by Kuhn. It has 
been argued that evidence based medicine is not a new paradigm because it 
is not significantly different from the way that medicine was previously 
practised (Couto 1998, Sehon and Stanley 2003, Daly 2005, Goldenberg 
2010), randomised controlled trials are poorly understood by the medical 
profession (Shahar 1998), the concept of evidence based medicine is poorly 
                                                          
88
 A systematic review was undertaken in April 2013 to identify papers considering the claim that 
evidence based medicine is a new paradigm. The search strategies that were used can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
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defined (Shahar 1998, Tonelli 1998, Sehon and Stanley 2003) and there are 
problems with the theory of Kuhnian paradigms (Greaves 2002, Sehon and 
Stanley 2003, Gaeta and Gentile 2016). Nobody has previously argued that 
evidence based medicine cannot be a new Kuhnian paradigm because 
evidence based medicine is not science89. Conversely, it has been claimed 
that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm because it is significantly 
different from the way that medicine was previously practised (Evidence 
Based Medicine Working Group 1992, Lambert 2006, Djulbegovic et al 
2009).  
 
There appear to be three main sources of confusion when the claim that 
evidence based medicine is a new paradigm has previously been considered 
in the literature. Firstly, there appear to be a poor understanding of the theory 
of paradigms. For example, it has been falsely claimed that evidence based 
medicine is not a new paradigm because the notion of incommensurability is 
incoherent (Sehon and Stanley 2003) and paradigms are not influenced by 
moral and cultural factors (Greaves 2002). Secondly, some authors have 
struggled to define the concept of evidence based medicine. This is important 
because if evidence based medicine cannot be clearly defined it may be 
difficult to determine whether it is a new paradigm. Finally, there is 
disagreement as to whether evidence based medicine is incommensurable 
with a previous paradigm of medicine. This third area of confusion is central 
                                                          
89
 Gaeta and Gentile (2016) argued that evidence based medicine could not be a Kuhnian paradigm 
because it described a methodology not an underlying theory. However, they did not explicitly claim 
that evidence based medicine was not science. 
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to consideration of the claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm. 
 
In this chapter I will consider the claim that evidence based medicine is a 
new Kuhnian paradigm in detail. In the first section I will explain what it 
means for different paradigms to be incommensurable and clarify some 
important elements of the theory of Kuhnian paradigms. This will resolve 
some of the confusion that currently exists in the medical literature and 
provide a foundation for later analysis. In the second section, several 
problems with the original claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm will be highlighted. These include the concurrent claim that 
evidence based medicine provides superior patient care and a failure to 
identify the relevant scientific community affected by paradigm shift. In the 
final section, I will argue that evidence based medicine cannot be a new 
paradigm because it is not science, it was not preceded by a revolutionary 
crisis and it is not incommensurable with the way that medicine was practised 
prior to its introduction. 
 
9.2. Kuhnian Paradigms and Incommensurability: 
 
The theory of Kuhnian paradigms is considered complicated and the 
concepts of paradigm and incommensurability can be difficult to understand. 
Furthermore, this theory of scientific method has been interpreted in a 
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number of different ways (Masterman 1970, Ladyman 2002, Chalmers 2010). 
This may explain why there appears to be poor understanding of the theory 
of Kuhnian paradigms within the evidence based medicine literature 
(Greaves 2002, Sehon and Stanley 2003). Kuhn (1996) was aware that his 
theory had been interpreted in a number of different ways by philosophers of 
science and he wrote the ‘Japanese postscript’ to address these problems. In 
this chapter the definitions and theory about the nature of science presented 
in the ‘Japanese postscript’, will be used to minimise confusion. 
 
The original version of ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ was criticised 
because the term paradigm was used in a number of different senses 
(Masterman 1970). Kuhn (1996) later clarified, in the ‘Japanese postscript’, 
that the term paradigm was used in only two different senses. Firstly, the 
term paradigm was used to refer to exemplars. An exemplar is an example 
showing how puzzles can be solved within normal science. Exemplars are 
typically found in science textbooks. Second, the term paradigm was used to 
refer to the entire constellation of beliefs, commitments, values and 
techniques shared by a scientific community, including exemplars. In order to 
avoid further confusion, unless otherwise explicitly stated, the term paradigm 
will only be used in the second sense in this chapter.   
 
Kuhn (1996) acknowledged that distinguishing paradigms was difficult and 
required close historical study. He was very clear that revolutions could 
involve both large and small communities of scientists. A revolution can 
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actually affect a community with fewer than 25 members. Kuhn was also 
clear that revolutions did not happen immediately and a community could 
take a generation to convert to a new paradigm. This is because new 
paradigms are usually taken up by the younger members of a scientific 
community who are more amenable to change. In order to study paradigms it 
is therefore necessary to isolate the relevant scientific community and 
reconstruct their beliefs, commitments, values and techniques over time. 
 
Communities are fundamental to the study of Kuhnian paradigms. A 
community can be understood as a group of members that interact with each 
other and share common interests and goals (Fulcher and Scott 2011). 
Communities can be difficult to identify and this may complicate the study of 
paradigms in some sciences. This is a recognised problem with the theory of 
Kuhnian paradigms but may not be particularly important when the theory is 
applied to medicine. This is because medicine is a profession (MacDonald 
1995). Different scientific communities in medicine can therefore be more 
readily identified because they are regulated and accredited by different 
professional bodies.    
 
Different paradigms are considered incommensurable because they define 
terms and concepts in different ways, use different reference frameworks and 
disagree about the legitimacy of problems and proposed solutions. The 
theory of Kuhnian paradigms has been misinterpreted as claiming that reality 
changes with paradigm change. However, this is not the case as Kuhn 
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(1996) clearly states in the ‘Japanese postscript’ that different paradigms are 
simply different perspectives or views of the same world.  
 
Sehon and Stanley (2003) argued that evidence based medicine could not 
be a new paradigm because the notion of incommensurability was 
incoherent. They appeared to equate incommensurability with 
incomprehensibility but this demonstrates a misunderstanding of the theory 
of paradigms. Different paradigms can be comprehended by scientists and 
translation between paradigms is possible with care. Translation between 
paradigms is not the same as conversion to the new paradigm as conversion 
involves adopting a particular world view and thinking and working within the 
new paradigm. The difference between incommensurability and 
incomprehensibility can be illustrated with an example. The adoption of the 
heliocentric model of the solar system, during the Scientific Revolution, is 
commonly used to illustrate paradigm shift (Ladyman 2002). Geocentric and 
heliocentric models of the solar system are incommensurable because they 
represent different world views. However, they are not incomprehensible as 
we are clearly able to understand both models. What we cannot do is 
simultaneously interpret the solar system from both perspectives.  
 
The theory of scientific method expounded by Kuhn (1996) in ‘The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions’ was mainly developed using historical examples 
from physics and it has been suggested that this theory may have no 
application outside of physics (Chalmers 2010). This potential problem is 
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acknowledged but should not prevent us analysing the claim that evidence 
based medicine is a new paradigm. This is because the theory of Kuhnian 
paradigms is not restricted to physics within contemporary philosophy of 
science textbooks (Ladyman 2002, Curd, Cover and Pincock 2013) and Kuhn 
(1996) himself considered Darwinian evolutionary theory. It is also important 
to remember that the claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian 
paradigm was originally advanced by proponents of evidence based 
medicine. If the theory of paradigms is only applicable to physics evidence 
based medicine cannot be a new paradigm because it is not a branch of 
physics.   
   
In this section the theory of Kuhnian paradigms has been described in 
greater detail. The meanings of the terms paradigm and incommensurability 
have been clarified and elements of the theory that are commonly 
misunderstood have been explained. I have also acknowledged some 
potential limitations of the theory of paradigms. This section is important 
because it provides a framework for the analysis that takes place in the rest 
of this chapter. In the next section we will explore problems associated with 
the original claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm. 
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9.3. Evidence Based Medicine as a new Paradigm: 
 
The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group have claimed on several 
occasions that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm (Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group 1992, Guyatt et al 2000). The term ‘paradigm’ can 
be defined in a number of different ways (Oxford English Dictionary 2006) 
therefore it is important to clarify that the term is used in a Kuhnian sense. If 
the term ‘paradigm’ is not used in a Kuhnian sense it would be inappropriate 
to criticise the Working Group for claiming that evidence based medicine was 
a new Kuhnian paradigm. However, when we appraise the original paper it is 
very clear that the Working Group use the term ‘paradigm’ in a Kuhnian 
sense as they reference ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ and state 
that:  
‘Thomas Kuhn has described scientific paradigms as ways of looking 
at the world’. (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group, 1992, page 
2420) 
It is therefore appropriate to consider whether evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm within the theory of Kuhnian paradigms.  
 
There are a number of problems with the original claim that evidence based 
medicine is a new paradigm. Firstly, the Working Group simultaneously 
claimed that evidence based medicine was both a new paradigm and 
resulted in superior patient care. This appears to demonstrate a 
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misunderstanding of the theory of Kuhnian paradigms because different 
paradigms are incommensurable. Incommensurability means that a new 
paradigm cannot be shown to be superior in any objective sense when 
compared with a preceding paradigm. If evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm it cannot also be shown to result in superior patient care.  
 
There may be an alternative explanation for the concurrent claim that 
evidence based medicine provides superior patient care. This claim may be 
interpreted as an attempt to persuade medical scientists to convert to 
evidence based medicine. The theory of paradigms is an irrational theory of 
scientific method and individuals must be persuaded to convert to the new 
paradigm. If medical professionals believe that evidence based medicine 
results in superior patient care they may be more likely to convert. This may 
also explain why the new paradigm is described as exciting and fun in the 
original paper. 
 
The second problem with the claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm is that the relevant scientific community is not clearly identified. In 
order to establish whether evidence based medicine is a new paradigm we 
need to isolate the relevant scientific community and reconstruct their beliefs, 
commitments, values and techniques. If the relevant scientific community 
cannot be isolated we cannot determine if evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm. The opening sentence of the original paper claims that a new 
paradigm for medical practice is emerging (Evidence Based Medicine 
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Working Group 1992). This suggests that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm for medical practice. Later in the same paper, the principles of 
evidence based medicine are restricted to internal medicine and other (un-
named) clinical departments. This suggests that evidence based medicine is 
a new paradigm for communities within medicine rather than medicine as a 
whole. The original paper is actually entitled: ‘Evidence Based Medicine a 
New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine’. This suggests that 
evidence based medicine is only a new paradigm for the teaching of 
medicine.  
 
The failure of the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1992) to identify 
a relevant scientific community, makes the claim that evidence based 
medicine is a new paradigm, difficult to analyse. When we 
contemporaneously consider the claim that evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm we tend to assume that the relevant scientific community is 
the medical profession. This is because, evidence based medicine has 
permeated all areas of modern medicine. However, this may not be the 
relevant scientific community that is referred to in the original paper. A lack of 
clarity over the relevant scientific community may partially explain the lack of 
agreement that exists in the literature when the claim that evidence based 
medicine is a new paradigm is considered (Couto 1998, Daly 2005). 
 
The final problem with the claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
Kuhnian paradigm is that the concept of evidence based medicine is 
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simultaneously articulated, and claimed to be a new paradigm, at the same 
time. Paradigm choice is a consensus decision made by a scientific 
community and revolutions take many years. Revolutions do not occur 
instantaneously. It is therefore unclear how the Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group (1992) can claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm at the same time as the concept is first fully articulated. This does 
not mean that the relevant scientific community will not convert to evidence 
based medicine in the future but this conversion will not occur 
instantaneously. 
 
Evidence based medicine did not mysteriously appear in 1992 and the 
concepts underpinning evidence based medicine actually developed over 
many years within clinical epidemiology (Daly 2005). It is therefore 
conceivable that evidence based medicine was a new paradigm for the 
clinical epidemiology community in 1992. The relevant scientific community 
affected by paradigm change is not clear in the original paper so it could refer 
to the clinical epidemiology community. It is important to appreciate that this 
is a charitable interpretation of the claim because, although a number of 
different possible scientific communities are suggested, clinical epidemiology 
is not mentioned.   
 
In this section we have considered three problems with the original claim that 
evidence based medicine is a new paradigm: evidence based medicine 
cannot be a new paradigm and provide superior patient care, the relevant 
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scientific community is not specified and evidence based medicine cannot be 
a new paradigm as soon as it is articulated. These problems suggest that the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1992) did not fully understand the 
theory of Kuhnian paradigms when they first advanced the claim that 
evidence based medicine was a new paradigm. However, the problems do 
not necessarily prevent evidence based medicine being a new paradigm. The 
first problem can be resolved if the claim that evidence based medicine 
provides superior patient care is withdrawn or acknowledged as an attempt to 
persuade individuals to convert to evidence based medicine. The second and 
third problems can potentially be resolved if a relevant scientific community is 
identified.  
 
In the next section, the claim that evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm is analysed in greater detail. I will argue that evidence based 
medicine cannot be a new paradigm because it is not science, it was not 
preceded by a revolutionary crisis and it is not incommensurable with the way 
that medicine was practised prior to its introduction. The relevant scientific 
community will be assumed to be the medical profession although other 
scientific communities will be considered where they are important to the 
arguments that are analysed.  
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9.4. Evidence based medicine is not a new Paradigm: 
 
In order to analyse the claim that evidence based medicine is not a new 
paradigm we need to identify the relevant scientific community. The relevant 
scientific community is identified as the medical profession. This is because 
the medical profession is one of the communities mentioned in the original 
paper and evidence based medicine has influenced the whole medical 
profession with time. Different scientific communities, both inside and outside 
the medical profession, are considered when these influence the arguments 
that are analysed. It is acknowledged that the relevant scientific community 
may not have been correctly identified by applying the arguments to the 
entire medical profession. However, the arguments that are presented 
remain sound when they are applied to different scientific communities within 
medicine. 
 
Three arguments are presented to support my claim that evidence based 
medicine is not a new paradigm: evidence based medicine is not science, 
evidence based medicine was not preceded by a revolutionary crisis and 
evidence based medicine is not incommensurable with the way that medicine 
was practised prior to its introduction. These arguments are summarised 
below: 
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Paradigm Argument 1: 
If evidence based medicine is not science it is not a new Kuhnian paradigm 
Evidence based medicine is not science 
Evidence based medicine is not a new Kuhnian paradigm 
 
Paradigm Argument 2: 
If evidence based medicine was not preceded by a revolutionary crisis it is 
not a new Kuhnian paradigm 
Evidence based medicine was not preceded by a revolutionary crisis 
Evidence based medicine is not a new Kuhnian paradigm 
 
Paradigm Argument 3: 
If evidence based medicine is not incommensurable with the way that 
medicine was practised prior to its introduction it is not a new Kuhnian 
paradigm 
Evidence based medicine is not incommensurable with the way that medicine 
was practised prior to its introduction 
Evidence based medicine is not a new Kuhnian paradigm 
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These three arguments are all valid arguments of the form modus ponens. 
We therefore need to consider the truth of the premises to determine if the 
arguments are sound. The first paradigm argument claims that evidence 
based medicine cannot be a new Kuhnian paradigm because it is not 
science. The theory of Kuhnian paradigms describes how science evolves 
with time and cannot be applied to pseudoscience or knowledge claims 
justified in other ways. In Chapter 8 I argued that evidence based medicine 
was not science because it did not justify knowledge claims using a method 
that corresponded to an established theory about the nature of science. If the 
reader accepts that evidence based medicine is not science it cannot be a 
new paradigm. Importantly, this argument remains sound when it is applied 
to any ‘scientific’ community within medicine. If the method used to justify 
knowledge claims does not correspond to an established theory about the 
nature of science that ‘scientific’ community cannot claim to practice normal 
science. This argument provides strong support for my claim that evidence 
based medicine is not a new paradigm and we could stop at this point. 
However, the claim that evidence based medicine is not science may be 
disputed so it is still important to consider the other arguments. 
 
The second paradigm argument claims that, if evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm, there must have been a revolutionary crisis prior to its 
acceptance by the medical profession. Kuhn (1996) argued that all 
revolutionary crises had two universal features: blurring of the existing 
paradigm and loosening of the rules of normal research. Revolutionary crises 
can be identified because they are associated with the proliferation of 
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competing ideas, a willingness to try anything, debate over fundamentals and 
recourse to philosophy. However, there does not appear to have been a 
revolutionary crisis in the medical literature prior to the introduction of 
evidence based medicine (Gaeta and Gentile 2016). There was no period of 
time where competing ideas proliferated and different approaches were tried 
before evidence based medicine emerged. If evidence based medicine was 
not preceded by a revolutionary crisis it cannot be a new paradigm. 
 
It would actually be very difficult to envisage a revolutionary crisis in any 
scientific community within medicine where the medical profession could try 
anything. This is because medicine involves the treatment of patients who 
may suffer morbidity and mortality if they receive inappropriate treatment. 
This highlights an important difference between medicine and established 
sciences such as astronomy, chemistry and physics. Wild theories can be 
developed and tested in science because falsification does not have 
important ramifications for the care of patients. However, it would be 
inappropriate and unethical to adopt this approach in medicine. This 
reinforces the argument that evidence based medicine cannot be a new 
paradigm because it is not science. The theory of paradigms is simply not 
applicable to evidence based medicine on a practical level because it is 
medicine and not science. The absence of a revolutionary crisis in medicine 
prior to the introduction of evidence based medicine provides further support 
for my claim that evidence based medicine is not a new paradigm. 
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The third paradigm argument claims that if evidence based medicine is a new 
paradigm then there must be an old paradigm and this must be 
incommensurable with evidence based medicine. In order to analyse this 
argument we need to identify and compare the relevant features of the 
different paradigms. This is complicated by the lack of clarity regarding the 
relevant scientific community affected by the paradigm shift. Several authors 
have argued that evidence based medicine cannot be a new paradigm 
because the concept of evidence based medicine is poorly defined (Shahar 
1998, Tonelli 1998, Sehon and Stanley 2003). However, the Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group (1992) clearly defined an old ‘paradigm’ and a new 
‘paradigm’ in their original paper and they provided three arguments to 
support their claim that evidence based medicine was a new paradigm.  
 
The Working Group first argued that evidence based medicine was a new 
paradigm because it recognised the limitations of certain types of evidence: 
common sense, pathophysiological rationale, expert opinion and clinical 
experience. It is important to appreciate that these forms of evidence are still 
used by evidence based medicine. They are simply attributed lesser 
importance than other forms of evidence, particularly randomised controlled 
trials and later systematic reviews. This is illustrated if we consider the large 
number of hierarchies that include expert opinion.  Evidence based medicine 
will clearly use evidence derived from expert opinion to guide decision 
making when preferred forms of evidence are unavailable. Furthermore, 
hierarchies are available that attribute much greater importance to expert 
opinion. The claim that evidence based medicine always attributes lesser 
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importance to this type of evidence can therefore be disputed. For evidence 
based medicine to be a new paradigm it needs to be a change in world view 
for a community of scientists. I would argue that paradigm shift involves more 
than a reduction in the importance of evidence derived from expert opinion, 
pathophysiological rationale, common sense and clinical experience. 
 
The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group also argued that evidence 
based medicine was a new paradigm because it required the skills of 
question formulation and literature searching. Medicine has surely always 
required healthcare professionals to formulate and answer questions so 
these skills alone cannot be used to argue that evidence based medicine is a 
new paradigm. However, what the Working Group actually mean is that 
evidence based medicine requires practitioners to search the literature in a 
specific way. This is illustrated in the ‘How to Keep up with the Medical 
Literature’ series published in the Annals of Internal Medicine (Haynes et al 
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e, 1986f). This series expressed concern 
about the increasing volume of medical literature and used the presence or 
absence of randomisation in the study design to identify articles that should 
be appraised. This series also briefly discussed electronic searching of the 
literature although computers and appropriate software were not widely 
available at this time.  
 
Within the context of this argument, evidence based medicine uses 
randomisation as a screening tool to identify its preferred study design, the 
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randomised controlled trial, amongst the ever increasing medical literature90. 
I would argue that screening the medical literature to identify certain study 
designs does not represent a change in world view and this does not make 
evidence based medicine a new paradigm. 
 
The use of computers, both hardware and software, to show that evidence 
based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm is more interesting. Computers 
have allowed us to develop electronic databases and more efficient literature 
search strategies within evidence based medicine. However, computers have 
also had a profound effect on all science. Medicine would surely have started 
using computers with or without evidence based medicine. When we 
consider whether a paradigm shift has occurred we need to identify the 
relevant scientific community. It may be possible to argue that the use of 
computers has resulted in a paradigm shift but this shift has affected a much 
wider community than the medical profession. It has affected the whole 
science community. Therefore I would argue that when the relevant scientific 
community is identified as the medical profession, or any community within 
the medical profession, the use of computers cannot be used to demonstrate 
that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm.  
  
The final argument claims that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm 
because it uses formal rules of evidence to determine the importance of 
                                                          
90
 The use of randomisation as a screening tool has recently been superseded and we now have the 
concept of a rapid review process which screens the literature to identify systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses (Manger et al 2017).  
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research. The Working Group did not define what they meant by the term 
‘formal rules of evidence’ and this may explain why some authors have 
complained that the concept of evidence based medicine is poorly defined. 
However, although the term ‘formal rules of evidence’ is not clearly defined, if 
the original paper is placed in the correct historical context, we can see that 
the term is used to refer both to hierarchies of evidence that prioritise 
randomised controlled trials and methods to appraise different study designs. 
This is because by 1992 many of the pioneers of evidence based medicine 
had made strong claims about the merits of different study designs and study 
methodology (Sackett 1979) and already developed hierarchies of evidence 
(Cochrane 1972, Spitzer et al 1979, Trout 1981, Sackett 1989). Furthermore, 
the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group subsequently developed their 
own hierarchies (Guyatt et al1995, Guyatt et al 2000).  
 
The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1992) argued that evidence 
based medicine was a new paradigm because it recognised the limitations of 
certain types of evidence, required clinicians to search the literature in an 
efficient manner and used formal rules of evidence. However, although the 
Working Group purport to present three separate arguments they actually 
make the same argument in three different ways. Each of these arguments 
effectively claims that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm because 
it values evidence from randomised controlled trials. The first argument 
devalues evidence that is not from randomised controlled trials, the second 
argument suggests that we should only search for randomised controlled 
trials and the third argument values the study design prioritised by early 
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hierarchies, the randomised controlled trial. The key question then is: Does a 
preference for evidence derived from randomised controlled trials make 
evidence based medicine incommensurable with the way that medicine was 
practised prior to its introduction? 
 
Randomised controlled trials are not new. The first randomised controlled 
trials were conducted by Fisher in the field of agriculture in the 1920’s (Fisher 
1926). Prior to this randomisation had been used in the Nineteenth Century, 
albeit in a less sophisticated way, in empirical investigations into telepathy 
(Hacking 1988). The first medical randomised controlled trial, which showed 
that streptomycin was effective in the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis, 
was published in 1948 (Marshall et al 1948) and the methodological 
advantages of this study design were well known to Bradford-Hill (1951), 
Feinstein (1964) and Cochrane (1972). The work of Bradford-Hill (1951) is 
particularly advanced in its understanding of randomised controlled trials and 
would not appear out of place in a contemporary evidence based medicine 
textbook.  
 
Randomised controlled trials were clearly available to medicine for a number 
of years prior to 1992. If evidence based medicine originated in 1992 the 
continued use of randomised controlled trials would not make evidence 
based medicine incommensurable with the way that medicine was previously 
practised. However, although the concept of evidence based medicine was 
not articulated until 1992 this does not mean that the concept was not 
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developed before this time. Kuhn (1996) was clear that revolutions did not 
happen immediately and could take a generation to occur. It is therefore 
possible that Bradford-Hill (1951), Feinstein (1964) and Cochrane (1972) 
were early adopters of the unnamed concept that subsequently became 
evidence based medicine. It is also possible that, although randomised 
controlled trials were available prior to 1992, they were not the preferred form 
of evidence before this time. It is therefore still possible that evidence based 
medicine could be a new paradigm even though randomised controlled trials 
had been available within medicine since 1948. 
 
Many of the later hierarchies rank systematic reviews above randomised 
controlled trials as the highest level of evidence. The first systematic review 
was published in 1974 (Bastian et al 2010) although evidence has been 
collated in medicine for several centuries (Evans et al 2010)91. As the first 
systematic review was published at around the same time that the concept of 
evidence based medicine was articulated evidence based medicine could 
argue that it was a new paradigm because it used evidence from systematic 
reviews. However, this argument would be difficult to justify because few 
hierarchies include systematic reviews or meta-analyses prior to 1995. 
Proponents of evidence based medicine would therefore need to explain this 
chronological discrepancy if they were going to use the use of systematic 
reviews as justification for the claim that evidence based medicine was a new 
paradigm. 
                                                          
91
 James Lind undertook a review of scurvy over 250 years ago (Evans et al 2010). 
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If evidence based medicine is a new paradigm it must have conceptual, 
theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments that are 
incommensurable with the previous paradigm. It should also define terms 
and concepts in different ways; disagree about the legitimacy of problems 
and proposed solutions and use a different reference framework (Kuhn 
1996). However, the only features that differentiate evidence based medicine 
from the way that medicine was previously practised are the hierarchy of 
evidence and the preferred use of evidence derived from randomised 
controlled trials. Even this is a charitable interpretation given the long history 
of use of randomised controlled trials in medicine. Evidence based medicine 
does not define terms and concepts in different ways and it does not 
disagree about the legitimacy of problems when it is compared with the way 
that medicine was practised prior to 1992.  
 
If evidence based medicine only used evidence from randomised controlled 
trials and these had never been used in medicine prior to evidence based 
medicine, there may be a stronger case for arguing that evidence based 
medicine was a new paradigm. However, this is clearly not the case. Users of 
evidence based medicine are also happy to use evidence from other study 
designs when randomised controlled trials are unavailable and ignore the 
results of randomised controlled trials when they are considered implausible. 
This is illustrated by the response to the randomised controlled trial 
undertaken by Leibovici (2001). Evidence based medicine is not 
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incommensurable with the way that medicine was practised prior to its 
introduction and it is not a new Kuhnian paradigm. 
 
The argument that evidence based medicine is not incommensurable with 
the way that medicine was practised prior to its introduction has been 
analysed with the medical profession identified as the relevant scientific 
community. However, the use of a hierarchy of evidence and a preference for 
evidence derived from randomised controlled trials do not represent a 
paradigm shift for any scientific community within medicine. I would argue 
that no scientific community within medicine has defined terms and concepts 
in different ways or used a different reference framework following the 
introduction of randomised controlled trials. If proponents of evidence based 
medicine would like to refute this claim they need to first specify a scientific 
community and then show how this scientific community has conceptual, 
theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments that are 
incommensurable with a previous paradigm. I would suggest that this would 
be extremely challenging. 
 
In this section, we have considered the claim that evidence based medicine 
is a new paradigm. I have argued that evidence based medicine cannot be a 
new paradigm because evidence based medicine is not science, evidence 
based medicine was not preceded by a revolutionary crisis and evidence 
based medicine is not incommensurable with the way that medicine was 
practised prior to its introduction. Difficulties associated with identifying a 
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relevant scientific community have been acknowledged. However, this is not 
detrimental to the arguments that are presented because they remain sound 
regardless of the scientific community that they are deemed to affect within 
medicine. 
 
9.5. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter the claim that evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian 
paradigm has been analysed. This claim is important because categorisation 
as a paradigm has given evidence based medicine powerful perlocutionary 
force. This claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm has 
previously been considered in the literature although considerable confusion 
exists with a number of different arguments used to both support and refute 
the claim. The analysis presented in this chapter has attempted to resolve 
this confusion.  
 
The claim that evidence based medicine is a new paradigm is difficult to 
analyse because the relevant scientific community affected by paradigm shift 
is unclear. To facilitate analysis the relevant scientific community has been 
identified as the medical profession although it is acknowledged that this may 
not have been the intention of the original claim. Failure to clearly identify the 
relevant scientific community is not detrimental to the arguments that are 
presented because it has been argued that evidence based medicine is not a 
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new paradigm. However, any refutation of this claim would need to specify a 
relevant scientific community and demonstrate how this community has 
conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments that 
are incommensurable with a previous paradigm. 
 
Three arguments have been presented to support my claim that evidence 
based medicine is not a new paradigm. Firstly, building on the analysis 
presented in Chapter 8, I have argued that evidence based medicine is not 
science. The theory of Kuhnian paradigms is a theory about the nature of 
science therefore if evidence based medicine is not science it cannot be a 
new paradigm. Secondly, I have argued that evidence based medicine 
cannot be a new paradigm because it was not preceded by a revolutionary 
crisis. Finally, I have argued that an increased reliance on evidence derived 
from randomised controlled trials and systematic reviews does not make 
evidence based medicine significantly different from the way that medicine 
was practised prior to the development of the concept. If evidence based 
medicine is not incommensurable with the way that medicine was previously 
practised it cannot be a new Kuhnian paradigm. These three arguments 
provide strong support for my claim that evidence based medicine is not a 
new Kuhnian paradigm and it should not be characterised as such. 
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Chapter 10: Implications for Evidence Based Medicine 
  
10.1. Summary of Findings: 
 
This thesis has presented a critical analysis of evidence based medicine 
using the method of analytical philosophy. The knowledge claims that are 
made by evidence based medicine determine which treatment interventions 
clinicians can prescribe for patients, healthcare funding, medicolegal 
standards and the medical research agenda. These knowledge claims 
therefore have significant implications for patients, clinicians, regulators and 
purchasers of healthcare. This thesis has analysed the justification for these 
knowledge claims with the aim of improving understanding of evidence based 
medicine.  
 
Hierarchies of evidence are fundamental to the justification of knowledge 
claims that are made by evidence based medicine. These hierarchies are not 
the sole determinant of knowledge claims but, it has been argued that, as 
they are the characteristic feature of evidence based medicine they are 
fundamental to any knowledge claims that are made. It is therefore surprising 
that so many different hierarchies of evidence have been developed. This 
suggests a problem with the epistemology of evidence based medicine and 
provided the rationale for this thesis.    
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The hierarchies generally rank randomised controlled trials, systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence and expert 
opinion as the lowest level of evidence. However, there is little theoretical or 
empirical support for the superiority of randomised controlled trials and the 
properties that have been used to determine hierarchical position are 
problematic. It has been argued that a lack of theoretical support has allowed 
factors that are independent of study design to influence the development of 
hierarchies. This may explain why there are so many different hierarchies of 
evidence.  
 
The existence of multiple hierarchies led us to question the rationality of the 
decision making process used by evidence based medicine. Decision making 
is not rational from the perspective of theoretical or practical rationality but 
can be rational from the perspective of substantive rationality. This has 
important implications because knowledge claims are dependent upon 
underlying value commitments. This means that different conclusions can 
rationally be derived from the same evidence base. It is therefore importance 
to identify the value commitments that underpin any knowledge claim 
produced by evidence based medicine.  
 
We have also considered the status of evidence based medicine as science. 
Evidence based medicine does not use scientific method to justify knowledge 
claims and it may be pseudoscience. If evidence based medicine is not 
science it cannot be a Kuhnian paradigm. These conclusions strip evidence 
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based medicine of some of its power and have important consequences for 
its status in society. This does not mean that evidence based medicine is not 
important or cannot produce knowledge. However, if evidence based 
medicine is not science knowledge claims are surely more likely to be 
robustly examined and challenged.   
 
The analysis presented in this thesis has built on existing research, clarified 
areas of disagreement and improved understanding of evidence based 
medicine. Evidence based medicine has not been portrayed in a favourable 
light and some of the conclusions may be contested. In the final section my 
conclusions will be related to current ideas about evidence based medicine, 
possible responses will be anticipated and wider implications for evidence 
based medicine are considered. 
 
10.2. Implications for Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
Analytical philosophy progresses through argument and counterargument. 
This thesis should not therefore be considered a definitive analysis of the 
epistemology of evidence based medicine. The arguments and concepts that 
have been presented in this work should themselves be critically analysed 
and counterarguments are expected. Possible counterarguments have been 
anticipated as the thesis has progressed but it is not possible to anticipate 
every possible counterargument. The findings of this thesis will be published 
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to stimulate further debate in the literature about evidence based medicine. It 
is hoped that this will lead to a deeper understanding of the concept.  
 
The method of analytical philosophy emphasises the importance of argument 
structure and requires clear definitions of any concepts that are analysed. It 
is acknowledged that the arguments can feel artificial and the style of writing 
is necessarily repetitive. Analytical philosophy may not be familiar to many 
medical professionals and it is uncertain how they will interpret the thesis. 
This thesis is envisaged as a contribution to medicine but it is accepted that 
the use of analytical philosophy may provide a barrier to the dissemination of 
the research findings to the medical profession. The medical profession may 
be more accepting of my research findings if they are supported by 
examples. The current controversy surrounding the necessity for antibiotic 
prophylaxis in cardiac patients prior to dental treatment (Thornhill et al 2016) 
may provide a useful case study.   
 
This thesis represents a direct evaluation of evidence based medicine 
because it analyses the arguments that have been put forward by evidence 
based medicine to support the hierarchies. The arguments have been 
interpreted charitably and evidence based medicine has been given every 
opportunity to defend the hierarchies. This has allowed me to understand the 
hierarchies from their own perspective and is a major strength of the 
research method that has been used.  
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This thesis has not investigated how the hierarchies have been interpreted 
outside of evidence based medicine and this may be considered a weakness 
of my approach. We have not considered how the concept of evidence based 
medicine has evolved, how the hierarchies have been used to control power 
within medicine or how different hierarchies influence the construction of 
medical knowledge. Conceptual history, discourse analysis and qualitative 
methods were considered as possible research methods when my research 
question was developed and they remain important areas for further 
research. However, I would argue that I am now better placed to pursue 
these more indirect evaluations of evidence based medicine following my 
direct evaluation of the hierarchies themselves. 
 
Some proponents of evidence based medicine hold strong views about the 
concept and may react negatively to the analysis that has been presented. It 
has never been my intention to denigrate evidence based medicine and this 
thesis has simply sought to improve understanding of the concept. Within 
philosophy of science the pessimistic induction thesis teaches us that all 
scientific theories, regardless of how strongly they are held by scientists at 
any particular time, are eventually replaced by new scientific theories. 
Evidence based medicine is not science but similar reasoning can be applied 
to this concept. It is therefore highly likely that, as time progress, evidence 
based medicine will be replaced by a different concept. Systems theory 
teaches us that we cannot anticipate how medicine will evolve but the 
concept of evidence based medicine will almost certainly be replaced. This 
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should be remembered when the arguments that have been presented in this 
thesis are interpreted. 
 
Problems with the epistemology of evidence based medicine have previously 
been considered in detail by both Howick (2011) and Blunt (2015). It could 
also be argued that each new hierarchy reflects an implicit recognition of 
problems with the epistemology of evidence based medicine. Howick (2011) 
resolved these problems by favouring a particular hierarchical interpretation 
whereas Blunt (2015) advocated abolition of the hierarchies unless empirical 
support was provided. Neither Howick (2011) or Blunt (2015) sought to 
explain why there were so many different hierarchies or considered whether 
the decision making process used within evidence based medicine was 
rational or scientific. This thesis builds upon their previously published work 
but considers the implications of different hierarchies from an alternative 
perspective. 
 
The hierarchies of evidence could be modified to include or exclude evidence 
derived from different study designs. Randomised controlled trials, 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses are not epistemically superior to other 
study designs and they could be excluded from hierarchies. However, if 
randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews and meta-analyses were 
excluded which study design should replace them as the highest level of 
evidence? Following on from the analysis that has already been presented I 
would be highly sceptical that any study design could be shown to be 
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epistemically superior to other study designs. This is because the most 
appropriate study design is dictated by a variety of different factors including 
the question of interest and any value commitments that are held. It is 
therefore unlikely that any modification that maintains a hierarchical structure 
will withstand epistemological analysis. 
 
Abandonment of hierarchies of evidence by evidence based medicine has 
been suggested on several occasions (Glasziou et al 2004, Hofmeijer 2014 
and Blunt 2015) and I would be broadly supportive of this idea. This does not 
mean that study design is unimportant but we should move away from the 
idea that some study designs are epistemically superior. Study design should 
still be considered, alongside other factors, when medical decisions are 
made. However, producers of evidence-based recommendations must be 
clear about all factors that are considered and any value commitments that 
underlie the decision making process. This will allow users of evidence based 
medicine to be better informed about any conclusions that are reached. If 
evidence based medicine did abandon the hierarchies it could be argued that 
it was no longer ‘evidence based medicine’ because it had lost its 
characteristic feature. 
 
Hierarchies have clearly been influenced by a variety of factors that are 
independent of study design. This has been demonstrated by considering 
five factors in detail. It is also likely that other factors have influenced the 
development of hierarchies. These factors are important and should be 
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recognised when any conclusions that are derived using evidence based 
medicine are interpreted. It is not clear whether the hierarchies have naturally 
evolved to include these factors or they have been consciously manipulated 
to ensure the right sort of ‘evidence based’ conclusions. This may provide an 
interesting area for future research. 
 
In this thesis it has been argued that evidence based medicine is not science 
and may be pseudoscience. It is important to appreciate that pseudoscience 
can provide justification for knowledge claims and pseudoscience is not 
necessarily epistemically inferior to science in this respect. Evidence based 
medicine could therefore accept that it was pseudoscience but argue that 
knowledge claims were still justified. I would suggest that this approach is 
unlikely because the term pseudoscience has such negative perlocutionary 
force. Proponents of evidence based medicine are more likely to abandon 
any claim to be science in which case it is neither science nor 
pseudoscience.  
 
If evidence based medicine was accepted as pseudoscience there could be 
important implications for the control of professional jurisdiction and 
governance within medicine. There is an unresolved debate in the literature 
about whether evidence based medicine has strengthened or weakened the 
professional jurisdiction of the medical profession. Power relations within 
medicine are dynamic and complex and it is uncertain how the conclusions of 
this thesis, if accepted, will alter power relationships both within the medical 
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profession and between the medical profession, patients, regulators and 
purchasers of healthcare. Categorisation of evidence based medicine as 
pseudoscience would certainly be detrimental to the argument, presented by 
Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004), that the concept buttressed the medical 
profession by reinforcing the scientific character of medical practice. The 
potential impact of categorisation of evidence based medicine as 
pseudoscience on power relationships within medicine would be another 
interesting area of future research. 
 
This thesis has identified a number of problems with the epistemology of 
evidence based medicine. However, although it is easy to be critical of 
decision making within evidence based medicine, we do need to make 
decisions about medical care. It is also not clear that there are any 
alternatives to evidence based medicine at the present time. The analysis 
presented has drawn attention to the importance of value commitments and 
other factors that influence knowledge claims that are made using evidence 
based medicine. This improves our overall understanding of the concept and 
should make us more sceptical about any decisions that are justified using 
evidence based medicine.   
 
The aim of this thesis has been to improve understanding of evidence based 
medicine. I have argued that evidence based medicine is not science but this 
does not mean that knowledge claims should not inform medical decision 
making with medicine. Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are 
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not epistemically superior to other study designs but they do produce 
knowledge. In many circumstances these study designs will actually provide 
the strongest evidence to support medical decision making. If we accept that 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses can produce knowledge 
should it matter that this knowledge is justified in a non-scientific way? I 
therefore envisage that, although the arguments presented in this thesis may 
lead to a re-evaluation of evidence based medicine, they should have limited 
impact on the wider practice of medicine. 
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Appendix 1: Search Strategies used to identify Articles Considering the 
Epistemology of Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
Number Search Terms Results 
1 *Evidence-Based Medicine/ 24012 
2 *Evidence-Based Dentistry/ 521 
3 *Evidence-Based Nursing/ 2000 
4 *Evidence-Based Practice/ 3526 
5 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 30008 
6 *Philosophy/ 6389 
7 *Philosophy, Medical/ 5571 
8 *Knowledge/ 5149 
9 *Empiricism/ 137 
10 "epistemol*".ab,sh,ti. 3925 
11 logical positivism.ab,sh,ti. 42 
12 "falsification*".ab,sh,ti. 657 
13 popper.ab,kw,ti. 417 
14 "paradigm*".ab,sh,ti. 117177 
15 "Kuhn*".ab,sh,ti. 1464 
16 "research program*".ab,sh,ti. 8672 
17 lakatos.ab,sh,ti. 48 
18 rationalism.ab,sh,ti. 207 
19 
6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 
15 or 16 or 17 or 18 
147128 
20 5 and 19 889 
21 limit 20 to English language 771 
 
Table 6: Medline Search using the Ovid Interface 12/08/17 
 
 
Line Search Term Number of Hits 
1 SU.EXACT("Medicine") 9297 
2 SU.EXACT("philosophy of science") 4602 
3 1 AND 2 55 
 
Table 7: IBSS Search undertaken 16/04/13 
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Appendix 2: Search Strategies used to identify different Hierarchies of 
Evidence: 
 
 
Search Term Results 
1 *Evidence-Based Medicine/ 22020 
2 *Evidence-Based Dentistry/ 464 
3 *Evidence-Based Practice/ 2778 
4 *Evidence-Based Nursing/ 1604 
5 evidence based medicine.ab.ti.kw. 10664 
6 evidence based dentistry.ab.ti.kw. 455 
7 evidence based practice.ab.ti.kw. 7178 
8 evidence based nursing.ab.ti.kw. 639 
9 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 37664 
10 levels of evidence.ab.ti.kw. 5277 
11 hierarchy of evidence.ab.ti.kw. 235 
12 grading of evidence.ab.ti.kw. 177 
13 quality of evidence.ab.ti.kw. 7547 
14 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 13083 
15 9 and 14 1392 
16 limit 15 to (abstracts and English language) 1178 
 
Table 8: MEDLINE search strategy via the OVID interface (26/04/16) 
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Search Term Hits 
S1 Evidence based medicine 2749 
S2 Evidence based dentistry 150 
S3 Evidence based practice 29893 
S4 Evidence based nursing 5844 
S5 MM "Medical Practice, Evidence-Based" 3352 
S6 MM "Nursing Practice, Evidence-Based" 3237 
S7 MM "Professional Practice, Evidence-Based" 4304 
S8 MM "Evidence-Based Dental Practice" 6 
S9 
S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR 
S8 
31584 
S10 "level* of evidence" 5584 
S11 "grading of evidence" 137 
S12 "quality of evidence" 4042 
S13 "hierarchy of evidence" 130 
S14 S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 9235 
S15 S9 AND S14 2019 
S16 
Limiters: abstract available; English language; Peer 
reviewed; Exclude MEDLINE records 
332 
 
Table 9: CINAHL Search Strategy (19/01/12) 
"level* of evidence" ti.ab.kw 
OR "hierarchy of evidence" ti.ab.kw 
OR "grading of evidence" ti.ab.kw 
OR "quality of evidence" ti.ab.kw 
 
Table 10: Cochrane Methodology Register Search Strategy 
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Appendix 3: Hierarchies of Evidence listed in Chronological Order: 
 
 
1. Cochrane (1972): 
 
Level of Evidence Study design 
1 Randomised Controlled Trial 
2 Observational Study 
3 Clinical Opinion 
 
 
2. Canadian Task Force (Spitzer et al 1979): 
 
I Randomised controlled trial 
II-1 Cohort or case-control study 
II-2 Historical control 
III Expert opinion 
 
 
3. How to Read Clinical Journals (Trout 1981): 
 
Methodological Strength Study Design 
Strongest Randomised controlled trial 
 Cohort Study 
 Case-control Study  
Weakest Case Series 
 
 
4. American College of Chest Physicians (1986), (Sackett 1989):  
 
Level of 
Evidence 
Study Design 
I 
Randomised controlled trials with low alpha and beta errors 
(high power) 
II 
Randomised Controlled Trials with high alpha and beta 
errors (interesting but not significant, may be useful in 
future meta-analyses) 
III Non randomised concurrent cohort study 
IV Non randomised historical cohort comparison 
V Case series 
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5: Canadian Task Force Modification 1 (1989), (Goldbloom 1997): 
 
1 At least one randomised controlled trial 
2-1 Well-designed controlled trials without modification 
2-2 
Well-designed cohort or case-control analytic studies preferably 
from more than one centre or group 
2-3 Multiple time series with or without intervention 
3 Expert opinion, clinical experience or descriptive studies 
 
 
6. American College of Chest Physicians (modification 1), (Cook et al 1992):  
 
LOE Definition 
I 
Results come from a single RCT92 in which the lower limit of the 
confidence interval for the treatment effect exceeds the minimal 
clinically important benefit 
I+ 
Results come from a meta-analysis of RCTs in which the treatment 
effects from individual studies are consistent, and the lower limit of 
the confidence interval for the treatment effect exceeds the minimal 
clinically important benefit 
I- 
Results come from a meta-analysis of RCTs in which the treatment 
effects from individual studies are widely disparate, but the lower 
limit of the confidence interval for the treatment effect still exceeds 
the minimal clinically important benefit 
II 
Results come from a single RCT in which the confidence interval 
for the treatment effect overlaps the minimal clinically important 
benefit 
II+ 
Results come from a meta-analysis of RCTs in which the treatment 
effects from individual studies are consistent and the confidence 
interval for the treatment effect overlaps the minimal clinically 
important benefit 
II- 
Results come from a meta-analysis of RCTs in which the treatment 
effects from individual studies are widely disparate and the 
confidence interval for the treatment effect overlaps the minimal 
clinically important benefit 
III Results come from non-randomised concurrent cohort studies 
IV Results come from non-randomised historic cohort studies 
V Results come from case series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92
 RCT = Randomised controlled trial. 
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7. American Association of Critical Care Nurses (1993), (Armola et al 2009): 
 
Level Description 
I Manufacturers recommendation only 
II 
Theory based, no research data to support recommendations; 
recommendations from expert consensus groups may exist 
III 
Laboratory data only, no clinical data to support 
recommendations 
IV Limited clinical studies to support recommendations 
V 
Clinical studies in more than 1 or 2 different populations and 
situations to support recommendations 
VI 
Clinical studies in a variety of populations of patients and 
situations to support recommendations 
 
 
8. Canadian Hypertension Society (Carruthers et al 1993): 
 
Level Criteria 
I 
A randomised controlled trial (RCT) that demonstrates a statistically 
significant difference in at least one important outcome e.g. survival 
or major illness OR if the difference is not statistically significant, an 
RCT of adequate sample size to exclude a 25% difference in relative 
risk with 80% power, given the observed results.  
II An RCT that does not meet level I criteria. 
III 
A non-randomised trial with contemporaneous controls selected by 
some systematic method (i.e. not selected by perceived suitability for 
one of the treatment options for individual patients) OR Subgroup 
analysis of a randomised trial. 
IV 
A before-after study or case series (of at least 10 patients) with 
historical controls or controls drawn from other studies. 
V Case series (at least 10 patients) without controls. 
VI Case report (fewer than 10 patients). 
 
 
9. Infectious Diseases Society of America (Gross et al 1994): 
 
 
Quality of 
Evidence 
Definition 
I Evidence from 1+ properly randomised, controlled trial 
II 
Evidence from 1+ well designed clinical trial without 
randomisation, from cohort or case-controlled analytic 
studies (preferably 1+) , from multiple time series or dramatic 
results from uncontrolled experiments 
III 
Evidence from opinions of respected authorities, based on 
clinical experience, descriptive studies or reports of expert 
committees 
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10. Braunwald et al (1994): 
 
Strength of 
Evidence 
Definition 
A Randomised controlled trials 
B Well-designed clinical studies 
C 
Panel consensus, studies with 
methodological deficiencies 
 
 
11. Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (Guyatt et al 1995): 
 
 
Level of 
Evidence 
Definition 
A1 
Randomised controlled trials, no heterogeneity, confidence 
intervals all on one side of threshold number need to treat. 
A2 
Randomised controlled trials, no heterogeneity, confidence 
intervals overlap threshold number needed to treat. 
B1 
Randomised controlled trials, heterogeneity, confidence 
intervals all on one side of threshold number needed to treat. 
B2 
Randomised controlled trials, heterogeneity, confidence 
intervals overlap threshold number needed to treat. 
C1 
Observational studies, confidence intervals all on one side of 
threshold number needed to treat. 
C2 
Observational studies, confidence intervals overlap threshold 
number needed to treat. 
 
 
12. Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (1995), (Gugiu 
and Gugiu 2010): 
 
LOE Definition 
I 
Evidence obtained from a systematic review of all relevant 
randomised controlled trials. 
II Evidence obtained from at least one properly designed RCT. 
III-1 
Evidence obtained from well-designed pseudo-randomised 
controlled trial (alternate allocation or some other method). 
III-2 
Evidence obtained from comparative studies (including a 
systematic review of these studies) with concurrent controls and 
allocation not randomised, cohort studies, case-control studies or 
interrupted time series with a control group. 
III-3 
Evidence obtained from comparative studies with historical 
control, two or more single arm studies, or interrupted time series 
without a parallel control group. 
IV 
Evidence obtained from case series, either post-test or pre-
test/post-test. 
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13. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (Hadorn et al 1996): 
 
LOE Definition 
1 
Supportive evidence from well conducted randomised 
controlled trials that included 100 patients or more 
A Evidence from a well conducted multicentre trial 
B 
Evidence from a meta-analysis that incorporated quality ratings 
in the analysis and included a total of 100 patients in its 
estimate of effect size and confidence intervals. 
2 
Supportive evidence from well conducted randomised 
controlled trials that included fewer than 100 patients  
A Evidence from a well conducted trial at one or more institution 
B 
Evidence from a meta-analysis that incorporated quality ratings 
in the analysis and included fewer than 100 patients in its 
estimate of effect size and confidence intervals. 
3 Supportive evidence from well conducted cohort studies 
A 
Evidence from a well conducted prospective cohort study or 
registry 
B Evidence from a well-conducted retrospective cohort study 
C 
Evidence from a well conducted meta-analysis of cohort 
studies 
4 Supportive evidence from a well conducted case-control study 
5 
Supportive evidence from poorly controlled or uncontrolled 
studies 
A 
Evidence from a randomised controlled trial with one or more 
major or three or more minor methodological flaws that could 
invalidate the results 
B 
Evidence from observational studies with a high potential for 
bias (such as a case series with comparison to historical 
controls) 
6 
Conflicting evidence with the weight of evidence supporting the 
recommendation 
7 Expert opinion 
 
 
14. EUR-ASSESS (Granados et al 1997):  
 
 
Level of 
Evidence 
Definition 
1 
Strong: based on empirical evidence, including 
experimental and quasi-experimental data 
2 Moderate: clear consensus among committee members 
3 
Weak: insufficient evidence, but viewed worth considering 
by committee members 
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15. American College of Chest Physicians (modification 2), (Guyatt et al 
1998):  
 
LOE Study design Explanation 
A 
Randomised controlled 
trials, no heterogeneity 
Methods strong, results 
consistent 
B 
Randomised controlled 
trials, heterogeneity present 
Methods strong, result 
inconsistent 
C Observational studies Methods weak 
 
 
16. Djulbegovic and Hadley (1998): 
 
Level of 
Evidence 
Description Relative 
Strength 
Level I 
Well-designed prospective randomised 
controlled trial 
5 
Level II A single arm, prospective study 3 
Level III Retrospective/anecdotal data 1 
 
 
17. Canadian Diabetes Association (Meltzer et al 1998): 
 
Level Criteria 
1+ 
Systematic overview or meta-analysis of randomised 
controlled trials 
1 1 randomised controlled trial with adequate power 
2+ 
Systematic overview or meta-analysis of level 2 randomised 
controlled trials 
2 RCT that does not meet level 1 criteria 
3 Non randomised clinical trial or cohort study 
4 
Before-after study, cohort study with non-contemporaneous 
controls, case-control study 
5 Case series without controls 
6 Case report or case series of <10 patients 
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18. Stetler et al (1998): 
 
Level Type of Evidence 
I Meta-analysis of controlled studies 
II Individual experimental studies 
III 
Quasi-experimental studies such as non-randomised 
controlled single group, pre-post, cohort, time series or 
matched case-controlled studies 
IV 
Non-experimental studies such as comparative and 
correlational descriptive research as well as qualitative 
studies 
V 
Program evaluation, research utilisation or quality 
improvement projects or case reports 
VI 
Opinions of respected authorities or an expert committee 
including their interpretation of non-research based 
information 
 
 
19. Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network (1998), (Harbour and Miller 
2001): 
 
LOE Definition 
1++ 
High quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or 
RCTs with a very low risk of bias 
1+ 
Well-conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or 
RCTs with a low risk of bias 
1- 
Meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or RCTs with a high 
risk of bias 
2++ 
High quality systematic reviews of case control or cohort 
studies. High quality case control or cohort studies with a 
very low risk of confounding or bias and a high probability 
that the relationship is causal 
2+ 
Well-conducted case control or cohort studies with a low 
risk of confounding or bias and a moderate probability that 
the relationship is causal 
2- 
Case control or cohort studies with a high risk of 
confounding or bias and a significant risk that the 
relationship is not causal 
3 Non-analytic studies, e.g. case reports, case series 
4 Expert opinion 
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20. Oxford Levels of Evidence (1999), (Ball and Phillips 2001) – Therapy, 
prevention, aetiology and harm hierarchy only: 
 
Level Definition 
1a SR93 (with homogeneity) of RCTs 
1b Individual RCT (with narrow confidence interval) 
1c All or none study 
2a SR (with homogeneity) of cohort studies 
2b 
Individual cohort study (including low quality RCT e.g. 
<80% follow-up) 
2c Outcomes research 
3a SR (with homogeneity) of case control studies 
3b Individual case-control study 
4 
Case-series (and poor quality cohort and case-control 
studies) 
5 
Expert opinion without explicit critical appraisal, or based 
on physiology, bench research or 'first principles' 
 
 
21. American Academy of Ophthalmology (Wilkinson 1999): 
 
 
Level Definition 
I 
Data that provided strong evidence in support of the 
recommendation. The design of the study addressed the issue in 
question and the study was performed in the population of 
interest and executed in a manner that ensured production of 
accurate and reliable data, using appropriate statistical methods 
II 
Data that provided substantial evidence in support of the 
recommendation. The study had selected attributes of Level I 
support but lacked one or more of the components of Level I 
III 
Consensus of opinion in the absence of evidence that met Levels 
I and II 
 
 
22. Chestnut et al (1999): 
 
Class Definition 
I Properly designed randomised controlled trials 
II a 
Randomised controlled trials that contain design flaws e.g. 
failure to blind or lack of follow up data. Multi-centre or 
population based longitudinal cohort studies 
II b 
Non-randomised controlled trials. Case-control studies. Case 
series with adequate description of the patient population, 
interventions and outcomes measured 
III 
Descriptive studies (uncontrolled case series). Expert opinion. 
Case reports. Clinical experience. 
                                                          
93
 SR = Systematic review. 
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23. Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (modification 1), (Guyatt et al 
2000): 
 
n-of-1 randomised trial 
Systematic Review of randomised trials 
Single randomised trial 
Systematic review of observational studies addressing patient 
important outcomes 
Single observational study addressing patient important 
outcomes 
Physiologic study 
Unsystematic clinical observation 
 
 
24. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Guidelines (American Heart Association 
2000): 
 
 
Evidence Level Definition 
1. Positive 
RCTs (p<0.05) 
A prospective RCT. Concluding that new treatment 
significantly better (or worse) than control treatment 
2. Neutral 
RCTs (non-
significant) 
An RCT concluding new treatment no better than 
control treatment 
3. Prospective, 
non-random 
Non-randomised prospective observational study of 
a group that uses new treatment. Must have a 
control group for comparison 
4. 
Retrospective, 
non-random 
Non-randomised retrospective observational study 
where one group uses new treatment. Must have a 
control group for comparison 
5. Case series 
Series of patients received new treatment in past or 
will receive in future 
6. Animal 
studies (A and 
B) 
Studies using animals or mechanical models. A level 
studies are higher than B level studies 
7. 
Extrapolations 
Reasonable extrapolations from existing data or data 
gathered for other purposes; quasi-experimental 
designs 
8. Rational 
conjecture, 
common sense 
Fits with common sense; has face validity; applies to 
many non-evidence based guidelines that "made 
sense". No evidence of harm 
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25. Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (Greer et al 2000): 
 
A Randomised Controlled Trial 
B Cohort study 
C 
Case-control study, non-randomised study with concurrent or 
historical control, population based study or study of the 
sensitivity/specificity of a diagnostic test 
D Cross-sectional study, case series or case report 
 
 
26. United States Task Force on Community Preventive Services (Briss et al 
2000):  
 
 
Suitability Attributes 
Greatest 
Concurrent comparison groups and prospective 
measurement of exposure and outcome 
Moderate 
All retrospective designs or multiple pre or post 
measurements but no concurrent comparison group 
Least 
Single pre and post measurements and no concurrent 
comparison group or exposure and outcome measured 
in single group at the same point in time 
 
 
27. American College of Chest Physicians modification 3 (Guyatt et al 2001): 
 
 
Grade Methodological Strength of Supporting Evidence 
1A RCTs without important limitations 
1C+ 
No RCTs but strong RCT results can be unequivocally 
extrapolated, or overwhelming evidence from 
observational studies 
1B 
RCTs with important limitations (inconsistent results, 
methodological flaws) 
1C Observational studies 
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28. Stetler (modification 1), (2001), (Hooper et al 2009): 
 
 
Level of 
Evidence Strength of Individual External Evidence 
I 
Systematic statistical review of multiple controlled studies 
(e.g. meta-analysis) 
II 
Systematic interpretive, tabular integrative review of 
multiple studies, primarily of quantitative research 
III 
Experimental studies, may be called randomised 
controlled trials 
IV 
Quasi-experimental studies, such as non-randomised 
control group studies or interventional time series 
V 
Systematic interpretive, tabular integrative review of 
multiple studies, primarily of qualitative research 
VI 
Non-experimental studies such as correlational and 
descriptive research, as well as qualitative research or 
systematically designed case studies 
VII 
Systematically obtained, verifiable quality or program 
evaluation data from the literature 
VIII 
Consensus opinion of respected authorities (e.g. a 
nationally known guideline group) 
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29. World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry (Bandelow et al 
2002):  
 
Category 
of 
Evidence Definition 
A Positive evidence 
  
2 or more randomised double blind studies showing 
superiority to placebo AND one or more positive double 
blind study showing superiority to or equivalent efficacy as 
established comparator drug. In case of negative existing 
studies (studies showing non superiority to placebo or 
inferiority to comparator drug) these must be outweighed by 
at least two more positive studies. Studies must fulfil 
established methodological criteria. 
B Preliminary positive evidence. 
B1 
One or more randomised double-blind study showing 
superiority to placebo and no negative studies. 
B2 
One or more positive naturalistic open studies and no 
negative studies. 
B3 
One or more positive case reports and no negative studies 
exist. 
C Inconsistent results. 
  
Controlled positive studies are outweighed by an 
approximate equal number of negative studies. 
D Negative evidence. 
  
The majority of controlled studies show non superiority to 
placebo or inferiority to comparator drug. 
F Lack of evidence. 
  
Adequate studies providing efficacy or non-efficacy are 
lacking. 
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30. Evans (2003): 
 
 
Effectiveness Appropriateness Feasibility 
Excellent 
Systematic 
Review 
Systematic 
Review 
Systematic 
Review 
  
Multi-centre 
randomised 
controlled trials 
Multi-centre 
randomised 
controlled trials 
Multi-centre 
randomised 
controlled trials 
Good 
Randomised 
controlled trial 
Randomised 
controlled trial 
Randomised 
controlled trial 
  
Observational 
studies 
Observational 
studies 
Observational 
studies 
    
Interpretive 
studies 
Interpretive 
studies 
Fair 
Uncontrolled 
studies with 
dramatic results 
Descriptive 
studies 
Descriptive 
studies 
  
Before and after 
studies 
Focus groups Action research 
  
Non-
randomised 
controlled trials 
  Before and after 
studies 
      Focus groups 
Poor 
Descriptive 
studies Expert opinion Expert opinion 
  Case studies Case studies Case studies 
  
Expert opinion Studies of poor 
methodological 
quality 
Studies of poor 
methodological 
quality 
  
Studies of poor 
methodological 
quality     
 
 
31. Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy (Ebell et al 2004): 
 
 
Level 
1 
Systematic review or meta-analysis with consistent findings. High 
quality individual randomised controlled trial with allocation 
concealment, blinding if possible, intention to treat analysis, 
adequate statistical power and adequate loss to follow up or ‘all or 
none’ study.  
Level 
2 
Systematic review of lower quality clinical trials or studies with 
inconsistent findings, lower quality clinical trial, cohort study or 
case control study. 
Level 
3 
Consensus guidelines, extrapolations from bench research, usual 
practice, opinion, disease orientated evidence (surrogate 
outcomes), or case series for studies of diagnosis, treatment, 
prevention or screening. 
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32. Grading of Recommendations Assessment Development and Evaluation 
(2004), (Brozek et al 2009): 
 
Quality of 
Evidence 
Definition 
High 
Further research is very unlikely to change our 
confidence in the estimate of effect 
Moderate 
Further research is likely to have an important impact on 
our confidence in the estimate of effect and may change 
the estimate 
Low 
Further research is very likely to have an important 
impact on our confidence in the estimate of effect and is 
likely to change the estimate 
Very Low Any estimate of effect is very uncertain 
 
 
33. Joanna Briggs Institute for Nursing (2005), (Joanna Briggs Institute 
2011): 
 
LOE Effectiveness 
1 
Meta-analysis (with homogeneity) of experimental 
studies (e.g. RCT with concealed randomisation) OR 
one or more large experimental studies with narrow 
confidence intervals 
2 
One or more smaller RCTs with wider confidence 
intervals OR quasi-experimental studies (without 
randomisation) 
3 
A. Cohort studies. B. Case-control studies. C. 
Observational studies without control group 
4 
Expert opinion or physiology, bench research or 
consensus 
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34. Oncology Nursing Society Putting Evidence into Practice Weight of 
Evidence Classification Schema (Mitchell and Friese 2007): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommended 
for Practice 
Supportive evidence from at least two well conducted randomised controlled trials that 
were performed at more than one institutional site and that included a sample size of at 
least 100 participants 
  
Evidence from a meta-analysis or systematic review of research studies that 
incorporated quality ratings in the analysis, and included a total of 100 patients or more 
in its estimate of effect size and confidence intervals 
  Recommendations from a panel of experts, that derive from an explicit literature search strategy, and include thorough analysis, quality rating and synthesis of evidence 
Likely to be 
Effective 
Supportive evidence from a single well conducted randomised controlled trial that 
included fewer than 100 patients or was conducted at more than one institutions 
  
Evidence from a meta-analysis or systematic review of research studies that 
incorporated quality ratings in the analysis, and included fewer than 100 patients or 
had no estimates of effect size and confidence intervals 
  
Evidence from a synthetic review of randomised controlled trials that incorporated 
quality ratings in the analysis 
  
Guidelines developed largely by consensus/opinion rather than primarily based on 
evidence and published by a panel of experts, that are not supported by synthesis and 
quality rating of the evidence 
Benefits 
Balanced with 
Harms 
Supportive evidence from one or more randomised trials, meta-analyses or systematic 
reviews, but where the intervention may be associated, in certain patient populations, 
with adverse effects that produce or potentially produce mortality, significant morbidity, 
functional disability, hospitalisation or excess length of stay 
Effectiveness 
not 
Established 
Supportive evidence from a well conducted case control study 
  
Supportive evidence from a poorly controlled or uncontrolled study. Evidence from 
randomised clinical trials with one or more major flaws or three or more minor 
methodological flaws, Evidence from non-experimental studies with high potential for 
bias (such as case series with comparison to historical controls). Evidence from case 
series or case reports. 
  
Conflicting evidence, but where the preponderance of the evidence is in support of the 
recommendation or meta-analysis showing a trend that did not reach statistical 
significance 
Effectiveness 
Unlikely 
Evidence from a single well conducted randomised controlled trial with at least 100 
participants or conducted at more than one site and which showed no benefit for the 
intervention 
  
Evidence from a well conducted case control study, a poorly controlled or uncontrolled 
study, a randomised trial with major methodological flaws, or an observational study 
(e.g. case series with historical controls) that showed no benefit and a prominent and 
unacceptable pattern of adverse effects and serious toxicities 
Not 
Recommended 
for Practice 
Supportive evidence from two or more well conducted randomised controlled trials with 
at least 100 participants or conducted at more than one site which showed no benefit 
for the intervention and excessive costs or burdens expected 
  Evidence from a well conducted trial that showed a prominent and unacceptable pattern of adverse events and serious toxicities 
  
Evidence from a meta-analysis or systematic review of research studies that 
incorporated quality ratings in the analysis, included a total of 100 patients or more in 
its estimate of effect size and confidence intervals with demonstrated lack of benefit or 
prominent and unacceptable toxicities 
  
Intervention discouraged from use by a panel of experts in the related subject, after 
conducting a systematic examination, quality rating and synthesis of the available 
evidence 
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35. John Hopkins Evidence Rating Scale (Newhouse et al 2007):  
 
 
Evidence 
Level 
Definition 
I RCT or systematic review of RCTs (with or without meta-
analysis) 
II Quasi-experimental study or systematic review of quasi-
experimental studies (with or without meta-analysis) 
III Non-experimental study (or systematic review of non-
experimental studies), qualitative study or meta-synthesis 
IV Opinion of nationally recognised experts based upon 
research evidence or expert consensus panel e.g. clinical 
guidelines 
V Opinion of individual expert based on non-research 
evidence (includes case studies, narrative reviews, quality 
improvement projects, personal experience/expertise) 
 
 
36. American Association of Critical Care Nurses modification 1(2008), 
(Armola et al 2009): 
 
 
Level Description 
A 
Meta-analysis of multiple controlled studies or meta-synthesis 
of qualitative studies with results that consistently support a 
specific action, intervention or treatment. 
B 
Well-designed controlled trials, both randomised and non-
randomised, with results that consistently support a specific 
action, intervention or treatment. 
C 
Qualitative studies, descriptive or correlational studies, 
integrative reviews, systematic reviews or randomised 
controlled trials with inconsistent results. 
D 
Peer-reviewed professional organisational standards with 
clinical studies to support recommendations. 
E 
Theory based evidence from expert opinion or multiple case 
reports. 
M Manufacturer’s recommendation only. 
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37. Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (modification 
1), (Merlin et al 2009): 
 
Level Intervention 
I A Systematic Review of Level II Studies 
II A Randomised Controlled Trial 
III-1 
A Pseudo-randomised Controlled Trial (i.e. alternate 
allocation or some other method) 
III-2 
A Comparative Study with concurrent controls: non 
randomised experimental trial, cohort study, case-control 
study, interrupted time series with a control group 
III-3 
A comparative study without concurrent controls: historical 
control study, two or more single arm studies, interrupted 
time series without a parallel control group 
IV 
Case series with either post-test or pre-test/post-test 
outcomes 
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38. World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry (modification 1), 
(Grunze et al 2009): 
 
 
Category of 
Evidence Definition 
A Full evidence from controlled studies is based on: 
 2 or more double blind, parallel group randomised controlled trials 
showing superiority to placebo (or in the case of psychotherapy 
studies, superiority to a 'psychological placebo' with adequate 
blinding) and one or more randomised controlled trials showing 
superiority or equivalent efficacy with established comparator 
treatment in a three arm study with placebo control or in a well 
powered non-inferiority trial (only required if such a treatment 
exists). In case of negative existing studies (studies showing non 
superiority to placebo or inferiority to comparator treatment) these 
must be outweighed with at least two more positive studies or a 
meta-analysis of all available studies showing superiority to 
placebo and non-inferiority to a comparator treatment. Studies 
must fulfil established methodological criteria. The decision is 
based on the primary efficacy measure. 
B Limited positive evidence from controlled studies is based on: 
 1 or more randomised controlled trial showing superiority to 
placebo (or in the case of psychotherapy studies superiority to a 
"psychological placebo". A randomised controlled comparison 
with a standard treatment without placebo control with a sample 
size sufficient for a non-inferiority trial. In case of negative existing 
studies (studies showing non superiority to placebo or inferiority to 
comparator treatment) these must be outweighed by at least one 
more positive studies or a meta-analysis of all available studies 
showing superiority to placebo or at least one more randomised 
controlled comparison showing non inferiority to an established 
comparator treatment. 
C1 Evidence from uncontrolled studies is based on: 
 One or more positive naturalistic studies (with a minimum of 5 
evaluable patients) or a comparison with a reference drug with a 
sample size insufficient for a non-inferiority trial and no negative 
controlled studies exist 
C2 Evidence from case reports is based on:  
 One or more positive case reports and no negative controlled 
studies exist 
C3 Based on the opinion of experts in the field or clinical expertise 
D Inconsistent results 
 Positive randomised controlled trials are outweighed by an 
approximate equal number of negative studies 
E Negative evidence 
 The majority of randomised controlled trials or exploratory studies 
show non superiority to placebo (or in the case of psychotherapy 
studies superiority to a "psychological placebo") or inferiority to 
comparator treatment 
F Lack of evidence 
 Adequate studies providing efficacy or non-efficacy are lacking 
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39. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Guidelines modification 1(Sayre et al 
2010): 
 
LOE Intervention studies 
1 
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) or meta-analyses of 
RCTs 
2 
Studies using concurrent controls without true 
randomisation (e.g. pseudo-randomised) 
3 Studies using retrospective controls 
4 Studies without a control group (e.g. case series) 
5 
Studies not directly related to the specific patient/population 
(e.g. different patient/population. Animal models, 
mechanical models etc.) or expert opinion 
 
 
 
 
 
40. Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine (modification 1), (Howick et 
al 2011) 
 
Level Description 
1 Systematic review of randomised trials or n-of-1 trials 
2 Randomised trial of observational study with dramatic effect 
3 Non-randomised controlled cohort/follow-up study 
4 
Case-series, case-control studies or historically controlled 
studies 
5 Mechanism based reasoning 
 
 
41. Research Pyramid Experimental Research Face (Tomlin and Borgetto 
2011): 
 
Level Definition 
1 Meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials 
2 Randomised controlled trial 
3 Controlled clinical trial 
4 Single-subject study 
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42. HEAL system (Gugiu 2015): 
 
 
                                                          
94
 ECT = Equivalent controlled trial. 
Research 
Design Grade Description 
Randomised 
controlled trial 
A 
A well conducted RCT free of bias or confounding factors in 
which the randomisation process is able to ensure the 
equivalence of the treatment and control groups beyond 
statistical chance. 
  
B 
A RCT with a flawed randomisation process but which properly 
used an ECT94 method for ensuring the equivalence of the 
treatment and control groups beyond a reasonable doubt. 
  
C 
A RCT with a flawed randomisation process, which cannot 
ensure the equivalence of the treatment and control groups 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, a cohort RCT that 
failed to show the population from which the samples were 
drawn remained stable over time. 
  
D 
An RCT with one or more fatal flaws (a number of these are 
listed). 
Pseudo-RCT, 
matched 
comparison, 
stratified 
random 
sampling, 
paired 
comparison, 
regression 
discontinuity B 
A well conducted Equivalent Controlled Trial that demonstrated 
the statistical equivalence of the treatment and control groups 
on key baseline variables or the pre-post regression model. 
  
C 
An Equivalent Controlled Trial which demonstrated baseline 
differences on key variables or that did not employ an adequate 
number of covariates, pairing or strata variables to sufficiently 
remove reasonable doubt regarding the statistical equivalence 
of the treatment and control groups on key baseline variables or 
a regression discontinuity design that failed to demonstrate the 
equivalence of the pre-post regression model. Alternatively a 
cohort ECT that did not demonstrate the population from which 
the samples were drawn remained stable over time.   
  D An ECT with one or more fatal flaws. 
Cohort study, 
case-control 
C 
A controlled study that did not adequately establish the 
equivalence of the treatment and control groups beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
  D A Non-Equivalent Controlled Trial with one or more fatal flaws. 
Before-after, 
case series 
D 
Any study that did not employ a controlled comparison between 
two or more groups, including RCT, ECT and non-ECT studies 
that did not employ a true comparison group (i.e. compared two 
treatments against each other but not against a treatment as 
usual group).  
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Appendix 4: Eccles and Mason (2001) Hierarchy of Evidence  
 
 
Level Definition 
I a 
Evidence from meta-analysis of randomised controlled 
trials 
I b Evidence from at least one randomised controlled trial 
II a 
Evidence from at least one controlled study without 
randomisation 
II b 
Evidence from at least one other type of quasi-
experimental study 
III 
Evidence from non-experimental descriptive studies, such 
as comparative studies, correlation studies and case-
control studies 
IV 
Evidence from expert committee reports or opinions 
and/or clinical experience of respected authorities 
 
